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The California Supreme Court Survey
A Review of Decisions:
December 1982-March 1983
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent deci-
sions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to supply the
reader with a basic understanding of the issues involved in the decisions,
as well as to serve as a starting point for researching any of the topical
areas. The scope and format of the survey has been modified to provide the
reader with analysis of every decision rendered by the supreme court dur-
ing the period which is covered by the survey.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. In an expulsion proceeding, a student, pursuant to
the Education Code, must be allowed to confront or
question adverse witnesses unless disclosure of the
witnesses' identity would subject them to a
significant risk of harm: John A. v. San Bernardino
City Unified School District.
I. INTRODUCTION
In John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School District,' a
high school student who was expelled after an administrative
hearing claimed that his due process rights were violated during
the hearing. This claim was based on the fact that he was not al-
lowed to confront or question the witnesses testifying against
him. The supreme court determined that this was a violation of
1. 33 Cal. 3d 301, 654 P.2d 242, 187 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1982), as corrected (Jan. 2,
1983).
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Education Code2 requirements and, therefore, did not address the
alleged due process violations.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After a freshman football game at San Bernardino High School,
John A. and a number of team members became involved in a
fight. No school officials witnessed the fight; however, a vice-prin-
cipal later investigated the incident.
Acting on the vice-principal's findings, the high school principal
recommended that John A. be expelled. A hearing was scheduled
to consider the matter. Appellant's mother received a hearing no-
tice which stated that appellant would be allowed to participate in
the hearing, could present evidence, and could bring an advisor or
attorney to the proceedings. 3
The hearing was conducted by a three-member panel "com-
posed of certificated employees of the district who were not em-
ployed at the high school attended by [appellant] ."4 During the
hearing, appellant was questioned about this incident as well as
his attendance record and an incident in which appellant was re-
ported to have hit another student in class.
Neither the witnesses to the fight nor the two boys allegedly in-
jured by appellant testified at the hearing. Affidavits describing
the incident were offered as evidence in place of the boys' testi-
mony. The affidavits and appellant's testimony contained varying
descriptions of the incident. The two injured boys and several
witnesses claimed that appellant and several others chased the
two boys (those allegedly injured) and that appellant and one
other had struck and kicked them.
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48914 (West Supp. 1983).
3. The notice included information required by statute:
[D]ate and place of the hearing; a statement of the specific facts and
charges upon which the proposed expulsion is based, a copy of all the
rules of the district which pertain to discipline adopted pursuant to Sec-
tion 35291, and the opportunity of the pupil or the pupil's parent or guard-
ian to appear in person or to employ and be represented by counsel,
inspect and obtain copies of all documents to be used at the hearing, con-
front and question all witnesses who testify at the hearing, question all
other evidence presented, and present oral and documentary evidence on
the pupil's behalf, including witnesses.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48914(b) (West Supp. 1983).
4. 33 Cal. 3d at 305, 654 P.2d at 244, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 474. Section 48914(d) re-
quires the three panel members to be certificated employees of the district who
are not employed at the school attended by the pupil. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48914(d)
(West Supp. 1983).
The fight was stopped by other students and the police were
called. Appellant admitted that he had held one of the boys but
denied hitting him, claiming he was simply "play boxing." The
vice-principal who interviewed the injured boys saw no apparent
injuries but was convinced that they were "in pain at the time of
the fight."5
The panel found that appellant and one other student attacked
the two boys without provocation and recommended expulsion
for the remaining six and one-half months of the school year.6
These findings were adopted by the school board and appellant
was expelled. The school board's decision was affirmed by the
county board of education.
Appellant filed a petition for mandamus claiming violations of
his procedural due process rights. The district countered by argu-
ing that in the interest of student safety, schools should be al-
lowed to discipline violent students without giving them an
opportunity to face their accusers. The district claimed that to re-
quire such a confrontation would make students reluctant to co-
operate for fear of retaliation.7 The court found the panel's
decision to be supported by the weight of the evidence and the
petition was denied.
On appeal, appellant again claimed that he had a right to con-
front and cross-examine the witnesses against him and that the
board's failure to honor this right renders his expulsion invalid.8
III. ANALYSis
A. The Board's Compliance with Statutory Requirements
The statutory scheme prescribes the procedure by which a stu-
dent may be expelled.9 A principal may recommend expulsion,
and a hearing on the matter should be held within twenty days of
the recommendation.10 The hearing is conducted by the school
5. 33 Cal. 3d at 306, 654 P.2d at 245, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
6. The panel also recommended that plaintiff be readmitted if a licensed ther-
apist wrote the board a letter "indicating satisfactory involvement in a counseling
program." Id.
7. As evidence of this claim, administrators told of instances of harassment
and of witnesses being forced to change schools for their safety. Id.
8. Id. at 306, 654 P.2d at 245, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 476. Appellee claimed that ap-
pellant's appeal was rendered moot by his readmission to school. The court
stated, however, that the issue of process due an expelled student is an important
issue of continuing public interest which will likely recur. As such, this case falls
within the exception to the general mootness rule. Id. at 307, 654 P.2d at 246, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 476.
9. Each school district is free to establish its own rules, but they must in-
clude the statutory requirements. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48914 (West Supp. 1983).
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48904.5, 48914(a) (West Supp. 1983).
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board, a hearing officer, or an "impartial administrative panel.""
If expulsion is recommended, a hearing officer or administrative
panel must submit findings of fact and recommendations to the
board.12
The primary issue presented on appeal related to the statute's
requirements regarding confrontation of witnesses and evidence
presented at expulsion hearings. The statute provides a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify at the hearing13
and allows evidence to "be admitted and given probative effect
only if it is the kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons
are accustomed to rely, in the conduct of serious affairs." 14 The
board's decision must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 5
The evidence presented in the vice principal's report, written
affidavits and appellant's testimony, was in "sharp dispute."' 6 In
such cases of conflicting evidence, the reasonable person would
not rely on written statements but would "demand that witnesses
be produced so that their credibility may be tested and their testi-
mony weighed.' 7 Affiants should be required to testify when
they are readily available and there is "no substantial reason why
their testimony may not be produced."' 8 Here, there was no ap-
parent reason for the affiants' failure to testify.
The board unsuccessfully argued that the witnesses in this case
were not present due to a risk of retaliation. The court stated that
when the identification of a witness would expose him to a "sig-
nificant and specific risk of harm," the board may properly rely on
statements and reports.' 9 However, there was no showing in this
case that there was any risk of harm to the witnesses. The board,
therefore, failed to establish cause for appellant's expulsion by
the preponderance of evidence required by statute.20
11. Id. at § 48914(d) (West Supp. 1983).
12. Id.
13. Id. at § 48914(b) (West Supp. 1983).
14. Id. at § 48914(f) (West Supp. 1983).
15. Id.
16. 33 Cal. 3d at 308, 654 P.2d at 246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
17. Id. at 307, 654 P.2d at 246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
18. Id. at 307-08, 654 P.2d at 246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 476. The court also pointed
out that administrative reports such as the vice-principal's report in this case were
not to be relied upon in cases of conflicting evidence when witnesses are readily
available. Id. at 308, 654 P.2d at 246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
19. Id. In such cases, Witnesses are not readily available.
20. Id. at 308, 654 P.2d at 247, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
B. Impartiality of the Administrative Panel
Appellant also questioned the impartiality of the administrative
panel who heard his case. Although the composition of the panel
followed the guidelines provided in the statute,21 appellant
claimed that "teachers have a built-in bias in disciplinary matters
against students"22 which prevents them from rendering a fair
decision.
Although the appellant does have a right to an impartial trier of
fact, this right is "not synonymous with the claimed right to a
trier completely indifferent to the general subject matter of the
claim before him."23 The court pointed out that teachers probably
do have general disciplinary views which would be considered ad-
verse to the student. This does not, however, present a ground for
disqualification, nor does a teacher's participation on an adminis-
trative panel result in a denial of due process. 24
C. Other Arguments
Appellant also argued that the questions asked by the panel ev-
idenced bias against him. The court, however, found no bias evi-
denced in the panel's proceedings. He further argued that the
hearing notice should have advised him of the availability of free
legal aid. The court held that the notice of hearing sent to appel-
lant was sufficient.25
IV. CONCLUSION
Appellant asserted that he had been denied due process in an
administrative hearing in violation of the state and federal consti-
tutions. The court did not address this issue, holding that appel-
lant did not receive the level of process required by statute. A
student recommended for expulsion is entitled, by statute, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses who have presented testimony
against him. This requirement is dispensed with only when the
21. The panel members were certificated employees of the district who were
not employed at appellant's school. Id. at 305, 654 P.2d at 244, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
This complies with the statutory requirements. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48914(d)
(West Supp. 1983).
22. 33 Cal. 3d at 308, 654 P.2d at 247, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
23. This distinction was made in Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.,
28 Cal. 3d 781, 623 P.2d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1981) (temporary administrative law
officer properly refused to disqualify himself in unfair labor practice hearings
against agricultural employers although his law firm regularly represented Span-
ish-surnamed persons against agricultural employers).
24. 33 Cal. 3d at 309, 654 P.2d at 247, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
25. Id. at 309-10, 654 P.2d at 247-48, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
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witness' presence is not readily available or when there is a sub-
stantial reason for their testimony not being produced.
B. Trial court's review of administrative agency
decisions: Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles;
Unterthiner v. Desert Hospital District; Tiernan v. Trustees
of the California State University and Colleges.
The petitioner in Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, '
a sales person, lost her driver's license after she was charged with
driving while under the influence of alcohol and resisting, delay-
ing, or obstructing an officer.2 Petitioner plead guilty to one count
of reckless driving3 and received notice that her license would be
suspended for six months.4 Her license was revoked after a De-
partment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) hearing.5 She then petitioned
the superior court for judicial review of the DMV decision alleging
that its findings were unsupported by the evidence presented at
the hearing.6 In addition, plaintiff questioned the trial court's de-
cision to apply the "substantial evidence" test instead of the "in-
dependent judgment" standard of review because she argued that
the right to drive was "fundamental." 7
Section 1094.5(c) of the California Civil Procedure Code 8 pro-
1. 33 Cal. 3d 392, 657 P.2d 383, 188 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1983).
2. Id. at 394, 657 P.2d at 384, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
3. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103 (West Supp. 1983).
4. 33 Cal. 3d at 394, 657 P.2d at 385, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
5. The DMV's findings included the following: (1) the arresting officer had
reasonable cause to believe plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol; (2)
she was lawfully arrested; (3) plaintiff was properly advised that refusal to submit
to a blood alcohol test would result in suspension of her driving privileges; and (4)
she failed to submit to the tests. Id.
6. The trial court rejected petitioner's request that it use the "independent
judgment" standard of review and found the administrative decision properly sup-
ported using the "substantial evidence" test. Id. at 395, 657 P.2d at 385, 188 Cal.
Rptr. at 893.
7. If an administrative agency's decision does not affect a fundamentally
vested right (such as the continued possession of a license, as opposed to the
mere application for a license), the reviewing court must "exercise its independ-
ent judgment upon the evidence." Id. (citing Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481
P.2d 242, 251, 193 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971)). However, if a fundamental vested right
is not involved, the court need merely "review the whole administrative record to
determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and
whether the agency committed any errors of law." Id. (citing 4 Cal. 3d at 144, 481
P.2d at 251, 193 Cal. Rptr. 243).
8. California Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5(c) states:
Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in
cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent
vides the courts with a standard for evaluating administrative de-
cisions. In Bixby v. Pierno, 9 the California Supreme Court
"added [itsl own judicial amplification to these statutory princi-
ples,"' 0 by adding two criteria to the statutory standard.' First, if
a "fundamental vested right" will be affected by the agency's deci-
sion, then the trial court must exercise independent judgment in
its review of the administrative record.12 Second, where there are
no fundamental vested rights involved, the trial court must deter-
mine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence
by reviewing the entire administrative record.13 Bixby was based
on the latter standard.
The court began its analysis by deciding that driving is, at least,
a "vested" right.'4 Even so, it is not a "fundamental" right in the
constitutional sense requiring strict judicial scrutiny of the
DMV's decision to revoke a license.' 5 It does, however, amount to
an interest of such importance that it warrants an independent
judgment standard of review of a quasi-judicial adminstrative
agency determination. 6 Thus, for the purpose of selecting the
proper standard of judicial review of an administrative decision
suspending of a driver's license, the "right to drive" is considered
"fundamental.' 7 The suspension of a driver's license may still be
entirely appropriate, but it may only be done after an independ-
ent judgment review of the administrative record. 18
Unterthiner v. Desert Hospital District19 was also based on the
judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court
determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evi-
dence; and in all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court
determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in
the light of the whole record.
CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West Supp. 1983).
9. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
10. 33 Cal. 3d 392, 395, 657 P.2d 383, 385, 188 Cal. Rptr. 891, 893 (1983) (citing
Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d at 143, 481 P.2d at 251, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 243).
11. 4 Cal. 3d at 143-44, 481 P.2d at 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
12. Note that the administrative record is the only evidence examined. Id.
13. Id. at 144, 481 P.2d at 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
14. See 33 Cal. 3d at 396, 657 P.2d at 386, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 894 and the cases
cited therein.
15. Id. at 397, 657 P.2d at 386-87, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
16. Id. at 398, 657 P.2d at 388, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 896. It is an important interest
because of our "travel-oriented society." In this particular case, the fact that plain-
tiff used her car in her job, and was a single parent, illustrated the inconvenience
she would suffer if she were denied the use of her car. Id. "[T]he revocation or
suspension of that license, even for a six-month period, can and often does consti-
tute a severe personal and economic hardship." Id. (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971)).
17. 33 Cal. 3d at 397, 657 P.2d at 386-87, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
18. Id. at 398, 657 P.2d at 388, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
19. 33 Cal. 3d 285, 656 P.2d 554, 188 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1983).
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principles expressed in Bixby v. Pierno.20 It involved a plastic
surgeon who was denied admission to a public hospital's medical
staff.21 Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, but the trial
court found that the decision against Unterthiner was not based
on false answers he had given on his application.22 Instead, it
found that the hospital's decision rested on letters from three doc-
tors who argued against his admission. The court held that the
applicant would not get a fair hearing from the hospital and,
thereby, granted relief.2 3 Again, the supreme court was faced with
the issue of the applicable standard of review of an administrative
agency decision. This time it involved a public hospital's decision
denying surgical privileges. 24
The court first inquired into the "vest" aspect of an initial appli-
cation for hospital privileges and found its answer in Anton v. San
Antonio Community Hospital.25 There the court drew a distinc-
tion between those physicians already admitted to staff member-
ship as having a vested fundamental right to continue practice in
the hospital and those applying for staff membership who did
not.26 The court in Unterthiner upheld that distinction and fol-
lowed the rule requiring only substantial evidence review of those
initial applications for hospital privileges. 27 The court's use of the
lesser standard of substantial evidence resulted in an affirmation
of the findings of false hood and failure to meet with ethical stan-
dards,28 because they were undisputed and sufficiently supported
by the evidence. 29 The judgment of the trial court allowing Un-
terthiner to have clinical privileges at the Desert Hospital was
20. Id. at 294, 656 P.2d at 559, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (citing Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.
3d at 144-45, 481 P.2d at 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243).
21. 33 Cal. 3d at 287, 656 P.2d at 555, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
22. Id. at 288, 656 P.2d at 555, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 293, 656 P.2d at 558, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 594. The applicant here, a plastic
and reconstructive surgeon, did most of his work in his own office. Even so, access
to the hospital was necessary for the performance of reconstructive surgery. This
necessity led him to fie his application. Id. at 287, 656 P.2d at 555, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
591.
25. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1971).
26. Id. at 824, 567 P.2d at 1174, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
27. 33 Cal. 3d at 298, 656 P.2d at 563, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
28. These were the reasons the hospital gave for denying Unterthiner's appli-
cation. Id. at 298-99, 656 P.2d at 563, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
29. Id. at 299, 656 P.2d at 563, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 599. The supreme court also held
the trial court's findings were without support in the record. Id. at 299-300, 656
P.2d at 594, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
reversed.30
In Tiernan v. Trustees of the California State University and
Colleges,3' a decision cited by the court in Bixby, petitioner
brought suit against defendants who denied her reappointment as
an archivist.3 2 The basis of her claim was that pursuant to Educa-
tion Code section 89534(a), 33 the trustees of the University were
required to adopt rules governing notice of the nonreappointment
or termination of its employees. 3 4 Defendants argued, and the
trial court agreed, that section 89534(a) applied only to probation-
ary employees with a reasonable expectation of permanent em-
ployment,35 and not to temporary employees such as the
petitioner. The supreme court, however, reversed,36 holding that
the trustees were required to adopt rules and regulations gov-
erning the termination of temporary employees. 37 Nonetheless,
this result did not benefit the petitioner as the court found she
had not suffered any prejudice due to the lack of rules adopted by
the trustees under section 89534(a). 38
C. Sufficiency of evidence: Daniels v. Department of Motor
Vehicles; Himelspach v. Department of Motor Vehicles
In the companion cases of Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, 33 Cal. 3d 532, 658 P.2d 1313, 189 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1983) and
Himelspach v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 542, 658
P.2d 1319, 189 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1983), the court held that an accident
30. Id.
31. 33 Cal. 3d 211, 655 P.2d 317, 188 Cal. Rptr. 115, modified, 33 Cal. 3d 461a
(1983).
32. Id.
33. California Education Code section 89534(a) states:
The trustees shall adopt rules prescribing the form, time and method of
notice of rejection at any time during the probationary period to any pro-
bationary nonacademic employee, or notice of intention not to recommend
reappointment of an academic employee for the succeeding year to any
such employee not having permanent status.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 89534(a) (West Supp. 1983).
34. 33 Cal. 3d at 216, 655 P.2d at 320, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 222, 655 P.2d at 324, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
37. The facts showed that the position offered to Tiernan was a temporary one.
Id. at 214-15, 655 P.2d at 319, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 117. Her continued employment was
based on various factors including funding and status of the archives center. This
sharply contrasted with those positions considered probationary, as opposed to
those of full permanent employment. The court, however, correctly applied the
statute to "any such employee not having permanent status." Id. at 219-220, 655
P.2d at 322, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 121; see supra note 33.
38. Because defendants had made her fully aware of the conditions of her em-
ployment, and any subsequent reappointment, "[5]he cannot now reasonably
claim that she was surprised by that decision or that the defendant's failure to
adopt and follow regulations requiring proper notice prejudiced her in any way."
Id. at 221, 655 P.2d at 324, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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report filed by another driver is insufficient by itself to support an
administrative decision upholding an order by the Department
suspending a driver's license. Though the proceedings of the
DMV raised obvious due process issues, the court resolved the
matter exclusively on statutory grounds.
The Department first contended that the use of the reports fell
within the statutory evidence hearsay records exception. See
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 1966). Noting that the accident re-
ports were not made by either driver in their "regular course of
business" and that the drivers were not present at the respective
hearing to identify the records, the court rejected the Depart-
ment's position.
The DMV also argued that even if the reports were hearsay as
to a civil proceeding, they were admissible in an administrative
proceeding because such use was expressly provided for by stat-
ute. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 14108 (West 1971). Although the court
agreed that hearsay evidence may be considered at the hearing,
the court concluded that the language of the statute cannot be
construed so that such information is the sole basis for a detri-
mental decision. Rather, the statute provides that such evidence
may only be used to supplement other admissible evidence. Both
matters were remanded to the Department for hearings consis-
tent with the court's opinion.
II. ATrORNEY DISCIPLINE
A. Suspensions and disbarments: Davis v. State Bar; In
re Cannan; In re Mudge; In re Gross; Newton v. State
Bar; Shalant v. State Bar.
In Davis v. State Bar, 33 Cal. 3d 231, 655 P.2d 1276, 188 Cal. Rptr.
441 (1983), the attorney involved was faced with one year of sus-
pension and three years of probation for failure to represent a cli-
ent. The facts showed the attorney had undertaken to prosecute
his client's personal injury claim, but failed to file suit or settle
the claim within the statute of limitations. Although the peti-
tioner argued that the discipline was excessive, the supreme
court disagreed, finding his negligence was fully supported by the
evidence.
It may be difficult to predict the supreme court's reaction to
charges of criminal participation by members of the state bar. In
the case of In re Cannan, 33 Cal. 3d 417, 657 P.2d 827, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1983), the attorney had been convicted of four counts of
grand theft under CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 1970), and sen-
tenced to two years on each count, with the terms to run concur-
rently. After serving sixteen months in a state prison, Cannan
was placed on parole. The state bar recommended suspension for
five years, with execution of the order stayed on the condition
that Cannan be placed on probation for five years and actually
suspended for two and one-half years. The supreme court, while
stating it was adopting the state bar's recommendation, ordered
Cannan suspended for five years, with the execution stayed on
condition of a five year probation, and actual suspension of only
one year.
While the supreme court may decrease the actual time of sus-
pension in certain instances, other petitioners may not have the
same luck. In the case of In re Mudge, 33 Cal. 3d 152, 654 P.2d
1307, 187 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1982), an attorney, convicted on one count
of grand theft, pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(1) (West Supp.
1983), served eight months in jail for the misappropriation of large
sums of money from two estates to which he had acted as execu-
tor. In addition, the court found the attorney had filed a false
statement in probate court, in an effort to conceal the
misappropriations.
The review by the hearing panel of the state bar resulted in a
recommendation of suspension for three years, with the order
stayed and the attorney placed on probation with an actual sus-
pension for two years. The review department increased the pro-
bation period to five years and required the attorney's compliance
with numerous other conditions. However, the increase in the
penalty did not stop there. Mudge was then notified that the
supreme court was considering imposition of more substantial
discipline. At that time, Mudge was prompted to seek review
before the supreme court.
Because "[mlisappropriation of client's funds is extremely seri-
ous misconduct which warrants disbarment in the absence of mit-
igating circumstances," the supreme court felt compelled to
increase the period of actual suspension to three years. Com-
menting that the discipline could have been even more severe,
the supreme court instead gave some deference to the recommen-
dation of the State Bar.
The Committee's ability to look to probable, but not actual,
criminal convictions was illustrated by In re Gross, 33 Cal. 3d 561,
659 P.2d 1137, 189 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1983). There the court favorably
reviewed the Committee's decision to discipline Gross after he
plea bargained his way from an initial felony charge down to a
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misdemeanor. Gross attempted to collaterally attack his guilty
plea on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court rejected
this argument, noting that misdemeanor convictions are not sub-
ject to such an attack; and that even if they were, the salient issue
was Gross' actual conduct. As to that, the court found that there
was ample evidence supporting the Committee's conclusion that
Gross' conduct was outside acceptable bounds and that discipline
was therefore warranted. Justice Richardson concluded that
Gross' conduct was sufficient for disbarment.
In Newton v. State Bar, 33 Cal. 3d 480, 658 P.2d 735, 189 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1983), the court ordered the state bar to reopen proceedings
to determine Newton's mental state pursuant to CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6007 (West Supp. 1983). The Bar had opened and closed
such proceedings based upon a one hour interview of Newton by
an attorney hearing examiner. Nothing but the interview was
considered by the examining attorney in deciding that there was
no probable cause to believe that Newton was mentally unfit.
The court looked to section 6007 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code and concluded that the examiner should have consid-
ered the facts gathered in the disciplinary proceeding that had
been abated pending the mental fitness hearing in making his de-
cision. The court examined the disciplinary proceeding record it-
self and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that
Newton was mentally unfit or ill. The state bar was ordered to
proceed with a fitness examination pursuant to section 6007. The
disciplinary proceedings were abated pending the outcome of a
thorough evaluation.
In Shalant v. State Bar, 33 Cal. 3d 485, 658 P.2d 737, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (1983), the court addressed a series of questions that
one might expect to encounter on a Professional Responsibility
Exam:
C retains attorney A to represent her in some personal injury litigation
commenced by attorney XA. A and XA agree that XA's fee will be mutu-
ally agreed upon and paid at the conclusion of the case before A with-
draws any of the recovery from his trust fund.
A settles C's case for $10,000 from which he deducts his fee forwarding
the balance to C. A uniaterally determines XA's fair fee to be $200 which
he tenders to XA. XA rejects the tender and brings a suit to recover $910
from A and C. Process is served on A who, though he remains in contact
with C, never tells her of the suit. C is served a year later and calls to ask
A about the matter. When A fails to respond, C retains new counsel NC to
represent her in XA v. C et al. and to bring a cross claim against A. Dur-
ing this period of time, A also represents C's father, F, in various matters
and knows that C has retained NC. After C sues A, A asks F to try and
persuade his daughter C to come in and talk about the crossclaim to see if
it could be settled. F asks C and she declines.
A should be disciplined by the state bar for
I. Withdrawing funds from a client trust account when the attorney's
right to those funds is disputed by a client.
II. Failing to let C know that she had been sued.
III. Attempting to communicate directly with a represented opposing
party.
IV. All of the above.
V. Only III.
VI. Only II and III.
The correct answer according to the court is VI. The dispute re-
garding the legal fee was between A and XA, not A and C; hence
the disbursement was not improper. (There was no dispute about
the funds between the attorney and a client).
The court wasted little ink in concluding that A's attempt to
contact his client through her father amounted to an improper, al-
though indirect, initiation of communication with a party repre-
sented by counsel. Likewise, the court held that A had a duty to
inform his client that she had been sued.
Since petitioner Shalant had been privately reproved once
before, the court concluded that his discipline should be public
reprovement.
III. ATrORNEYS' FEES
A. Application of statutory private attorney general
doctrine: Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal
Commission; Westside Community for Independent Living,
Inc. v. Obledo.
Two recent cases, Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Coastal Commission, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 655 P.2d 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1982), and Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v.
Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348, 657 P.2d 365, 188 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1983), illus-
trate the attempt to use Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980),
often referred to as the '"private attorney general" doctrine, to re-
cover attorneys' fees. Section 1021.5 provides that "a court may
award attorney's fees to a successful party ... in an action which
has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting
public interest." Although the two cases provide different factual
situations, the supreme court denied the award of attorneys' fees
in each.
Pacific Legal Foundation involved a challenge to the California
Coastal Commission's public access requirements. Two beach-
front property co-owners sought to improve an existing seawall in
order to protect their property. The lower court had granted a
writ of administrative mandamus, allowing construction of the
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seawall improvements, and plaintiffs then sought reimbursement
of attorneys' fees, claiming the result benefitted all other beach-
front residents. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs did not
fulfill the requirement of section 1021.5(a) that a "significant ben-
efit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, [be] conferred on the
general public or a large class of persons." (emphasis added).
In Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc., plaintiffs
sought attorneys' fees as reimbursement for initiating the issu-
ance of final regulations in accordance with Cal. Gov't Code
§ 11139.5 (West Supp. 1983). This statute directs the Secretary of
the Health and Welfare Agency to establish standards for deter-
mining who is protected by section 11135, which bars discrimina-
tion in publicly funded programs, and to create guidelines for
determining what practices are discriminatory. Plaintiffs filed
suit to compel the Secretary to finalize and issue the regulations
and guidelines, which were already in the process of being
drafted and approved. The supreme court, in denying the trial
court's award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney gen-
eral statute, found there was no causal connection between the
plaintiffs' action and the relief obtained. The plaintiffs had failed
to prove that the "issuance of [the] regulations occurred even a
day earlier than it otherwise would have as a result of [their]
lawsuit."
IV. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Allocation of payments: Jessup Farms v. Baldwin.
In Jessup Farms v. Baldwin, 33 Cal. 3d 639, 660 P.2d 831, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 355 (1983), the court addressed a "narrow question of statu-
tory construction." Hence, this factually complex case is given
summary treatment. At issue was whether the trial court had
properly apportioned payments among four obligations of varying
origination dates, and whether a "subsequent instrument can re-
new the maturity date of an earlier note so that both obligations
can be said to mature simultaneously."
The friction between the parties arose out of plaintiff's eventual
acquisition of defendant's corporation. During the course of the
acquisition (which occurred over a period of years), several loans
were obtained by plaintiff for the corporation, the first of which
defendant cosigned. Plaintiff made payments on the notes, but
failed to specify to which note the payments applied. Plaintiff, as-
serting that the payments should have been applied equally to all
four notes, sought equitable contribution from defendant for the
first note. Defendant asserted that the payments should be ap-
plied in whole to the notes in the order of maturity, thus the note
she cosigned was therefore paid in full. Defendant also asserted a
claimed security interest in some of plaintiff's stock, arising out of
a property settlement with her former husband. The trial court
held that the payments should be distributed on a pro-rata basis,
and that since defendant's security interest was unperfected,
plaintiff's status as bona fide purchaser for value extinguished the
security interest in the note.
The court, after examining the construction of Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1479 (West 1982), concluded that the trial court had incorrectly
proportioned the payments and that the funds should be distrib-
uted so as to satisfy the oldest note (the one cosigned by the de-
fendant) first:
Thus, where the notes at issue have different maturity dates, section 1479
requires that payments be applied to the notes with the earlier maturity
date, in order, irrespective of whether secured or unsecured. Where, how-
ever, two or more obligations have the same maturity date, section 1479
mandates a ratable allocation among them (assuming all such obligations
are either secured or unsecured).
The court then determined, in a case of first impression, that
Cal. Com. Code § 3802 (West 1964), provides for the renewal of an
underlying obligation's maturity date only if the parties do not
provide otherwise. Since the parties did so provide, the court
found that the later notes did not renew the maturity date of the
first note, that section 1479 therefore required allocation of the un-
specified payments to the oldest note first, and that since the pay-
ments satisfied that note, there was no right of plaintiff to
equitable contribution from defendant.
As to defendant's crossclaim asserting a security interest in the
stock, the court found that the factual conclusions of the trial
court were supported by substantial evidence and could not be
disturbed on appeal. The judgment of the trial court requiring
contribution was reversed; the judgment denying a security inter-
est sustained.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Requiring successful malpractice litigants to accept
term payment of their awards violates equal
protection: American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community
Hospital.
That courts on occasion reverse themselves-or are reversed by
others-is a constant reminder that the process of law is not infal-
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lable. The court's decision in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Com-
munity Hospital' may eventually add grist to that mill. Three
months after the cour1 issued its opinion in the case, it an-
nounced that the decision would be reconsidered.2 Additional ar-
gument was heard late in August of 1983. As this article proceeds
through the publication process, the court has issued no opinion
on the additional arguments.
In short, American3 held that the provisions of the 1975 Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)4 violated the equal
protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to the ex-
tent that they require successful malpractice litigants to accept
term payment of their awards.5 This conclusion was premised
primarily on two perceived facts: (1) that the Act was not serving
the purpose for which i~t was designed and therefore bore no ra-
tional relationship to the legitimate goals of the legislature, and 6
(2) that the Act in no way amounted to a quid pro quo exchange
of benefits for the forbearance of rights as between the malprac-
tice litigants and the hospitals.7
The facts that gave rise to the malpractice claim are straightfor-
ward, and the defendant hospital's liability seems quite clear. In
the latter part of 1976, :plaintiff (American's predecessor in inter-
1. 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983). Justice Mosk wrote for
the majority with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Rattigan and Raconelli concur-
ring. Justice Kaus wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Broussard and
Feinburg concurred. It is interesting to note that the deciding vote in the case was
cast by a justice assigned by the Judicial Council.
The decision of the court of appeal in the case was ordered not reported in the
official reports. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1980).
2. 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), reh'g granted, June 15,
1983 (LEXIS, States library, Cal. file).
3. Since the malpractice claimant died before the case reached the supreme
court, the adminstrator of her estate was substituted in by stipulation of the par-
ties. 33 Cal. 3d at 678, 660 P.2d at 831, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 373. That plaintiff died
nearly two years after her injuries without ever seeing the proceeds of an appar-
ently legitimate claim is in itself an interesting commentary on the fallibility of the
legal process.
4. Codified at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980). The relevant statu-
tory language is set forth infra at note 12.
5. The court expressly himited its holding to hospitals. 33 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 660
P.2d at 839, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
6. 33 Cal. 3d at 685-92, 660 P.2d at 837-41, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379-82.
7. That there was no quid pro quo was the premise to the court's application
of equal protection analysis. Id. For the court's quid pro quo analysis see 33 Cal.
3d at 683-85, 660 P.2d at 835-37, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 377-79.
est)8 was admitted to the hospital for brain surgery. On the day
before the operation she suffered severe burns to her hip, thigh,
and groin while taking a shower due to overheated water. Her
burns were attended to so that the operation could proceed. After
apparently successful brain surgery, plaintiff underwent care for
her burn wounds. The services of a plastic surgeon were required
and plaintiff continued to encounter problems from the burns for
nearly two years. Some permanent cosmetic deformity resulted.9
Plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the hospital which
went to trial resulting in a verdict for plaintiff for $198,069.88. The
hospital brought all traditional post trial motions and also moved
that the court provide for periodic payment of all future damage
in excess of $50,000.00.1o All of defendant's post trial motions were
denied. Specifically, the motion for periodic payment was denied
on the trial court's finding that the statute providing for such pay-
ment violated state and federal guarantees of equal protection
and due process."
The statute [hereinafter section 667.7] was part of a 1975 legisla-
tive effort to slow the then "skyrocketing" cost of medical mal-
practice insurance in order that health care would continue to be
available (MIRCA).12 In reviewing the legislation, the court ex-
8. See supra note 3.
9. 33 Cal. 3d at 677-7b, 660 P.2d at 831, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
10. Id. at 678, 660 P.2d at 831, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The motion for periodic pay-
ment was made pursuant to CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).
11. 33 Cal. 3d at 678, 660 P.2d at 831, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 372. The ruling must have
taken counsel by surprise. Not every day does a trial court judge declare major
portions of state law unconstitutional.
12. MICRA was the result of an extraordinary session of the legislature called
by proclamation of the governor after a number of doctors went "on strike" or re-
fused to perform certain risky procedures because of escalating malpractice insur-
ance costs. While there was some debate as to the reason for the sudden increase
in costs, it was clear to the governor and the legislature that some action had to be
taken in order to insure the continued availability of medical services. 33 Cal. 3d
at 678-79, 660 P.2d at 831-32, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. See 1975 Cal. Stats. 4007 (cited
by the court). Section 667.7 provides:
(a) In any action for injury or damages against a provider of health care
services, a superior court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judg-
ment ordering that money damages or its equivalent for future damages of
the judgment creditor be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments
rather than by a lump-sum payment if the award equals or exceeds fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) in future damages. In entering a judgment or-
dering the payment of future damages by periodic payments, the court
shall make a specific finding as to the dollar amount of periodic payments
which will compensate the judgment creditor for such future damages. As
a condition to authorizing periodic payments of future damages, the court
shall require the judgment debtor who is not adequately insured to post
security adequate to assure full payment of such damages awarded by the
judgment. Upon termination of periodic payments of future damages, the
court shall order the return of this security, or so much as remains, to the
judgment debtor.
(b) (1) The judgment ordering the payment of future damages by peri-
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amined the impact of section 667.7 on successful malpractice liti-
gants. Two major problems seem to stick in the court's mind.
First, although the periodic payments would insure that the in-
jured person would have a steady source of funds for life, and
that the damages would be paid more or less as they accrued,
there was no way that a trial court could allow for the possibility
that some unexpected medical problem would suddenly require
more funds than were scheduled to be paid. In contrast, were
plaintiff to collect a lump sum, she could invest it in a combina-
tion of liquid assests and long term annuities thereby being pre-
odic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments,
the dollar amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and
the number of payments or the period of time over which payments shall
be made. Such payments shall only be subject to modification in the
event of the death of the judgment creditor.
(2) In the event that the court finds that the judgment debtor has exhib-
ited a continuing pattern of failing to make the payments, as specified in
paragraph (1), the court shall find the judgment debtor in contempt of
court and, in addition to the required periodic payments, shall order the
judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor all damages caused by the
failure to make such periodic payments, including court costs and attor-
ney's fees.
(c) However, money damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall
not be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the
judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to
his death. In such cases the court which rendered the original judgment,
may, upon petition of any party in interest, modify the judgment to award
and apportion the unpaid future damages in accordance with this subdivi-
sion.
(d) Following the occurrence or expiration of all obligations specified in
the periodic payment judgment, any obligation of the judgment debtor to
make further payments shall cease and any security given, pursuant to
subdivision (a) shall revert to the judgment debtor.
(f) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to authorize
the entry of judgments :in malpractice actions against health care provid-
ers which provide for the payment of future damages through periodic
payments rather than lump-sum payments. By authorizing periodic pay-
ment judgments, it is the further intent of the Legislature that the courts
will utilize such judgments to provide compensation sufficient to meet the
needs of an injured plaintiff and those persons who are dependent on the
plaintiff for whatever period is necessary while eliminating the potential
windfall from a lump-sum recovery which was intended to provide for the
care of an injured plaintiff over an extended period who then dies shortly
after the judgment is paid, leaving the balance of the judgment award to
persons and purposes for which it was not intended. It is also the intent
of the Legislature that all elements of the periodic payment program be
specified with certainty in the judgment ordering such payments and that
the judgment not be subject to modification at some future time which
might alter the specifications of the original judgment.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).
pared for such a contingency.13
The court's second difficulty with the statute was that it pro-
vides for the termination of payments upon the death of the plain-
tiff. In the majority's view, the same problem noted above arises.
Even though the plan prevents a windfall to heirs upon plaintiff's
death (for harm theoretically never suffered), it also denies plain-
tiff fair compensation in the event actual future damages exceed
estimations before death. "The sums retained by the insurer are
the same funds which would have provided a financial safety
valve to the victim for unexpected expenses connected with his
injury during the course of his life, but which the statute prevents
him from using to the extent he may find necessary."' 4 Thus, the
court concluded that the statute operated to place on the plaintiff
the entire risk that future payments might not be adequate to
meet his needs.
Having found that the statute "took" something from plaintiffs,
the court turned to examine whether the statute provided some
otherwise unavailable benefit to plaintiffs in return. It was theo-
rized that this might somehow justify the statute in the same
sense that worker's compensation is justified as a "quid pro quo"
exchange between employer and employee.' 5
The hospital cited two advantages gained by the plaintiff: (1)
that the plaintiff or his dependents would not be able to dissipate
the award before the need for compensation ended,16 and (2) that
13. 33 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 660 P.2d at 834-35, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77. The court
also suggests that if the plaintiffs "pain and suffering" increases, the periodic pay-
ment plan makes no provision for increased compensation. While this contention
bears obvious relation to the theory that the periodic plan is intended to renumer-
ate losses as they occur, it is not a valid criticism of the plan for a lump sum
leaves plaintiff in no better a position. That plaintiffs pain and suffering increase
will not increase the amount of his lump sum after entry of judgment.
14. Id. at 683, 660 P.2d at 835, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
15. Worker's Compensation plans provide for recovery without fault for inju-
ries suffered by an employee while working. See CAi LAB. CODE § 3200 (West
Supp. 1983). The employer relinquishes the right to contest liability while in turn
the employee relinquishes the right to recover damages beyond those provided for
under the worker's compensation system. The employer benefits from limited lia-
bility and the worker benefits from certain recovery for on-the-job injuries. See,
e.g., Nelson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 474, 118 Cal. Rptr. 725
(1975).
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978) (dis-
cussing the constitutionality of the exchange of common law rights for otherwise
unavailable benefits in general).
16. 33 Cal. 3d at 685, 460 P.2d at 836, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that plaintiff is awarded a lump sum based on a life expectancy of 40 years
and on the theory that his children will depend on him for only 10 years. Instead,
plaintiff lives 60 years and his children become incapacitated in some way so that
they are dependent upon him for the remainder of their lives. The lump sum
might be long exhausted before the need for compensation ended while the peri-
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a periodic payment plan enjoyed significant tax benefits.' 7 The
court saw no otherwise unavailable net benefit in either. In its
view, plaintiff could invest the lump sum for continuing returns
just as well, and probably better from a flexability standpoint, as
the periodic payment plan could. As to the tax benefit: "It seems
obvious that it is to the advantage of the victim to obtain a return
on the invested lump-sum award, even though he must pay taxes
on the profit, if the alternative is to forego the opportunity to earn
any return."18 The court concluded that successful medical mal-
* practice litigants were thereby denied something of value with no
benefit afforded in return. It was acknowledged that this fact in
itself was insufficient to declare the statute invalid, but was cited
as very relevant in determining the overall impact of the statute
in regard to the equal protection challenge.19
The court identified three basic problems arising out of the
state and federal constitutional 20 guarantees of due process:
(1) The statute sets the tortfeasor who is a "health care provider" apart
from other tortfeasors by permitting him to pay future damages of $50,000
or more on a periodic (rather than a lump-sum) basis, subject to modifica-
tion on the subsequent death of the victim. (2) It sets the victim of medi-
cal malpractice apart from other victims by requiring him to accept
payment on the terms above described. (3) It classifies medical malprac-
tice victims by limiting its application to those suffering future damages of
$50,000 or more, permitting all others to obtain a lump-sum judgment.2 1
Noting that the proper constitutional measure by which to. ex-
amine the classifications was the rational relationship test,22 the
court set out to determine just what that test was. Some recent
odic payments might, in some circumstances, continue past the plaintiff's death
until the children's deaths.
17. The court noted:
Damages for personal injuries are exempt from taxation (26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a) (2)), but the return earned on the investment of that sum is taxa-
ble. However, according to a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service relied
on by the hospital, periodic payments received in satisfaction of a recov-
ery for personal injuries are exempt from taxation because the plaintiff
does not have the "economic benefit of the lump-sum amount." (Rev. Rul.
No. 79-220, q.B. 1979-2, 74).
33 Cal. 3d at 685, 660 P.2d at B36, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
18. Id. 1
19. Id. at 684, 660 P.2d at 836, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 378. See Wright v. Central Du
Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Note, Medical Malprac-
tice, 18 HARv. J. ION LEGIS. 143 (1981).
20. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 33 Cal. 3i at 685-86, 660 P.2d at 837, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
22. Id. at 686, 660 P.2d at 837, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379. The right to recover tort
damages is not subject to strict scrutiny. See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
cases, noted the court, hold that legislation passes the test "if it
bears a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state pur-
pose,"23 while others state that the classification made must be
based upon "some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of legislation." 24 The court concluded
that on the whole it was required to make a "serious and genuine
judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classifica-
tion and the legislative goals." 25 The court also observed that
they must look to the impact of the legislation in its totality rather
than simply to the "four corners" of the statute itself. Further,
they would have to determine whether the statute was in fact
serving its stated goals. 26
The standard of review in hand, the court identified its percep-
tion of the legislative reasoning behind section 667.7:
The assumption made by the Legislature was that insurers could pro-
vide malpractice insurance at lower rates if they could save on the cost of
providing such insurance and that these lower premium rates would then
be passed on to the public in the form of lower medical costs, or at least
containment of such costs.
27
The court then concluded that hospital costs have in fact not been
23. See, e.g., D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10,
112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
24. 33 Cal. 3d at 686, 660 P.2d at 837, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (quoting Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)).
25. 33 Cal. 3d at 686, 660 P.2d at 837, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379, (quoting Newland v.
Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139 Cal. Rtpr. 620, 624
(1977)).
26. 33 Cal. 3d at 686-88, 660 P.2d at 837-39, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 379-81. The court
found three cases particularly relevant. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978) (where the court rejected a cap on malpractice damages finding that
the legislature was either misinformed as to the facts on which the statute was
based or that the facts had changed); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla.
1976) (holding a requirement that malpractice claims be submitted to an arbitra-
tion panel); and Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (reversing Carter on
the grounds that the statute had proved "unworkable and inequitable" thereby de-
nying due process). The court fails to observe that the cases deal in a broad sense
with malpractice claims covering all damages--certain and uncertain. Section
667.7 only subjects clearly uncertain claims to special treatment.
27. 33 Cal. 3d at 689, 660 P.2d at 839, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The dissent took issue
with this assessment:
To be sure, one-but only one--of the reasons the Legislature adopted
section 667.7 was its belief that the provision-along with other changes in
the tort system-would help to hold down the cost of medical malpractice
insurance. Contrary to the majority's claim, however, there is nothing in
the Legislature's express statement of purpose . . . or in the statute's leg-
islative history which suggests that the Legislature's sole--or even princi-
pal--objective in limiting such costs was simply a means or [sic] reducing
or containing the overall expense of medical or hospital care. Although
the Legislature may have viewed the containment of total medical costs as
an incidental benefit of limiting malpractice insurance costs, its primary
goal was related directly to the reduction of insurance costs and insurance
premiums themselves.
33 Cal. 3d at 693, 660 P.2d at 842, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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kept down28 a nd that the goal of the statute is thereby not met by
the operation of sectio, 667.7. "Since section 667.7 was premised
on [the] assumption Ithat holding malpractice insurance costs
down would in turn hold hospital costs down], the classification of
malpractice yictims made therein constitutes a denial of equal
protection of the law under the foregoing standard."29 Thus, the
majority reached its ultimate conclusion: the trial court did not
err in denyirg the motion for the application of section 667.7 be-
cause the statute was unconstitutional.3 0
The dissen provided able criticism of the majority opinion, not-
ing first that "it is-to say the least-a novel proposition that a
statute is to be declared unconstitutional simply because it does
not accomplish all that; the enacting Legislature may have hoped
for."31 It is s uggested that under such logic, the entire Penal Code
could be declared unconstitutional as ineffective.32
It is also observed-as is noted above3 3-that even if the major-
ity's novel te~t is applied, it fails, in that the true legislative goal is
misstated. In the dissent's view, the true overall goal was to keep
health care costs down. Thus, the majority's simple conclusion,
that hospital bed per clay costs are up, ignores a substantial por-
tion of the legislative goal.
Further, tlIe court's holding is said to be "flawed" in that it as-
28. Id. at 6 0s660 P.2d at 840, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The majority appears to
make this concI sion solely upon a "cost per bed" basis. No explanation is given
as to why this is a valid measure. It has been suggested that the court's misinter-
pretation of this data was a basis for the decision to reconsider the case.
29. 33 Cal. 3 1 at 691, 660 P.2d at 840-41, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. The dissent re-
jects the court's view that the sole purpose of the Act was to hold costs down and
asserts that one of the purposes was to ensure a better match of injury to payment
via the periodic payment plan. Id. at 694-95, 660 P.2d at 843, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
The dissent als9 observes that even if the Act does not appear to hold hospital
costs down, it d es hold malpractice costs down which was, by the majority's ad-
mission, a legitimate goal of the legislature. Id. at 694, 660 P.2d at 843, 190 Cal.
Rptr. at 385. |
30. 33 Cal. 3d at 691-92, 660 P.2d at 839-40, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82. The court
looked for out-of-state support for its conclusion but found only two cases on point
with conflicting results. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980)
(declaring a periodic payment plan unconstitutional); State ex rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (upholding a periodic payment plan finding it in-
tended to beneAt those in need of long term care).
The court alIo rejected defendant hospital's contention that the damages as-
sessed were ex4essive. 33 Cal. 3d at 692, 660 P.2d at 841-42, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
31. 33 Cal. 3d at 693, 660 P.2d at 842, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
32. Id. This may amount to an overstatement, but it nonetheless is an excel-
lent illustration i of the nature of the majority's logic.
33. See supra note 27.
sumes that the sole purpose of MICRA was to keep costs
(whatever costs) down. Rather, says the dissent, the purpose of
MICRA included the implementation of periodic payment proce-
dures to provide, in the words of the statute itself, "compensation
sufficient to meet the needs of an injured plaintiff ... for
whatever period is necessary. . ."34 Justice Kaus observed:
While there obviously can be a difference of opinion as to whether a peri-
odic payment procedure is, on balance, beneficial or detrimental to injured
plaintiffs, we cannot hold a statute unconstitutional simply because we
might have resolved this basic policy decision differently than the
Legislature. 3 5
To suggest that the court's decision has failed justice would be
to ignore the complexity of the issue. If you were injured in a
hospital and disabled, would you want a company the hospital
hired taking care of your financial security? On the other hand, if
the legislature decides that policy considerations necessitate such
a result, should the courts reject such decisions, based on an indi-
vidual's right to choose? Until the court issues its opinion on re-
consideration-and perhaps not even then-the door on the
constitutional propriety of section 667.7 will remain open. In the
meantime, it will be interesting to watch those furiously pushing
the door in opposite directions.
B. Permissible limitation of voter participation: Citizens
Against Forced Annexation v. Local Agency Formation
Commission; Fullerton Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Education.
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, the California Supreme Court addressed
the general issue of restricting voting participation in two differ-
ent contexts. In Citizens9 Against Forced Annexation v. Local
Agency Formation Comm'n,' participation in an annexation elec-
tion was restricted to only those who lived in the area proposed to
be incorporated, limiting the voting rights of citizens of the incor-
porating city. The case of Fullerton Joint Union High School Dis-
trict v. State Board of Education2 dealt with an election held for
approval to create a new school district which would include a
portion of an already existing district. In this case only those who
were residents of the proposed district were allowed to vote.
34. CAL. Cv. PRoc. CODE § 667.7(f) (West 1980).
35. 33 Cal. 3d at 695, 660 P.2d at 843, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
1. 32 Cal. 3d 816, 654 P.2d 193, 187 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1982).
2. 32 Cal. 3d 779, 654 P.2d 168, 187 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1982).
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II. JuDmciAL REVIEW OF FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS
A. Standard of Review
In evaluating the validity of a franchise restriction, the court
must first determine the applicable standard of review. In most
cases, the two-tiered test is applied. If the legislation bears a ra-
tional relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose, it is
valid. If, however, the legislation involves a "suspect classifica-
tion" or a "fundamental right," strict scrutiny is applied requiring
the state to show that the distinctions created in the legislation
are necessarv to serve a compelling state interest.3
B. Identifiable Class cf Voters
It is well settled that strict scrutiny is the standard to be ap-
plied to legislation which "excludes certain potential voters from
participation."'4 It has further been held that if a voting restriction
does not discriminate against an "identifiable class" of voters, the
provision will not be viewed as a violation of the equal protection
clause. 5 A legislative classification which has minimal or no effect
on the fundamental right to vote will avoid the application of
strict scrutiny,6 while one which has a real and appreciable im-
pact upon the equality, fairness, and integrity of the electoral pro-
cess will be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.7
Courts have focused on the legislative classifications effect on the
electoral pro~ess in choosing its standard of review.
III. STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIED
A. Citizens Aaainst Forced Annexation
1. Facts
A group ofl Fastview citizens submitted a petition to the Local
3. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 951-52, 501 P.2d 537, 543-44, 104
Cal. Rptr. 297, 303-04 (1972).
4. Hawn v. County of Ventura, 73 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1019, 141 Cal. Rptr. 111,
116, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1977). See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Hauma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam); Curtis
v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d at 952, 501 P.2d at 544, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
5. Weber v. City Council, 9 Cal. 3d 950, 513 P.2d 601, 109 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1973);
Bordon v. Larce, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
6. Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 670, 536 P.2d 1337, 1342-43, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377,
382-83 (1975).
7. Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d 660, 664, 552 P.2d 438, 440, 131 Cal. Rptr. 654 656
(1976).
Agency Formation Commission of Los Angeles County (LAFCO)
proposing annexation of its unincorporated territory to the City of
Rancho Palos Verdes.8 As required by statute,9 an enviromental
study was prepared and, finding no significant environmental im-
pact, a negative impact statement was filed. A number of hear-
ings were held and LAFCO approved the annexation proposal
and instructed the city to begin annexation proceedings.O The
plaintiffs, a coalition of residents and homeowner associations
from the city sought a declaration that statutory procedures re-
garding annexation were unconstitutional and an injunction to
prevent defendants from certifying the election's completion."
A day after the lawsuit was filed, a hearing was held to hear
protests, and, in compliance with statutory requirements,12 the
City called an election limiting participation to residents of the af-
fected territory. The proposal was approved by the majority of
the voters. However, the superior court granted an injunction
which prevented the filing of the election's certificate of
completion.
On appeal of this injunction, appellant raised an issue of first
impression: whether legislation which limits voting participation
to residents of the territory to be annexed violates the equal pro-
tection rights of residents of the annexing city.
2. Annexation Elections and Strict Scrutiny
The limitation of voting rights in elections held to determine
whether a city will be incorporated13 or if a territory will be an-
8. The Local Agency Formation Commission of Los Angeles County adopted
this proposal by resolution pursuant to California Government Code section 35157
(West Supp. 1983). The entire process is governed by the Municipal Organization
Act of 1977, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 35000-35500 (West Supp. 1983).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 35152 (West Supp. 1983).
10. If the proposal is adopted by resolution the commission must initiate an-
nexation proceedings. The conducting authority, after receiving protests from vot-
ers and landowners from the area to be annexed, must take one of three courses
of action: (1) terminate the proceedings, (2) call a special election for the voters of
the affected territory, or (3) order the territory annexed or detached without an
election, depending upon the number of registered voters in the affected territory
who have filed and not withdrawn written protests. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 35228
(West Supp. 1983) as discussed by the court. 32 Cal. 3d at 820, 654 P.2d at 195-96,
187 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
11. California Government Code sections 35350-35357 (West Supp. 1983) pro-
vide the procedures for certification and completion of a municipal reorganization.
Requirements include recording a copy of the certificate of completion with the
county recorder, California Government Code section 35352 (West Supp. 1983),
and filing a notice with the Secretary of State describing the reorganization, Cali-
fornia Government Code section 35357 (West Supp. 1983).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 35228 (West Supp. 1983).
13. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d at 951, 501 P.2d at 545, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 303.
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nexed14 does I affect a fundamental right. As discussed in section
II, the standard of review to be applied in such cases is strict
scrutiny. This test must be applied to "determine the constitu-
tionally relevant boundaries, 'the geographic confines of the gov-
ernmental entity concerned' and subject to strict scrutiny any
measure which limits voting within those boundaries."' 5
To apply s trict scrutiny in this case, the relevant boundaries
must first be determined. While an argument can be made that
either the annexing city or the territory to be annexed 16 is the
governmental entity concerned," the court concludes that "the
relevant area includes both the affected territory and the affected
city."17 The residents of each area share the general concerns of
the wealth and governance of the whole area. Residents of each
area will be entitled to participate in city government, and the
benefits of municipal services and will also be subject to the city's
laws and tax requirements.
Since the statute limits voting rights within the "constitution-
ally relevant boundaries," the restriction must serve a compelling
state interest to be considered valid. The Commission asserts
that three state interests are served by the voting restriction: (1)
avoiding the additional cost and administrative burden of ex-
tending the vote; (2) avoiding the danger that the votes of the res-
idents of the area to be incorporated will be overwhelmed by the
votes of the less interested city residents; and (3) avoiding the
risk that the area to be incorporated will be unable to obtain city
services if city residents do not favor annexation.18 The court re-
viewed all three asserted grounds stating that each may qualify
as a compelling interest under the constitutional test but deter-
mined that only the third ground "could justify compelling cities
to annex adjoining territory even if the city's residents oppose
annexation "19
14. Levinso hn v. City of San Rafael, 40 Cal. App. 3d 656, 659, 115 Cal. Rptr. 309,
310 (1974).
15. Fullerton, 32 Cal. 3d at 822, 654 P.2d at 197, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (quoting
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68 (1978)).
16. The court points out that the city's territory will be augmented and that
the legal status of the annexed territory will be altered. 32 Cal. 3d at 822, 654 P.2d
at 197, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
17. 32 Cal. 3d at 824, 654 P.2d at 198, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
18. Id. at 824, 654 P.2d at 198-99, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
19. Id. at 824, 654 P.2d at 199, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 429. Asserted interests one and
two could serve a compelling interest in cases involving the annexation of a terri-
tory having few residents to a much larger city where the factors of inordinate cost
The determinative factor was the asserted state interest in per-
mitting unincorporated territories the election of joining adjacent
cities to obtain the benefits of municipal government and serv-
ices. 20 The evolution of California's annexation statutes, which at
one time allowed somewhat unstructured "sub-warfare" in annex-
ation controversies and then .eventually provided that local gov-
ernmental authorities deal with annexation proposals,2 1 seems to
support the asserted interest.22 The goal of the Municipal Organi-
zation Act of 1977 was to provide municipal services to areas
outside of the city and the Act implied that municipal government
can provide these services most efficiently by annexing the
unincoporated area rather than by allowing other agencies to per-
form this function. 23
The court pointed out that the legislature's goals of promoting
orderly and logical community development and providing munic-
ipal services could be undermined if the annexing city had the
power to veto the local commissioner's determinations. To extend
such powers to municipalities could result in the "creation or per-
petuation of islands of unwanted, unincorporated territories. '24
The state has a compelling interest in avoiding such areas of un-
wanted land, and the restrictions imposed by sections 35228 and
3523125 are necessary to the accomplishment of this interest. The
court therefore found these restrictions valid and constitutional.
B. Fullerton Joint High School District
1. Facts
The Yorba Linda community is a part of the Fullerton High
School District though the two areas are physically separated by
and administrative burden and the possible nullifying effect of disinterested vot-
ers would be a danger. This is compared to an annexation election in which the
two affected areas are relatively equal and annexation would have a significant ef-
fect on each. The relevant statute did draw an acceptable distinction regarding
elections in which the vote may properly be limited; however, the asserted inter-
ests can be achieved by less restrictive means.
20. Id. at 828, 654 P.2d at 202, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
21. CAL, GOV'T CODE §§ 54774, 54790, 54796 (West Supp. 1982). Although local
commissions were established to deal with annexation proposals, the Annexation
Act of 1913 which empowered the residents of the affected areas to determine an-
nexation disputes was not actually repealed until passage of the Municipal Organ-
ization Act of 1977.
22. In 1963 the California Legislature established a Local Agency Formation
Commission in every county to "intervene in boundary decisions affecting local
governments." Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc. v. City of Pittsburg, 52 Cal. App. 3d 983, 995,
124 Cal. Rptr. 698, 707 (1975).
23. 32 Cal. 3d at 829, 654 P.2d at 202, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
24. Id. at 829, 654 P.2d at 202, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 35228, 35231 (West Supp. 1983).
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the Placentia Unified School District.26 As a result of this separa-
tion, Yorba Linda high school students had to be bused five to
seven miles to and from school each day. To alleviate the
problems caused by this separation, the Orange County Commit-
tee on School District Organization prepared a plan to create a
new unified school district in Yorba Linda. Having found all stat-
utory requirements to be satisfied,27 the plan was submitted to
the State Board of Education for approval. The Committee also
decided that the election would be held only in the Yorba Linda
area, thus excluding all residents of the Fullerton District from
participation.
The State Department of Education submitted a report to the
Board stating that the plan substantially complied with the statu-
tory requirements and approved the election limitation restricting
the election to the Yorba Linda area. The Board voted unani-
mously to approve the plan.28 In response to the election results,
the Fullerton District filed a petition for a writ of mandate which
challenged the plan's compliance with statutory requirements
and claimed that the election should not have been limited to
Yorba Linda residents. Although the trial court found that the
plan complied with four of the statutory requirements, 29 it was
held that the lBoard abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily and
capriciously in approving a plan which tended to promote racial
segregation, which failed to comply with state environmental re-
quirements, and which violated the Fullerton District resident's
right to vote.30
26. A unified school district has grades kindergarten through twelve while the
Yorba Linda Elementary School District has only grades kindergarten through
eight. 32 Cal. 3d at 784 n.1, 654 P.2d at 171 n.1, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 401 n.1.
27. School organization plans must meet the following requirements: (a) new
districts must have adequate enrollment; (b) new districts will have adequate
financial ability; (c) each new district will have substantial community identity;
(d) the plan will result in an equitable division of the property and facilities of the
original district;I and (e) formation of the new district will not promote racial or
ethnic discrimination or segregation. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 4200 (West 1978).
28. The Board had to find that the plan substantially complied with the statu-
tory requirements of Section 4200 and "review the propriety of the County Com-
mittee's designation of the territory in which the election will be held." 32 Cal. 3d
at 785, 654 P.2d at 172, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
29. The plan substantially complied with requirements of adequate enroll-
ment, adequate financial ability, community identity, and equitable division of
property. Id. at 785-86, 654 P.2d at 172, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
30. Id. at 786, 654 P.2d at 172, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
2. Limitation of the Election and the Application of Strict
Scrutiny
As stated above in section II B, legislative classifications which
have a real impact on the equities of the electoral process will be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.3 1 The court states that this case
is clearly an instance of appreciable impact on a fundamental
right and, therefore, strict scrutiny should be applied.32
The State Board asserted that the classification at issue is geo-
graphical and thus strict scrutiny should only be applied if "the
exclusion results in some impermissible end."33 To support this
assertion, the Board cited to Town of Lockport v. Citizens for
Community Action 34 and Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa;35
however, neither of these cases supports the avoidance of strict
scrutiny here.
The New York law at issue in Lockport provided for the adop-
tion of a new county charter by approval of separate majorities of
city and noncity residents. The substantial but different interests
of the city and noncity voters was held to justify the "concurrent
majorities" of the two groups. 36 It is important to note, however,
that while Lockport does affirm that states can constitutionally
require concurrent majorities of two groups with substantial but
different interests, there is no support for the assertion that a
classification which excludes the residents of one of the areas
should not be subject to strict scrutiny.3 7 The statute in Lockport
gave equal recognition to the affected groups as opposed to the se-
lective recognition in the statute at issue in Fullerton. This case
does not support the Board's claim of immunity from strict
scrutiny.
At issue in the other case cited by the Board, Holt Civic Club, 38
was an Alabama statute which allowed the extention of police
31. Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d at 664, 552 P.2d at 440-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 656-
57.
32. 32 Cal. 3d at 799, 654 P.2d at 182, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 412. This case is analo-
gized to two Supreme Court decisions where voting restrictions applied to munici-
pal and school districts were invalidated after failing the application of strict
scrutiny. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
33. For example, the impermissible goal of racial discrimination, as demon-
strated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redefinition of city bounda-
ries excluded most black voters).
34. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
35. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
36. 32 Cal. 3d at 801, 654 P.2d at 183, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The requirement of
separate voter approval was based on the recognition of "substantially differing
electoral interests." Id.
37. Id.
38. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
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regulation and licensing authority to unincorporated areas within
three miles of the city limits even though nonresidents were im-
mune from a number of municipal powers. The residents of the
unincorporated area claimed that because they were excluded
from voting, the city's exercise of power beyond its limits was un-
constitutional.3 9 It was determined in Holt that the state did not
deprive anyo ne within the relevant geographical boundary (the
city of Tuscaloosa), strict scrutiny did not apply, and the plan sat-
isfied the "rational relationship test." If a classification limits vot-
ing rights within the "geographic boundaries of the govermental
entity concerIned"40 strict scrutiny still applies. 41 The impact of
the election regarding the Board's plan will have a considerable
impact on the entire Fullerton District42 and the District is con-
sidered by the court to be a part of the relevant geographic area
requiring the application of strict scrutiny to the classification.
The Board also cites Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist. 43 to support its claim that strict scrutiny does
not apply in elections which involve "a special district of limited
powers whose activities disproportionately affect members of a
particular group" when the vote is restricted to that group.44 In
Salyer, a franchise restriction allowing only landowners to vote in
an election for directors of the water storage district was upheld
because the financing was solely supported by levies on the land-
owners and the disproportionate effect of the district's activities
on the landowners.45 Similar reasoning has been applied in Cali-
fornia cases c1oncerning a reclamation district,46 a small irrigation
district,4, and elections concerning a park and recreation dis-
trict.4 The clourt points out, however, that Salyer attempted to
39. 32 Cal. 3 at 802, 654 P.2d at 184, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
40. Holt Civi Club, 439 U.S. at 68.
41. 32 Cal. 3d at 803, 654 P.2d at 184, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
42. For examrple, the Fullerton District may owe a substantial debt to the
newly created district which would have to be paid by residents of the Fullerton
District. The withdrawal of all Yorba Linda students would also have a considera-
ble impact on the Fullerton District. Id.
43. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
44. 32 Cal. 3c at 803, 654 P.2d at 185, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
45. Salyer, 4 0 U.S. at 731.
46. Philippar v. Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation Dist., 54 Cal. App. 3d 797, 127Cal. Rptr. 42 (19 7 6).*
47. Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1969).
48. Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n,
51 Cal. App. 3d 648, 124 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1975).
distinguish the water district election by emphasizing that educa-
tion is a vital government function and has a broad impact. The
water district election is of a limited purpose and disproportion-
ate effect and should therefore be excluded from strict scrutiny.4 9
This narrow exception does not support the Board's claim that
strict scrutiny should not be applied in the school district
election.
Having determined that strict scrutiny must be applied, the
court found no compelling state interest which would validate the
voting restriction. Both Yorba Linda and Fullerton District resi-
dents have a substantial interest in the election's outcome and
the exclusion of Fullerton residents is a denial of equal
protection.
3. The Plan's Compliance With Statutory Requirements
The court also reviewed the trial court's finding that the plan
substantially complied with the requirements of section 4200 of
the Education CodesO and whether the requirements of the Cali-
fornia Environmental Act 51 were met by the plan. The court re-
viewed the Board's actions to determine whether they were
arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or
unlawfully or procedurally unfair.52
The court studied the plan's compliance with each of the statu-
tory requirements: (1) the new district must have adequate en-
rollment; (2) the new district must have adequate financial
ability; (3) the division of property must be equitable; and (4) the
plan will not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segrega-
tion.53 In reviewing the plan, the court found that the Board did
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary support
when it approved the proposal.54 The Board's actions were there-
49. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 727-28.
50. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 4200 (West 1978).
51. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21050 (West 1977).
52. The Board's approval of a proposal to form a school district pursuant to
California Education Code sections 4200-4419 (West 1978) qualifies as a "quasi-leg-
islative" act. Such administrative agency decisions are therefore reviewed under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824,
833, 377 P.2d 83, 88, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1962).
53. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 4200 (West 1978). The court did not address the re-
maining requirement, i.e., that the new districts be organized on the basis of sub-
stantial community identity because the Fullerton High School District did not
contend that the plan failed to comply in that regard. 32 Cal. 3d at 787, 654 P.2d at
173, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
54. The court found that the enrollment of the new district was relatively low,
32 Cal. 3d at 789, 654 P.2d at 174, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 404; that there was a 17.19% devia-
tion of the Yorba Linda revenue limit from the Fullerton revenue limit, id. at 790,
654 P.2d at 174-75, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 405; that the actual effect of the property divi-
sion was uncertain, id. at 792, 654 P.2d at 176, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 406; and that the
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fore upheld.
The court also reviewed the plan's compliance with the Califor-
nia Environ ental Quality Act requirements that any public
agency undertaking a project which may have significant environ-
mental impact first conduct a study of the impact. 55 Although the
Board had sinply approved the plan and no action had been
taken, this approval was an essential step in implementing the
plan which would ultimately lead to environmental impact.56 A
study is required in this case.
Not only must the study be carried out, it should have been
completed before the plan was approved. The Act is intended to
ensure that the environmental impact of a project is considered in
the decision Taking process. 5 7 In order to carry out this purpose,
the Board should have had the environmental data, which a study
would provid6, before it in making its decision. The Board's fail-
ure to carry out and consider the plan was a violation of the Act.5 8
The trial court's order that the Board vacate its approval of the
plan and prohibition of the election until the Act's requirements
are met was 'ordered to be modified consistent with this court's
view.
IV. CONCLUSION
In reviewing these two cases, the court has made two important
statements r garding acceptable franchise restrictions. In Citi-
zens Against I'orced Annexation the court affirmed that franchise
restrictions affecting either the annexing city or the territory to be
annexed musjt be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.
The state does have, however, a compelling interest in allowing
residents of unincorporated territories to take advantage of the
proposed district would have a predominantly white population while the minority
enrollment of the Fullerton District would increase. Id. at 792, 654 P.2d at 176, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 406. None of these problems were sufficient, however, to show that
the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary support. Id. at
794, 654 P.2d at 177, 187 Cal. Rptr. 407.
55. CAL. PUs. RES. CODE § 2150 (West 1977).
56. This cas is similar to Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal.
3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975) (annexation approval is a necessary
step which will culminate in environmental impact and requires an environmental
report).
57. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 256-57, 502 P.2d
1049, 1054-55, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766-67 (1972).
58. 32 Cal. 3a at 798, 654 P.2d at 180-81, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
benefits of municipal government and services. This interest sat-
isfied the application of strict scrutiny, and the voting restriction
in Citizens was held to be valid.
In Fullerton, the court applied strict scrutiny in the context of a
school organization election. The residents of the Yorba Linda
area were to vote on a proposal to create their own unified district
seceding from the Fullerton District. Again the court applied
strict scrutiny. In this case both areas were found to have sub-
stantial interest in the election and the exclusion of Fullerton vot-
ers was held to be a violation of equal protection.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. An arrestee has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the back seat of a police car: People v. Crowson.
Although the court in People v. Crowson' resolved a question of
statutory interpretation concerning enhancement of criminal
sentences, it also added to the confusion surrounding the more
important question of an arrested suspect's right to privacy. 2 In
addressing the statutory question, the court held that the sen-
tence enhancement allowed in Penal Code section 667.53 may be
premised upon a foreign conviction and prison term only if the el-
ements of the foreign crime, as defined by the law under which
the defendant was convicted, are the same as those enumerated
by California law for the same felony.4 This resolved some ap-
parent disagreement in the lower courts.5 As to the question of
an arrested suspect's privacy interests, the divided court found
that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
when he was placed in the back of a police car with his co-
1. 33 Cal. 3d 623, 660 P.2d 389, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1983). Justice Kaus wrote the
opinion for the court, with Justice Mosk concurring generally. See infra note 2 for
a more detailed analysis of the composition of the court.
2. Justice Broussard and Chief Justice Bird concurred to establish a majority
as to the enhancement question. Justice Richardson dissented on this point. On
the question of the defendant's privacy rights, Justice Richardson concurred, Jus-
tice Broussard agreed with the court's holding for different reasons (thereby mak-
ing the decision on the issue a plurality), and Chief Justice Bird dissented. The
fact that the privacy issue was resolved by a plurality, that one member of that
group may hold differently in the future, and that the perceived attitude of Brous-
sard, the newest member of the court (who did not participate in this decision)
indicating he would side with the minority, suggest that the question is far from
resolved. See 96 L.A. Daily J., March 25, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West Supp. 1983).
4. 33 Cal. 3d at 632, 660 P.2d at 395, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
5. Compare People v. Hickey, 109 Cal. App. 3d 426, 438-39, 167 Cal. Rptr. 256,
262-63 (1980) with People v. Plies, 121 Cal. App. 3d 676, 678-82, 177 Cal. Rptr. 4, 5-7
(1981); People v. Cheri, 127 Cal. App. 3d 280, 283-85, 179 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424-26 (1981);
and People v. Roberson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 890, 894-95, 146 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1978).
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suspect.6
The case arose when defendant Earl Bradley Crowson was ar-
rested in San Diego after he was implicated in a robbery. He was
taken to the central police station, questioned briefly, and then
told he would be taken to the county jail by car. Crowson was
placed in the tack of a police cruiser with Ruben Romero, a sus-
pect in the crime who had implicated Crowson. Romero and
Crowson were apparently left alone for approximately half an
hour, during which they discussed their alleged criminal conduct.
Their stateme jits were damaging and, unbeknownst to them, were
recorded.7 The recording was later played at Crowson's trial
where he was convicted of robbery and burglary. Crowson ap-
pealed, citing The grounds noted above as reversible error.8
Crowson contended that the admission of the tape recording vi-
olated his federal fifth amendment rights as defined in Miranda v.
Arizona 9 and h is state constitutional right to privacy.' 0 The court
summarily disposed of the Miranda question by noting that the
issue was not raised at trial and had, therefore, been waived." A
contrary holding would very nearly mandate proof of compliance
with Miranda, in every criminal case,12 a result which would seem
6. 33 Cal. 3d at 629, 660 P.2d at 392, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
7. Id. at 627, 660 P.2d at 391, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 167. Romero and Crowson appar-
ently became aware of the recording device before anyone returned and, instead
of erasing the tape, tried to "exculpate" themselves with further statements.
8. Id. at 628, 660 P.2d at 391, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant's Miranda argument would be that the pro-
cess amounted to an interrogation without a Miranda warning or that after a
warning he expressed an intention not to speak without counsel present.
10. 33 Cal. 3dat 628, 660 P.2d at 391, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 167. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1
provides in pertinent part: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable lights. Among these [is the right to] privacy."
11. "Because Crowson failed to pursue this matter at trial, the People had no
reason or opportunity to present evidence on this factual threshold question." 33
Cal. 3d at 628, 660 P.2d at 392, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
12. Id. Apparently the court had touched on this issue just once before and
then it was in a juvenile context. In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 462, 540 P.2d 296,
307, 75 Cal. Rptr. , 12 (1969). The appellate courts have often dealt with the issue,
generally resolving it just as the Crowson court did. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 60
Cal. App. 3d 112, 16, 131 Cal. Rptr. 305, 307 (1976); People v. Peters, 23 Cal. App. 3d
522, 530, 101 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407-08, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ('There is abun-
dant authority in this state that if there is no objection at the trial to the admission
of a confession qr of statements obtained in violation of Miranda, the objection
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.").
Defendant contended on appeal that the Miranda issue should be heard none-
theless, either because there had been an unforeseeable change in the law or be-
to extend the privilege beyond its original intention.13
Turning to the question of defendant's privacy interests, the
majority observed that the right to privacy guaranteed by the Cal-
ifornia Constitution is no greater than that provided for by the
fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches in a criminal context.' 4 This conclusion was rejected by
Chief Justice Bird (with Justice Reynoso concurring), who argued
vigorously that the very reason for the addition of privacy to sec-
tion one rights was to expand those rights beyond the fourth
amendment.' 5
The court rejected Crowson's contention that White v. Davis'6
created an expanded privacy interest that may be abridged only
upon the showing of a compelling state interest, noting that non-
criminal surveillance first amendment rights were involved.'7
Hence, the court seemed to suggest that the extent to which a
person's privacy interests are protected is dependent upon the
nature of the intrusion. If this is so, what may amount to an im-
permissible intrusion in a non-criminal/civil context may be a
permissible intrusion in a criminal investigation.
cause the assistance of his trial counsel was constitutionally defective. The court
rejected these contentions.
As to defendant's first contention, neither California nor federal law recognized
any privacy interest in a non-privileged custodial conversation at the time of the
recording or trial, but recognized it at the time of the appeal. The court apparently
was of the opinion that the change was foreseeable, although no pattern of case
law was cited to support this proposition. This summary conclusion stands in
sharp contrast to the court's prior handling of this issue. See People v. De Santi-
ago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 22-28, 453 P.2d 353, 355-59, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811-15 (1969) (the
court presented an extensive discussion of case law in support of its conclusion
that the change was not foreseeable).
In rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the court had cited People v. Pope,
23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979), where a criminal defendant
was found to be entitled to the assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent con-
scientious advocate. However, the battle on this issue is not over yet for defend-
ant Crowson. Since the court refused to reach the issue, a writ of habeas corpus
was filed with the trial court and rejected. At time of publication, the question was
pending before the court of appeal. Telephone interview with Jeffrey J. Stuetz,
Deputy Public Defender for the State of California (Aug. 15, 1983).
13. 33 Cal. 3d at 629, 660 P.2d at 392, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was ultimately in-
tended to prevent police abuse of sixth amendment rights, not to add another ele-
ment of proof at every criminal trial.
15. 33 Cal. 3d at 637-38, 660 P.2d at 398-99, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75. This "legisla-
tive intent" argument, however, is based upon the ballot statements prepared for
voters at the time of the amendment's enactment, while the majority relies on
case law. Though the latter is binding authority, the former may be more persua-
sive. The dissent also questions the majority's distinction that here the right must
be interpreted in " a criminal context." Id. at 638 n.1, 660 P.2d at 399 n.1, 190 Cal.
Rptr. at 175 n.1 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
16. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
17. 33 Cal. 3d at 629 n.5, 660 P.2d at 392 n.5, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168 n.5.
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The court then observed that Crowson's right of privacy as de-
lineated by the fourth amendment turned on whether he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the back of the police car (a
la Katz in the phone booth).18 The court candidly observed that
Crowson undoubtedly expected that his conversation with his ac-
complice would be private, yet concluded that there was no "rea-
sonable" expectation of privacy. The court pointed to numerous
other decisio s, from California and other states, reaching the
same conclusion. The tacitly expressed critical distinction be-
tween Crowson and Katz was that Crowson was in police custody
while Katz was not. Crowson's recent arrest was "a most extreme
interference with his right to be left alone."' 9 However; this rea-
soning appears circuitous. The denial of a person's liberty is not a
basis for the wholesale abrogation of all his constitutional inter-
ests, especially where there is not yet a conviction.20
The court concluded its consideration of the privacy issue by
noting that its decision in DeLancie v. Superior Court2 l was not in
conflict with its holding in Crowson. DeLancie, it is observed,
dealt with sections 2600 and 2601 of the Penal Code-which apply
only, in the court's view, to prison inmates and jail detainees. The
proposition t at a convicted prisoner has greater privacy rights
than an arrested suspect is noticeably incongruous. 22
With the privacy issue disposed of, the court turned to the pro-
priety of the triq] court's enhancement 3 of Crowson's sentence. 24
18. Id. at 629, 660 P.2d at, 392-93, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967). Katz was in a phone booth that was "bugged." The
state contended that since the booth was glass, he had no "reasonable expectation
of privacy." The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that a reasonable person
would expect his conversation to be private.
19. 33 Cal. 3d at 629, 660 P.2d at 392-93, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
20. The appaent refusal of police agencies and the courts to recognize this
has resulted in an effort to curtail and control the traditional strip search of vari-
ous suspects.
21. 31 Cal. 34 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982).
22. This conflict is noted by Justice Broussard in his opinion: "[T]he reason-
ing of [DeLancie) necessarily casts doubt upon any parallel rule declaring that ar-
restees placed in a police car can never reasonably expect privacy, even if the
police have deliberately encouraged that expectation." 33 Cal. 3d at 635-36, 660
P.2d at 397-98, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that, but for the fact that DeLancie was decided after Crow-
son's trial, Broussard would. most likely have been on the other side, thereby
changing the ruling of the court. Hence, in light of the tenor of the court's newest
Justice, the holding of this case may be short lived. 96 L.A. Daily J., March 25,
1983, at 1, col. 2.
23. "Enhancement" of criminal sentences is intended to provide added dis-
Crowson carried a previous felony conviction from a federal juris-
diction on his record: conspiracy to possess a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. In order for this conviction to
support enhancement, it had to be based on the same elements as
those set forth in the California statute.25 Crowson contended
that his federal conviction was not premised upon a statute re-
quiring an overt act, which was specifically required by the Cali-
fornia statute, and that enhancement was therefore improper.26
The state argued that the federal statute did require an overt act,
and that even if it did not, an overt act was included in Crowson's
indictment and thus supported his conviction.27
Since Crowson conceded that the enhancement would be
proper if the federal crime was construed to include an overt act,
couragement to repeat offenders and to exact retribution from those who commit
particularly vicious crimes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West Supp. 1983) (pro-
viding for an addition of three years where defendant is convicted of a "violent fel-
ony" or an additional year if the defendant is a previously sentenced felon). See
also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 667.51, 667.6 (West Supp. 1983) (respectively provid-
ing for enhancement where defendant is a "serious felony habitual criminal," has
committed a lewd act with a child, or has repeatedly committed certain particu-
larly heinous crimes).
24. 33 Cal. 3d at 630, 660 P.2d at 393, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
25. See supra notes 3, 21, & 22 and accompanying text. Section 667.5 provides
in pertinent part:
Enhancement of prison terms for new offenses because of prior prison
terms shall be imposed as follows:
(b) [w]here the new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence is
imposed, in addition and consecutive to any other prison terms therefor,
the court shall impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term
served for any felony....
(f) A prior conviction of a felony shall include a conviction in another ju-
risdiction for an offense which if committed in California is punishable by
imprisonment in state prison provided the defendant served one year or
more in prison for such offense in the other jurisdiction. A prior convic-
tion of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction
for an offense which includes all of the elements of the particular felony
as defined under California law provided the defendant served one year or
more in prison for such offense in the other jurisdiction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West Supp. 1983).
26. 33 Cal. 3d at 630, 660 P.2d at 393, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Crowson was con-
victed of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in
this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may
not exceed the maximum punishment prescibed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). The section is ambiguous as to the necessity of an overt act.
In contrast, the California statute clearly requires an overt act:
No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside such
agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or
more of the parties to such agreement and the trial of cases of conspiracy
may be had in any country in which any such act be done.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 1970).
27. 33 Cal. 3d at 630, 660 P.2d at 393, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
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the court resolvea that issue first. Noting that the statute was un-
clear as to whether an overt act was required,28 the court turned
to case law applying the statute. This provided no simple solu-
tion, but the court ultimately concluded that no overt act need be
proved to find a violation of the statute.29
This requir ed the court to resolve conflicting appellate deci-
sions. One case held that enhancement was improper where the
specified elements of the other jurisdiction's crime are not identi-
cal to those in California,30 while others have suggested that in
some circumstances it is permissible for a court to go beyond the
elements of the foreign crime to determine whether the defend-
ant's actual conduct would have resulted in a similar California
conviction. 3 1 Considering the language of the enhancement stat-
ute,32 the court concluded that enhancement was proper only
where the foreign conviction included all California elements of
28. See supr9 note 26 for the full text of the statute.
29. 33 Cal. 3d at 631-32, (660 P.2d at 394-95, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71. The court
points to United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1975) in noting that the
federal circuits do not agree on the requirement of an overt act. In concluding that
no overt act is required by the Ninth Circuit, the court observes that although an
overt act is often mentioned "in passing" as one of the elements of a drug conspir-
acy charge, see, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 660 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1981), it has
never been at issue in a case. The court also suggests that a recent Ninth Circuit
decision "implicitly acknowledge [s]" that an overt act may not be required for a
section 846 violation. See United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th
Cir. 1980). The collective third strike in the court's eyes was the circuit's consis-
tent finding that no overt act was required by decisions interpreting the statutory
predecessors to section 846. See Ewing v. United States, 386 F.2d 10, 15 (9th Cir.
1967) (interpreting former 21 U.S.C. § 176a); Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714,
717 n.4 (9th Cir. 1967) (interpreting former 21 U.S.C. § 174). The court concluded:
To our knowledge, there is nothing in the legislative history of the 1970 re-
vision of the federal drug laws-which produced, inter alia, 21 United
States Code section 84E--that suggests that Congress intended to add a
new overt act requirement to the revised federal drug conspiracy provi-
sions (see U nited States v. DeViteri (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 350 F. Supp. 550, 552),
and cases outside of the Ninth Circuit have relied on the Ninth Circuit's
Ewing decision in concluding that 21 United States Code section 846 does
not requirel proof of an overt act. (See, e.g., United States v. Bernudez,
supra, 526 F.2d 89, 94, United States v. DeViteri, supra, 350 F. Supp. 550,
551-552).
33 Cal. 3d at 632, 660 P.2d at 394, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
30. People v. Hickey, 109 Cal. App. 3d 426, 438-39, 167 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262-63
(1980).
31. People v. Plies, 121 Cal. App. 3d 676, 678-82, 177 Cal. Rptr. 4, 5-7 (1981); Peo-
ple v. Cheri, 127 Cal. App. 3d 280, 283-85, 179 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424-26 (1981); People v.
Roberson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 890, 894-95, 146 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1978).
32. The relevant subsection of 667.5 is set forth in full supra at note 25. The
court concluded that the use of the term "offense" in the statute referred to a
crime and not merely the actual conduct of the defendant and that the word had a
the crime.33 Support for this conclusion was found in case law in-
terpreting other enhancement statutes. 34
The People had argued that even if an overt act was not found
to be an element of the crime, an overt act was set forth in the
indictment on which the conviction was based. Looking to the
United States Supreme Court, the court rejected this argument,
noting that a guilty plea is simply an admission of "all the ele-
ments of a formal criminal charge."35 The court also observed
that enhancement should not turn on the whim of the prosecutor
who drafted the indictment.3 6
Crowson thus resolved an important question as to the applica-
tion of enhancement-but did little to clarify an arrestee's privacy
interests. This case does not represent a final resolution of the
privacy issue, as it is merely a plurality opinion on that point, and
it appears that Justice Broussard may hold the other way the
next time the court considers the issue.37 An arrestee's custodial
privacy interests may take a back seat to other societal interests
for the moment, but the door is not yet completely closed.
B. Penal Code section 496 authorizes only a permissive
inference of guilty knowledge applicable to
secondhand dealers: People v. Roder.
Based on two new United States Supreme Court rulings regard-
ing presumptions and inferences,' the California Supreme Court
held in People v. Roder2 that section 496 of the Penal Code pre-
consistent meaning throughout the statute. See People v. Hernandez, 30 Cal. 3d
462, 468, 637 P.2d 706, 710, 179 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 (1981).
33. 33 Cal. 3d at 633, 660 P.2d at 395, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
34. See In re Finley, 68 Cal. 2d 389, 393, 438 P.2d 381, 384, 66 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736
(1968) ("neither the People nor the defendant can go behind. . . adjudicated ele-
ments in an attempt to show that he committed a greater, lesser, or different
offense").
35. McCarty v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
36. See People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1949). The court re-
jected the use of surplus allegations allowed by the courts under the former habit-
ual criminal law as inapplicable, since most of the cases involved situations where
defendant had a motive to attack the allegations for sentencing and parole pur-
poses. In addition, none of the cases addressed the "inherent problems" with such
practice. See In re Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 53, 187 P.2d 411, 417 (1947).
Justice Richards6n was the lone dissenter on the enhancement issue, positing
that since Crowson pleaded guilty to the indictment, he must have been guilty of
all the allegations made and that enhancement was therefore proper. 33 Cal. 3d at
636-37, 660 P.2d at 398, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 635-36, 660 P.2d at 397-98, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
1. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510 (1979). For further explanation, see infra notes 4-10 and accompany-
ing text.
2. 33 Cal. 3d 491, 658 P.2d 1302, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983). In January 1980,
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scribed a mandatory presumption, which created the possibility
that the jury, could interpret the presumption as relieving the
prosecution of the burden of proving each element of the crime.
As a result, the court found a constitutional error and reversed
the defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property.3I
In Ulster County Court v. Allen, 4 the United States Supreme
Court set forth the precise guidelines for analyzing the constitu-
tionality of an instruction regarding presumptions. Initially, the
trier of fact must distinguish between the two types of presump-
tions. The first type, a permissive inference, "allows-but does not
require--the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by
the prosecutor of the basic one and. . . places no burden of any
kind on the defendant."s The second category, a mandatory pre-
sumption, "tells the trier that he or they must find the elemental
fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has
come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connec-
tion between the two facts."6 Each type of presumption requires
a different standard of analysis. 7 A permissive inference will be
held constitutionally defective only if its use has caused the rea-
sonable factflnder to make an erroneous factual determination.
However, a mandatory presumption will be deemed an error ifI
"on its face"8 the resulting conclusion was insufficient to support
the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. With the intro-
Roder and a codefendant who were the proprietors of a secondhand shop were ar-
rested and charied with receiving stolen property.
3. Justice Kaus authored the opinion, expressing the unanimous view of the
court.
4. 442 U.S. aT ia.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id. (em hasis in original).
7. A permissive inference does not force the trier of the fact to draw any con-
clusions. He may accept or reject the inference. Also, this type of device does not
shift the burden' of proof to the defendant, and is constitutionally infirm only upon
a showing that no reasonable person could find the result permitted by the infer-
ence. See 33 Cal. 3d at 498, 658 P.2d at 1306, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
A mandatory presumption is a more complex evidentiary device. This pre-
sumption directs the trier to assume the existence of the ultimate, elemental fact
from proof of pIrticular, designated basic facts. The trier must assume this ulti-
mate fact, thus severely limiting his freedom to correlate all of the evidence
presented in order to determine whether the facts offered support guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
8. 442 U.S. at 157-60. The Court clearly distinguished between "on its face"
and "as applied" stating that mandatory presumptions may not be judged "as
applied."
duction of the Court's ruling in Sandstrom v. Montana, 9 an even
more stringent standard is required when a mandatory presump-
tion is utilized. This test further provides that the prosecution's
burden of proof has been met only if the "basic fact proved com-
pels the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."10
In the present case, defendant Roder claimed the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on the presumption of guilty knowl-
edge as applied to secondhand dealers, which is set forth in Penal
Code section 496.11 Defendant based this contention upon the rul-
ings in Ulster County and Sandstrom. In reversing defendant's
conviction, the court held that section 496 imposed a mandatory
presumption which ultimately shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant, a result inconsistent with the decisions in Winship,12
In re Ulster County, and Sandstrom.
Upon analyzing section 496,13 the court found the task of catego-
rizing the nature of the presumption in this case to be compli-
cated because section 496 was not utilized verbatim in the jury
9. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
10. 33 Cal. 3d at 498 n.7, 658 P.2d at 1306 n.7, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 505 n.7.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 1970) states in pertinent part:
Every person whose principal business is dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee
or representative of such person, who buys or receives any property
which has been stolen or obtained in any manner constituting theft or ex-
tortion, under such circumstances as should cause such person, agent,
employee or representative to make reasonable inquiry to ascertain that
the person from whom property was bought or received had the legal right
to sell or deliver it, without making such reasonable inquiry, shall be pre-
sumed to have bought or received such property knowing it to have been
so stolen or obtained. This presumption may, however, be rebutted by
proof.
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West Supp. 1983). This statute was amended
subsequent to the defendant's arrest.
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), established that the prosecution is con-
stitutionally required to prove the guilt of the defendant as to the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, thus including the knowledge element embodied in
the section 496 presumption.
13. Section 496 was not the exact jury instruction given; however, the court
found the actual instruction and section 496 similar. The actual instruction stated:
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants or either of
them, that their place of business or the place of business of either of
them, principal place of business was dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property or that defendants were
the agents or employees of such a person, that defendant or either of
them had bought or received stolen property under such circumstances as
would have caused the defendant or either of them to make reasonable in-
quiry that the person from whom such property was bought or received
had the legal right to sell or deliver it without the defendants making such
reasonable inquiry, then you shall presume that defendants bought or re-
ceived such property knowing it to have been stolen unless from all the
evidence you have reasonable doubt that defendants knew the property
was stolen.
33 Cal. 3d at 496 n.4, 658 P.2d at 1304 n.4, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.4. Cf. supra note 11
(text of section 496).
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instructions.14 beveral discrepancies between the two were
noted. First, the jury -was not instructed on the statutory defini-
tion of a "presumption" as provided for in Evidence Code section
600.15 Secondly, the jury was not informed of the provisions of
subdivision 3 of section 496, which allows the burden to be shifted
to the defendant upon the prosecution's establishment that (a)
the defendant was a secondhand dealer; and that (b) he had in
fact received stolen property under circumstances calling for rea-
sonable inquiry.16 The final incongruity, and apparently the most
troublesome aspect, was the court's instruction concerning the
conclusion of guilty knowledge. The jury was instructed to pre-
sume that defendant bought or received stolen property with
knowledge of its having been stolen, "unless from all the evidence
you have reasonable doubt that defendant knew the property was
stolen."' 7 While the first two inconsistencies may be viewed as
favorable to ihe defendant, the final one was found to be ambigu-
ous and thus confusing to an already bemused jury.18 The court
interpreted the last instruction as requiring the jury to presume,
upon the finding of certain basic facts, that the defendant had
criminal knowledge, unless of course it had a reasonable doubt.
The court ]also found fault with the trial court's clarification of
rebuttable aInd conclusive presumptions. It concluded that the
jury could have reasonably interpreted the court's statement as
relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.19 Accordingly, the court
ruled this a constitutional error in light of Ulster County and
14. "The constitutional issue before us is a bit more complicated, however, be-
cause the Supr me Court in Sandstrom explained that a determination of the na-
ture of the presumption at issue in any case 'requires careful attention to the
words actually spoken to the jury ... ' 33 Cal. 3d at 502, 658 P.2d at 1309, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 508 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514 (citation omitted)).
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1966). This definition provides that a pre-
sumption is an assumption "that the law requires to be made" from another fact.
Id. (emphasis Idded).
16. This event would normally lead the defendant to prove that he had made a
"reasonable inquiry" concerning ownership of the property in question. The
court's actual instructions were, in essence, that the prosecution had the burden of
proving that there had been no reasonable inquiry.
17. 33 Cal. 3d at 503, 658 P.2d at 1310, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (emphasis omitted).
18. During deliberation., the jury requested clarification of the instructions
they had been given. Id.
19. See 33 Cal. 3d at 504, 658 P.2d at 1311, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (the defendants
"can go forward and raise a reasonable doubt that they actually knew that").
Sandstrom. 20
The court concluded that section 496 should be preserved. The
Attorney General requested that it be construed as a legislatively
permissive inference in order to pass constitutional muster. On
the basis of Evidence Code section 501, the court concurred in
this conclusion. In its attempt to balance the unconstitutional ef-
fect of section 496 with its belief that some form of guidance for
the trier of fact is necessary, the court stipulated that section 496
be read as a permissive inference, thus maintaining the legislative
intent underlying the secondhand dealer statute. Upon doing so,
the court confirmed that the prosecution must retain the burden
of proving every element of the charged offense beyond a reason-
able doubt.21
C. Judge's remarks concerning credibility of witnesses
held inappropriate: People v. Cook.
People v. Cook, 33 Cal. 3d 400, 658 P.2d 86, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1983), raises the issue of how far a judge may go with his com-
ments in response to a request from a deadlocked jury. Here, the
defendant was charged and convicted with "preventing or dis-
suading a witness from attending a trial by means of force or
threats of unlawful injury." The prosecution's case consisted pri-
marily of testimony from the potential witness who was
threatened and from her 10 year-old daughter. There were no
other witnesses to the incident. The testimony of the two wit-
nesses was consistent, although the appellant attempted to de-
stroy the credibility of that testimony on cross-examination.
Five and one-half hours into the second day of jury delibera-
tions, the forewoman reported the jury deadlocked and delivered
a note indicating that their differences could be resolved if they
received an opinion from the court as to the credibility of the wit-
nesses. Despite the objection by appellant's counsel, the court
proceeded on the basis that its comments were "intended to be
advisory only."
While the law under Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10 does provide that
"[tihe court may make such comment on the evidence and the
20. Id. In accordance with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the court
did not rule this error "harmless." "The presumption in question directly affected
the only element of the offense that was in issue .... Under these circumstances,
we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruction did not affect the
jury's verdict." 33 Cal. 3d at 505, 658 P.2d at 1311, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE § 501 (West 1966) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[i] nsofar as any statute ... assigns the burden of proof in a criminal action, such
statute is subject to Penal Code Section 1096." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 relates the
rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is neces-
sary for the proper determination of the cause," the purpose of
this provision is limited to use of the trial court's experience and
training in the analysis of evidence, when attempting to assist the
jury. Because the supreme court felt the comments made at the
time of the jury s deadlocked position resulted in the usurpation
of "the function of the jury as the exclusive trier of fact," it re-
versed the judgment of conviction.
D. Effect of court's failure to state reasons for denying
Oail: In re Pipinos.
In re Pipinos, 33 Cal. 3d 189, 654 P.2d 1257, 187 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1982), provided an opportunity for the California Supreme Court
to delimit the requirements for an adequate statement of reasons
for denying release pending appeal.
Petitioner was convicted on conspiracy and possession of con-
trolled substances for sale and subsequently sent to state prison.
Petitioner moved for release on bail pending his appeal. The mo-
tion was deried for the following stated reasons: that petitioner
"posed a substantial flight risk," represented "some risk to soci-
ety," and there was not a "substantial likelihood of success on
appeal."
On appeal,1 petitioner claimed that the trial court had abused its
discretion and had failed to adequately articulate its reasons for
denying bail There is no absolute right to bail pending appeal.
The purpose of bail is to assure that the defendant will not leave
the jurisdiction. In exercising its discretion, a court may consider
the likelihoo d of defendant's flight, danger to society created by
defendant's release, and the frivolousness of appeal. If the court
decides to deny bail, it should give a brief statement of reasons
for the denial which would "permit meaningful review."
The court s reasons for denying petitioner bail amounted to
mere conclusory findings and did not evidence a consideration of
the relevant factors. Thus, the trial court's statement was inade-
quate because it did not allow for a review of its evaluative pro-
cess by an appellate court. To pass muster, "the statement
should clearly articulate the basis for the court's utilization of
[the relevari It factors] ."I
Because the trial court had failed to adequately state its rea-
sons for denying release on bail, the court did not have an ade-
quate record to address petitioner's claim that the trial court had
abused its discretion. The court denied the writ of habeas corpus,
but ordered the trial court to hold a new hearing.
E. Specific enforcement of plea bargain terms: People v.
Mancheno.
In People v. Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d 855, 654 P.2d 211, 187 Cal. Rptr.
441 (1982), the defendant, as the result of a plea bargain, pled
guilty to two counts of robbery and admitted using a firearm dur-
ing the commission of the robberies. In exchange, defendant was
to receive concurrent sentences and a diagnostic study by the De-
partment of Corrections. Defendant did not receive his diagnostic
study and therefore appealed, seeking specific enforcement of the
plea bargain term.
The court tested both the procedure of accepting the plea and
the implementation of its terms by due process standards, thus
raising a constitutional right to a remedy. Such relief should re-
dress the harm caused "without prejudicing either party or cur-
tailing the normal sentencing discretion of the trial judge."
Specific enforcement is an acceptable remedy when the parties'
expectations will be satisfied without tying the hands of the trial
judge to impose a proper sentence.
The Attorney General's argument that defendant waived the di-
agnostic study when he responded negatively to the court's ques-
tion: "Is there any just or legal cause why sentence should not
now be pronounced?" was not persuasive since granting the study
was a precondition to his plea. The court also rejected the Attor-
ney General's argument that the failure to perform the diagnostic
study was harmless error. Accordingly, the diagnostic test was
ordered to be carried out and defendant was to be resentenced.
F. Ineffective assistance of counsel: People v. Fosselman
In People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 659 P.2d 1144, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 855 (1983), the court vacated a trial court order denying Fos-
selman's motion for a new trial on grounds that he received inef-
fective assistance of counsel. From Fosselman's point of view,
however, the decision may have been more "bark than bite" as
the court left the prison door open by remanding to the trial court
for a finding as to the constitutional effectiveness of his lawyer.
Fosselman was charged with various counts of assault and bat-
tery after his attempt to force a young woman into an alley was
foiled by onlookers. He was convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon, false imprisonment, and battery. On appeal, the defend-
ant retained new counsel and raised various grounds of error in-
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eluding insufficiency of the evidence and constitutionally
ineffective counsel at trial.
The court rejected the allegations of error concerning the suffi-
ciency of the evidence with little discussion and moved on to Fos-
selman's claim that his counsel was ineffective. The record shows
that defendant's lawyer repeatedly failed to object to the clearly
improper conduct of the prosecutor who used inflammatory rheto-
ric while cross-examining defendant. The prosecutor also stated
his personal belief as to defendant's guilt, brought out an inad-
missible character witness, and attempted to arouse sexual
prejudice in the predominantly female jury. Perhaps most dam-
aging was the prosecutor's strong suggestion that Fosselman
wanted to rape the woman he accosted.
The court found that the prosecutor's "style" amounted to mis-
conduct, but noted that such misconduct by itself did not make
the conviction constitutionally defective. "[S]uch errors are
deemed waived if the defendant does not object to them at the
trial."
The People contended that since the errors were not perfected
at trial, they could not be raised via an ineffective assistance
claim on appeal. The court rejected this argument:
In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies
... the courts have permitted the defendants to raise for the first time on
appeal the waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim.
[citations omitted]. It follows that defendant may obtain a reversal if the
record demonstrates that he was denied [such counsel].
Applying the test it set forth in People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412,
590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979), the court noted that there
may have be n good tactical reasons for not objecting to the pros-
ecution's conduct and that defendant's only remedy under Pope
was a petition for habeas corpus.
The court pext addressed the propriety of the trial court's de-
nial of a motion for new trial. The court noted that the motion
was denied on the trial court's belief that, although counsel may
have been ineffective, the court is without statutory authority to
grant a new rial on those grounds, because ineffective assistance
of counsel was not listed in the controlling statutes. The court
found that, although Cal. Penal Code § 1181 (West Supp. 1983)
does not pro, ide such as a basis for new trial, defendant's right to
effective counsel was a constitutional one and not subject to limi-
tation by the legislature.
In order to assist the trial court on remand, the justices under-
took to explain the Pope doctrine. They noted that a reasonably
competent attorney would not unreasonably omit or damage a
meritorious defense:
[I]n cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based
upon acts or omissions not amounting to a withdrawal of a defense, a de-
fendant may prove such ineffectiveness if he establishes that his counsel
failed to perform with reasonable competence and that it is reasonably
probable a determination more favorable to the defendant would have re-
sulted in the absence of counsel's failings.
G. Attachment of Jeopardy: People v. Smith.
The court recently faced the question of whether the Penal
Code authorizes appeal by the People from post-mistrial dismis-
sals. In People v. Smith, 33 Cal. 3d 596, 658 P.2d 1152, 189 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1983), the court held that, where the dismissal is based on an
erroneous finding of prior jeopardy, the question is answered in
the affirmative. The court observed that the Penal Code clearly
provides that the People may appeal an order of dismissal before
the defendant is placed in jeopardy. "An appeal may be taken
from the people from . . . [ain order . . . dismissing . . . the ac-
tion before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy . .. ."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1238(a)(8) (West 1982). The court further
noted that while jeopardy is generally said to attach with the com-
mencement of the impaneled jury trial, "when a jury is dis-
charged for failure to reach a verdict, jeopardy does not attach
because the law places the parties back in status quo as if no trial
had ever occurred." 33 Cal. 3d at 601, 659 P.2d at 1155, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 886 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 920, 100
Cal. Rptr. 198 (1971)). The jury reached a verdict of acquital on
the greatest charged offense, but deadlocked on the lesser in-
cluded offenses and, therefore, jeopardy attached only to the high-
est offense. Accordingly, the court held that the dismissal of the
the lesser offenses was appealable error on the part of the trial
court. The "judgment of acquital" was reversed.
H. Plea bargaining: People v. Miller.
Suppose that defendant accepts a plea bargain after the court
refuses to supress certain damaging evidence. Suppose further
that the court erred in denying suppression. Does defendant's
guilty plea stick? The court answered that question negatively in
People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 538 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974).
Suppose, however, that the evidence improperly deemed admissi-
ble was only material to some of the crimes charged. The court
addressed this novel question in People v. Miller, 33 Cal. 3d 545,
658 P.2d 1320, 189 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1983). Said the court: "The ques-
[Vol. 11: 187, 1983] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion raised is i wnether the entire judgment of conviction must be
reversed when the erroneously admitted evidence was directly re-
lated to some, but not all, of the counts to which the accused pled
guilty. After provding an extensive discussion of its reasoning
in Hill, the court concluded that it was indistinguishable from the
facts at bar
Appellant undoubtedly negotiated for what he believed was the best
disposition that he could obtain given the trial court's denial of his sup-
pression motion. This objective may well have led him to plead guilty to
"untainted" las well as "tainted" counts. As in Hill, the denial of the mo-
tion to suppress evidence may have influenced appellant's decision to
agree to the negotiated plea bargain.
The state also contended that the erroneous suppression was
harmless error in that there was no conceivable defense to the
charges for which a guilty plea was entered. This argument was
rejected on ihe grounds that a reviewing court would never be
able to know whether a connection existed between the guilty
plea and the improperly admitted evidence. Defendant was given
a choice of sticking with the penalty assessed or starting over
with the original charges.
I. Sentencing: People v. Spears; People v. Riolo; by re Kelly;
In re Stanworth.
Four cases before the court presented four different aspects in
criminal law penalties. In People v. Spears, 33 Cal. 3d 279, 655
P.2d 1289, 188 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1983), the court held that, despite a
specifically identified legislative intent to effectuate a stricter
death penalty law in general, the intent was unrelated to a desire
to subject minors to such harsh sanctions. The legislature's in-
tent in construing the effect of the 1978 death penalty initiative
upon minors was silent as to its specific applicability to them and
any procedures that would impose the new penalty upon them.
In People v. Riolo, 33 Cal. 3d 223, 655 P.2d 723, 188 Cal. Rptr. 371
(1983), the court held that Cal. Penal Code § 2900.5(a) (West 1982)
requires all ime served in custody for an offense to be deducted
from the term of imprisonment imposed for the same offense. In
Riolo, the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and
sentenced to a term of three years. He had previously been con-
victed of tw? criminal offenses, for which he was imprisoned for
some time and eventually placed on probation. The sentencing
court attempted to deny credit for that time previously served
when it taclked sentences for the previous crimes to the most re-
cently imposed term of imprisonment. The supreme court re-
versed. Compare In re Kelly, 33 Cal. 3d 267, 655 P.2d 1282, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (1983), where a repeat offender's most recent prison sen-
tence was enhanced based on prior incarceration for parole revo-
cations which were accompanied with new offenses. Interpreting
Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(g) (West Supp. 1983), the court found that
every time the defendant committed a new offense which violated
his parole, his prior incarceration time constituted a separate
prison term if the parole violation was accompanied by a new
committment. Therefore, in Kelly, the enhancements for the four
prior prison sentences placed on his latest offense were found to
be proper.
Lastly, in In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 654 P.2d 1311, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 783 (1982), the court determined the type of parole hearing
to which a defendant is entitled. When Stanworth was sentenced
to life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) was
in force. When Stanworth's parole was under consideration, how-
ever, the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 (DSL) was
in effect. The court agreed with the defendant's argument that
use of the new guidelines prejudiced him in the determination of
his parole date. The standard of punishment was substantially
changed under the DSL, which no longer utilized postconviction
behavior to determine parole release dates. Even so, the court
held Stanworth was entitled to parole release consideration under
both the ISL and DSL standards.
J. Automatic appeals from death sentences: People v.
Easley; People v. Robertson.
People v. Easley, 33 Cal. 3d 65, 654 P.2d 1272, 187 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1982), reh'g granted, (Dec. 23, 1983), was an automatic appeal of a
death sentence. Defendant had been convicted of two counts of
first degree murder with two special circumstances.
On appeal, defendant raised a number of alleged errors; all
were, however, found to be without merit. The exclusion of the
juror who said she could not vote for the death penalty did not de-
prive defendant of a fair and impartial jury. The trial court had
not erred in instructing the jury that all twelve jurors must agree
in determining the penalty. The jury was properly instructed to
consider, at the penalty phase, as an aggravating circumstance,
defendant's prior criminal activity if the jury found him guilty of
that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the same
jury found defendant guilty of murder and considered the possi-
ble "aggravating factor" of arson did not deprive defendant of his
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due process rights. The court affirmed all aspects of the jury's
determination
In People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1982), reh'g denied, (Jan. 19, 1983), defendant, Robertson, was
found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and nine special
circumstancesl after unsuccessfully attempting a diminished ca-
pacity defense. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed the
punishment at death.
On appeal, the defendant claimed a number of errors in the
guilt phase, the penalty phase, and regarding the special circum-
stances. A number of the defendant's claims were found to be
without merit, and thus not warranting reversal: police officers did
not enter defendant's home to make a warrantless arrest in viola-
tion of established principles; trial counsel was not deficient in
failing to object to the introduction of defendant's identification of
his car; counsel did not err in failing to move to suppress defend-
ant's confessions; and the 1977 death penalty statute was properly
enacted as an "urgency" statute and therefore did apply to this
case.
Other claims of error were found to have some merit. The testi-
mony of one witness stating that defendant had told her he had
killed two other women should have been suppressed. In light of
the overwhelming evidence, however, this error was not prejvdi-
cial. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment as to defendant's guilt
and the special circumstances.
The court did find that there was prejudicial error in the pen-
alty phase of the defendant's trial. The trial court failed to in-
struct the jury sua sponte that evidence of other crimes which
had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt could not be con-
sidered as "aggravating circumstances" in determining the pen-
alty. This error necessitated a retrial of the penalty phase.
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Court considers continued existence of independent
state grounds in search and seizure: People v.
Chavers *
It is a curious, but not unexpected phenomena, that many judi-
cial decisions making important criminal law involve fact situa-
• This article was contributed by Donald L. Dalton, Literary Editor.
tions lacking any drama. Perhaps that is a good sign: evidence
that the courts consider every case of threatened individual lib-
erty an important one. Cases lacking factual significance are per-
fect opportunities for judges to experiment with the law.
Practitioners and commentators are not likely to be disturbed by
legal experimentation when it involves little more than personal
inconvenience.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Chavers' may have
eliminated independent state grounds 2 in search and seizure law
using just such a vehicle. 3 Michael Chavers was little more than
an unaccomplished, two-bit hood. He and his partner decided to
hold up a convenience store at three in the morning. One of them
carried a small handgun and threatened to use it against the
clerk. They lifted a couple of dollars in coins and bills, a small
bag of Lay's potato chips, a six-pack of sixteen ounce cans of
Schlitz beer, and another can of the same brand.
The clerk was able to provide a detailed physical description of
both of the bandits. The clerk's decription was corroborated by a
customer who had approached the store while the robbers were
still inside. The driver of a delivery truck identified the get-away
1. People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462, 658 P.2d 96, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1983).
2. The term "independent state grounds" refers to the notion that the states,
by virtue of their relatively autonomous existence in the national government,
may provide their citizens with a greater measure of constitutional protection
under the federal and state constitutions than do the federal courts. For instance,
when a state court reviews the case of a criminal defendant, it may strike down a
search which is otherwise valid under the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment or its state constitutional equivalent, citing in-
dependent state grounds as the justification. See generally Developments in the
Law-The Interfiretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HAxv. L. REV. 1324
(1982) (discussion of cases involving major developments in state constitutional
interpretation); Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on
State Rather than Federal Law, 15 Am. CrM. L. REV. 339 (1978) (discussion of
cases in which state courts have adopted a stricter policy than the federal courts
in situations involving searches incident to arrest); Note, State Constitutional
Guarantees as Adequate State Ground. Supreme Court Review and Problems of
Federalism, 13 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 737 (1976) (where local conditions indicate, state
courts should be the arbiter of its citizens' rights due to familiarity and compe-
tence in the particular area); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974) (state courts are
being forced to evade Supreme Court decisions due to the Court's withdrawal of
protections to the private citizen in the area of criminal procedure).
3. There are those who would disagree with the characterization of robbery
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1970)) and the use of a dangerous weapon (CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1203.06(a)(1) and 12022.5 (West 1983)), the crimes for which Cha-
vers was convicted, as minor offenses, especially when it is considered that the
penalty for violation of these statutes ranges from two, three, or five years for rob-
bery (CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 1983)) and an extra two years for the firearm
enhancement. Even so, the defendants in Chavers, despite the fact that they
pulled a gun on a citizen, took no more than some beer and potato chips from the
store they robbed.
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car as a "standard size, two-door sedan, early 1970's model, possi-
bly white in color." The investigating officers recorded these de-
scriptions and relayed them to the police dispatcher via radio.
Officers Mahakian and Becker received this information and iden-
tiffed a car very likely belonging to the robbery suspects. The car
had been obseived by the officers, "squealing around the corner"
away from the robbery scene at a high rate of speed. The car was
occupied by two men that matched the physical descriptions sup-
plied by the clerk.
The investigating officers then joined Mahakian and Becker
who followed the Cadillac for five minutes before pulling it over.
The occupants were patted down, handcuffed, and searched for
identification. During the pat-down, one of the investigating of-
ficers noticed a bag of Lay's potato chips on the dashboard of the
car, as well as a number of opened and unopened cans of Schlitz
beer. The officer also noticed clothing stashed under the front
seat which had been identified by the clerk as belonging to the as-
sailants. The suspects were removed from the general vicinity of
the car while Ihe officers conducted a more thorough automobile
search. The other investigating officer opened the glove compart-
ment and found a black plastic zippered shaving bag. As he lifted
it, he felt something which he believed to be heavier than normal
shaving utensils. He unzipped it and found a small revolver with
six live rounds in it. Both individuals were then arrested.
The facts of this case sounded curiously like those evaluated by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ross. 4 In-
deed, the similarity did not escape the court. Justice Richardson
began the analytical portion of his majority opinion by noting that
the "search ofl the car's interior, including its glove compartment
and the shaving kit found therein, was fully consistent with
Fourth Amen ment principles recently expressed [in Ross]."5 It
was, of course, perfectly legitimate and expected that Justice
Richardson would start by construing the federal Constitution,
that being thle minimum standard for all fourth amendment
jurisprudence.6
4. Uited StItes v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). For a general discussion of
Ross, see Note, UFnited States v. Ross: Search and Seizure Made Simple, 10 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 421 (1982).
5. 33 Cal. 3d at 466, 658 P.2d at 98-99, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
6. One author has noted that "[a] state court is bound to the Supreme
Court's interpretition of the federal Constitution (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975))." ee Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1367-68 n.2. Thus,
In Ross, the United States Supreme Court decided that police-
men, who had effected a lawful stop of an automobile, could con-
duct an automobile search which was as broad as that which
could be authorized by a magistrate's warrant.7 The policemen in
Ross, specifically, were permitted to conduct a search of a leather
pouch and paper bag which they found in the trunk of the defend-
ant's car. The defendant argued that after the police subdued
him, the policy reasons for permitting the warrantless search of
the car were extinguished and the police could proceed no further
without obtaining a warrant. In Ross, the Supreme Court held
that the traditional justifications for allowing the warrantless
search of an automobile were no longer important.8 It stated that
the Court's decision in Carroll v. United States9 did not depend
on an emergency situation which made the obtaining of a search
warrant impossible.10 Instead, the Court recognized parameters
inherent in the fourth amendment."
After deciding that the search of Chavers' car was consistent
with federal constitutional law, Justice Richardson went on to de-
termine whether the California Constitution afforded Chavers any
further protection. 12 Justice Richardson divided the search into
three parts: (1) the search of the automobile's interior; (2) the
search of the automobiles's glove compartment; and (3) the
search of Chavers' shaving kit bag. This division was deemed
necessary because of United States Supreme Court decisions dis-
tinguishing the search of automobiles from that of automobile
a state court could not, because of the incorporation of most of the fourth, fifth,
sixth, and eighth amendments of the United States Constitution into the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment, provide less protection for its citizens
than that provided by the United States Supreme Court. See Developments in the
Law, supra note 2, at 1367 n.1 (collecting cases).
7. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. See also Note, supra note 4, at 448-49.
8. See infra note 16 and accompanying text for discussion of the traditional
justification for a warrantless search. See also infra note 11 for a discussion of the
rationale of the Carroll decision which was relied on by Justice Stevens in Ross.
See 102 S. Ct. at 2162-64, 2170.
9. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. That has been, of course, the traditional explanation for Carroll: that only
the mobility of automobiles makes their warrantless search excusable. See 102 S.
Ct. at 2178 and n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. See Note, supra note 4, at 427-33, discussing the Carroll decision. Chief
Justice Taft relied on early Revenue Acts which permitted the warrantless search
of vehicles, opining that the Congress which passed that legislation was the same
Congress which helped ratify the fourth amendment, thereby implying that the
drafters of the fourth amendment recognized an inherent exception for moving
vehicles.
12. Again, if Justice Richardson had found a prior California Supreme Court
opinion which invalidated the search in Chavers, he indicated that he would follow
that decision even though the search was consistent with the federal interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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compartment 13 and, more importantly, that of personal articles.14
The basis for Justice Richardson's analysis was the California
Supreme Cor's opinion in Wimberley v. Superior Court. 15 Jus-
tice Richards n cited Wimberley for the general proposition that
the "exigency" which is required to justify the warrantless search
of an automobile' 6 "generally exists whenever probable cause is
first discover d at the time the police stop a vehicle and thus have
not had a por opportunity to obtain a warrant."17 Specifically,
Justice Rich rdson read Wimberley as authority for the proposi-
tion that "wken . . .the police discover facts constituting prob-
able cause at the time they stop a vehicle, an immediate on-the-
scene search of the vehicle is justified even if there are no addi-
tional exiger-t circumstances necessitating such an immediate
search."' 8 T is, of course, was exactly the situation in Chavers'
case; thus, there was no realistic possibility of distinguishing the
two cases.
As for the search of the glove compartment, Justice Richardson
turned agairI to Wimberley. The court in Wimberley evaluated
and disalloWTed the warrantless search of an automobile trunk:
"Because . " the facts known to the police officers did not pro-
vide probabl cause to believe that additional contraband was lo-
cated in the trunk, we invalidated the search of the trunk."19 But
the court in Chavers reasoned that the defendants' lack of identi-
13. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See also Note, supra note 4,
at 433.
14. See Ch cwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979). See also Note, supra note 4, at 434-37.
15. Wimberlev v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr. 64]
(1976).
16. Traditio' al fourth amendment jurisprudence has required the demonstra-
tion of circumstances making the obtaining of a search warrant impractical or dan-
gerous before authorizing a warrantless search. See generally Dalton, Tracing the
Bright-Line Through Search and Seizure: Robinson, Robbins and Belton, FORUM
(a bimonthly p Iblication of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice) July-August
19 (1982). The warrantless search of automobiles has been generally upheld on
the basis of th automobile's inherent mobility. See Note, supra note 4, at 452; see
also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. 33 Cal. d at 467-68, 658 P.2d at 99-100, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
18. Id.
19. 33 Cal. d at 469, 658 P.2d at 101, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 174. In her dissent, Chief
Justice Bird disagreed with the majority's assessment that Wimberley contains
the "controlling principle" for a glove compartment search. 33 Cal. 3d at 475 n.2,
658 P.2d at 105 n.2, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 178 n.2 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
She read Wimrnerley as holding that "probable cause to search is not necessarily
sufficient to justify the search of the car's trunk (citing 16 Cal. 3d at 568, 547 P.2d at
424, 128 Cal. Rjtr. at 648)." She stated that the "question whether a search war-
fication made the search of Chavers' glove compartment, a possi-
ble receptacle of identification, completely reasonable. 20 It was
also possible that the weapon used in the crime was located in
the glove compartment, in close proximity to the defendants.
This fact reinforced the reasonableness of the search.
In approving the search of Chavers' glove compartment, the
court overruled three courts of appeal decisions 2 1 which had re-
quired that there be exigent circumstances, above and beyond
those which justified the search of the automobile's interior, in or-
der to justify the warrantless search of an automobile compart-
ment. Under these decisions, police officers would have to show
facts and circumstances which would point to the conclusion that
contraband was hidden in that specific compartment. The court
cited with approval, however, another courts of appeal decision 22
which found it proper to search "areas adjacent and immediately
accessible to the occupants, such as ... a glove compart-
ment .. *"23 The supreme court found no basis for the lower
court determinations requiring additional exigent circumstances
for the compartment search and rejected Chavers' defense on this
point.24
Justice Richardson cited two California Supreme Court opin-
ions to validate the search of Chavers' shaving kit bag: Guidi v.
Superior Court25 and People v. Lilienthal.26 Justice Richardson
characterized the police officer's discovery of the handgun in the
shaving kit as "inadvertent," the result of an "entirely legitimate
seizure of the kit. .. ,"27 The inadvertence of the discovery trig-
gered, in the court's mind, the "plain view" exception to the war-
rant requirement.2 8 The two decisions noted above rested on that
exception. Justice Richardson was not troubled by the fact that
the inadvertent discovery was the result of the police officer's
"sense of touch ... [because] the knowledge [the police officer]
rant might be required to justify a trunk search (or a glove compartment search)
was not raised in Wimberley. . . ." Id.
20. 33 Cal. 3d at 470, 658 P.2d at 101, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
21. People v. Gott, 100 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3-4, 160 Cal. Rptr. 307, 308 (1979); Jackson
v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 361, 368, 142 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303 (1977); and People
v. Jochen, 46 Cal. App. 3d 243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1975).
22. People v. Gregg, 43 Cal. App. 3d 137, 117 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1974).
23. 33 Cal. 3d at 471, 658 P.2d at 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (citing People v.
Gregg, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 142, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 499).
24. 33 Cal. 3d at 471, 658 P.2d at 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
25. Guidi v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973).
26. People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 587 P.2d 706, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1978).
27. 33 Cal. 3d at 471, 658 P.2d at 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
28. Id. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) ("[Objects falling
in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence"). Id.
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meaningful and accurate as if the container had
!nt and [the police officer] had seen the gun within
'29 Justice Richardson also noted the admittedly
ure of the contraband and said that this was also a
Lng the warrantless search.30
e Bird submitted a fairly restrained dissent. She
ourt's consideration of the search of the automo-
was unnecessary given the fact that defendant had
the unconstitutionality of that search on appeal.3 1
zed that discussion as "basically dictum." 32 To her,
issue was whether there was any reason to treat
he glove compartment any differently than that of
e defendant having conceded the legality of the lat-
the fact that a glove compartment, as well as the
Sarable from the automobile itself, Chief Justice
no justification, and the defendant did not offer
r distinguishing the search of one from the other.33
istice did, however, refuse to adopt the reasoning of
tes Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 34
iia Supreme Court's decision in Wimberley v. Supe-
establishing the proper principle for governing the
arch of automobile compartments.35 Both decisions
'eater measure of protection for those areas than
)inions admit. She failed to proffer her own stan-
ag to leave that question unanswered until con-
a case in which it is squarely posed."36
e Bird argued, however, that there are reasons for
ter protection for the search of a closed container,
29. 33 Cal. 3d at 471, 658 P.2d at 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
30. Id. at 473, 658 P.2d at 103, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
31. Id. at 473- 14, 658 P.2d at 104, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
32. Id. Chief Iustice Bird's reluctance to address the majority's opinion on the
legitimacy of the automobile search also stems from her reluctance to make in-
dependent state rounds an issue in Chavers. See infra note 39 and accompanying
text. Apparently, by her silence, she intended to avoid calling attention to the is-
sue, thereby lea ng its settlement for another time.
33. 33 Cal. 3d at 474-75, 65:3 P.2d at 104, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenti g).
34. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
35. 33 Cal. 3d at 475-76, 658 P.2d at 105, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenti lg).
36. Id. at 476 658 P.2d at 105, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
unconnected with the automobile, such as Chavers' shaving kit.
Even so, she acknowledged the existence of exigent circum-
stances which rendered it impractical to obtain a search war-
rant.37 She noted the particularly dangerous nature of the
handgun and the fact that the officers were entitled to continue
searching the glove compartment for the stolen currency. Chief
Justice Bird objected to the majority's plain view justification as
not satisfying constitutional standards. The Chief Justice stated
that "absent exigent circumstances [which were existent in Cha-
vers' case], our state and federal constitutions require more than
the existence of probable cause to justify an intrusion into a
closed container."38
This, of course, leaves the most important feature of this opin-
ion for last. States may, legitimately, provide a greater measure
of constitutional protection for their citizens than that provided
by the federal Constitution.39 This they may do because of the
federal scheme of the national government.40 California has tradi-
tionally recognized this as a state constitutional irmperative. 4 1 But
some read the Chavers opinion as a retreat from this position.42
Justice Richardson recognized the traditional existence of a
broader measure of protection for criminal defendants in Califor-
nia when he said, in Chavers: "On occasion we have elected to af-
ford a 'broader security against unreasonable searches and
seizures than that required by the United States Supreme
Court. . . .' 43 In the same sentence, however, he stated that
"the challenged search was also lawful under our own prior deci-
sions ... ."44 By this, Justice Richardson refused to extend Cali-
37. Id. at 477, 658 P.2d at 106, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
38. Id.
39. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("Our holding... does not
affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required by the Federal Constitution .... "). Id.
40. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-14, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1975).
41. California's equivalent to the fourth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution is identical to the federal provision. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 13. But
in 1974, California ratified section 24 to article I which reads in part: "Rights guar-
anteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution." Justice Mosk, writing for the majority in Brisendine, charac-
terized this provision as the "ultimate confirmation" of the legitimacy of independ-
ent state grounds in California. 13 Cal. 3d at 551, 531 P.2d at 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
330. See also 13 Cal. 3d at 548 n.16, 531 P.2d at 1112 n.16, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328 n.16
(collecting cases).
42. L.A. Daily J., Feb. 18, 1983, at 14, col. 3.
43. 33 Cal. 3d at 467, 658 P.2d at 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (citing 13 Cal. 3d 528,
549, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328).
44. 33 Cal. 3d at 467, 658 P.2d at 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 172. He reaffirmed this
point later in the opinion where he stated: "[TI he police conduct in this case was
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fornia's constitutional protection of criminal defendants beyond
the point to which the court had previously gone. But the real
question is whether that point is still farther out than the point
established ROSS. 4 5
Justice Richardson said that the "general principles" for a law-
ful, warrantless search of an automobile in California were ex-
amined in Wfmberley: "(1) exigent circumstances renderling] the
obtaining of a warrant an impossible or impractical alternative,
and (2) probable cause exist[ing] for the search."46 Wimberley
stands for the proposition that "when, as in [Chavers], the police
discover factI constituting probable cause at the time they stop a
vehicle, an immediate on-the-scene search of the vehicle is justi-
fied even if there are no additional exigent circumstances necessi-
tating such an immediate search."4 7 This is certainly no broader
than Ross which permits police to conduct an immediate, war-
rantless search of an automobile as long as they have probable
cause before they stop, the vehicle.48
It should be noted that Justice Richardson cited the "Truth-in-
Evidence" provision of Proposition 8.49 This provision reads in
part: "1R] elevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and
hearings... ." It appears to prohibit California courts from pro-
proper both under Ross and under our own controlling 'automobile exception' and
'container' authorities .... " Id. at 473, 658 P.2d at 103, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
45. If it is, then the state must prove, in a given case, that the search was con-
sistent with Chavers as well as with Ross. But, if Chavers is no broader than Ross,
then a criminal defendant is afforded no independent state grounds to challenge
the search and nust rely on federal precedent.
The concept 4f independent state grounds, however, does not necessarily imply
that those grounds will be more protective of individual liberty than the federal
standard. Justice Mosk quoted the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Jan-
kovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1963), in Brisendine, to the ef-
fect that "even Ithough a state court's opinion relies on similar provisions in both
the State and Federal Constitutions, the state constitutional provision has been
held to provide' an independent and adequate ground of decision depriving this
Court of jurisdiction to review the state judgment." Id. at 491-92. A state constitu-
tional provisio identical to its federal counterpart, is still an independent state
ground. By the same token, a state court's adoption of a United States Supreme
Court opinion as the standard in that state does not make the state grounds any
less independent. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1368 n.5 (col-
lecting cases). [That is, however, independence only in the most technical sense.
46. 33 Cal. 3d at 467, 658 P.2d at 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (quoting 16 Cal. 3d at
563, 547 P.2d at 1421, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 645).
47. 33 Cal. d at 468, 658 P.2d at 100, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
49. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d).
viding a greater measure of protection for criminal defendants
than that provided by the United States Constitution. Justice
Richardson's use of the signal "but see" in the sentence noted
above which discusses independent state grounds appears to af-
firm that interpretation.50 But Justice Richardson's parenthetical
reference to that provision tends to confuse the issue because di-
rect reliance would have settled the question of independent state
grounds once and for all.
The effect of People v. Chavers on independent state grounds
for search and seizure in California is unclear. It is apparent that
Justice Richardson would not have upheld the searches if he felt
California Supreme Court precedent foreclosed that result. Thus,
even though Justice Richardson cited Ross with approval, that did
not necessarily make it the standard in California. The state will
still be required to prove that a given search did not violate the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal and state
constitutions.5' Independent state grounds for search and
seizure, at least in a technical sense, are still viable in
California.52
B. Justification for granting change of venue: Odle v.
Superior Court.
In Odle v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 932, 654 P.2d 225, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 455 (1982), the defendant was charged with the stabbing
death of a woman and the shooting death of the officer who at-
tempted to apprehend him, along with assault with a deadly
weapon on a peace officer, auto theft, kidnapping, and possession
of a firearm. After the denial of two motions for change of venue,
50. Justice Richardson used brackets to characterize section 28 as a "repeal of
[the I state exclusionary rule." 33 Cal. 3d at 467, 658 P.2d at 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
51. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
States can legitimately interpret both the federal Constitution and federal judi-
cial decisions interpreting the Constitution as providing more protection for indi-
viduals than provided by the federal judicial opinions. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v.
Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 735-36, 409 P.2d 867, 869 (1966). That is just one of the
methods used by state courts to affirm independent state grounds. See Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1384 and n.122.
52. This issue was presaged by one commentator. See Suarez, Proposition 8:
Dark Clouds Gathering, FORUM, March-April 6 (1983). The author noted two court
of appeals decisions which were still pending at the time of publication: McClana-
han v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 31, 188 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1983); and Jeter v.
Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 934, 188 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1983). In neither of these
decisions did the court discuss the availability of independent state grounds. See
also People v. Ruggles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 950, 188 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1983), in which one
of the concurring justices stated that article I, section 28, subsection (d) of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution "abrogates California decisional law imposing higher stan-
dards for searches and seizures than under Federal decisional law." 138 Cal. App.
3d at 968-69, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
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defendant p(titioned for mandate to compel the venue change.
Defendant claimed there was a reasonable likelihood that he
could not receive a fair trial in Contra Costa County, due to wide-
spread prejudicial publicity.
Change of enue should be granted if it is shown that there is a
reasonable ljkelihood that a fair trial is impaired from the "dis-
semination of potentially prejudicial publicity." Five different fac-
tors were c nsidered in determining the prejudicial effect: (1)
community ,ize; (2) the nature and extent of publicity; (3) status
of the accus d; (4) status and prominence of victims; and (5) the
nature and ,ravity of the offense. Reviewing these factors, the
court viewec the community as large and diverse; the publicity
was not foul d to be hostile to defendant, and considerable time
had passed ince the major coverage occurred; the defendant was
not portrayed as an outsider to the community; and the victims'
status was found to be inconclusive. None of these factors mili-
tated in favdr of a change of venue for defendant.
According]y, the court denied the change of venue, noting that
if the prejudicial effect was more widespread than determined
here, this e fect could be revealed in voir dire. The defendant
could then renew his motion, as supported by the voir dire exami-
nation, and i change of venue could then be ordered by the trial
judge.
VIII. EVIDENCE
A. Where similar offenses are involved, the technique of
"sanitizing" a prior conviction is ineffective to dispel
the prejudice in admitting evidence of the prior
felony: People v. Barrick.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Beagle, 1 the California Supreme Court unani-
mously held that although Evidence Code section 7882 authorizes
* This aticle was contributed by Mark Eugene Johnson, third year staff
member.
1. 6 Cal. 3(d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
2. Sectio 788 of the Evidence Code of California reads in full:
For the pu4-pose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown
by the exam ination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that
he has been convicted of a felony unless:
(a) A prdon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness
by the jurisdiction in which he was convicted.
the admission of prior felony convictions to impeach the credibil-
ity of a witness, a trial court must, when requested, exercise its
discretion under section 3523 and exclude this evidence if the pro-
bative value of the prior conviction is outweighed by other factors,
such as the risk of undue prejudice.4 Cases in which the prior fel-
ony conviction is for the same or substantially similar conduct for
which the accused is on trial obviously present the greatest dan-
ger of prejudice to the defendant.5 The prior conviction, however,
may also be highly probative on the issue of the credibility of the
defendant if he or she decides to take the stand. In order to strike
a balance between the risk of undue prejudice and the probative
value of the prior conviction in such a situation, the method of im-
peachment by making "sanitized" references to an earlier convic-
tion arose in California subsequent to Beagle.
The meaning of a "sanitized" reference to prior criminal activity
can best be described by an example.6 In cases where the de-
fendant is on trial for a crime (e.g., robbery) for which he has an
earlier conviction for the same or similar conduct (e.g., robbery,
burglary, etc.), impeachment by means of asking him questions, if
and when he testifies, concerning the specific type of prior convic-
(b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the
witness under the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with sec-
tion 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code.
(c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed
under the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this excep-
tion does not apply to any criminal trial where the witness is being
prosecuted for a subsequent offense.
(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the
witness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising
from the conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially
equivalent to that referred to in subdivision (b) or (c).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966). Section 788 is the only exception to the rule
that "evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to
prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of
a witness." CAL. Evw. CODE § 787 (West 1966).
3. Section 352 of the Evidence Code of California reads in full:
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) ne-
cessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
4. 6 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 7-8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20. See also People v.
Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 335-36, 590 P.2d 391, 397, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536, 538-40 (1979);
People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 115-16, 569 P.2d 771, 773-74, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177, 179-80
(1977); People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211, 218-19, 545 P.2d 833, 838-41, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457,
462-64 (1976); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 96-99, 539 P.2d 43, 54-55, 123 Cal. Rptr.
475, 486-88 (1975).
5. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
6. The California Supreme Court first uses the term "sanitized" in People v.
Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 122, 654 P.2d 1243, 1246, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719 (1982), but
gives no explanation as to how it arrived at the term.
250
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tion would violate Beagle. 7 To circumvent the holding, trial courts
would frequer tly allow the prosecution to ask questions such as:
"Have you ev r been convicted of a felony involving theft?" This
process of ma ing indirect references to the prior conviction has
been labeled s sanitizing" by the California Supreme Court.8
Once sanitize , the prejudice of admitting the prior conviction for
purposes of i peachment was thought to be dispelled.9
The Califor ia Supreme Court, however, has rejected this rea-
soning. In Pe ple v. Barrick, O Justice Broussard, writing for the
majority,]' an lyzed the reasons underlying the Beagle decision12
and held that where similar offenses are involved, the technique
of "sanitizin " the prior felony is ineffective to dispel the
prejudice in a mitting evidence of the prior conviction.' 3
This article will examine the scope of the law of impeachment
in California ubsequent to Beagle, present the facts of Barrick,
and then exa ine the basis for the supreme court's decision in
the Barrick (ase. In addition, this article will discuss how the
court has unr ecessarily circumscribed the application of section
788 to such ar extent that little remains of the original legislative
expression. Iastly, the impact of Proposition 814 on Barrick will
be discussed.
7. 6 Cal. 3d 1, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
8. See supr note 6.
9. The Calif rnia court of appeal decisions in line with this reasoning include
People v. Madas, 122 Cal. App. 3d 234, 175 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1981), and People v.
Moultrie, 99 Cal. App. 3d 77, 160 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1979). See infra notes 25-28 and ac-
companying tex . (Both cases were subsequently overruled by the Barrick
decision).
10. 33 Cal. 3 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982).
11. Two sepjrate dissenting opinions were written by Richardson, J., and
Kaus, J. Id. at 1 6-37, 654 P.2d at 718-20, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
12. The Bea le court had in turn adopted the reasoning of Judge (now Chief
Justice) Burger in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967) which
identified some f the more important factors for the trial court to consider in ex-
ercising its discr tion whether to allow evidence of the prior felony conviction for
the purpose of i peachment. Such factors include: whether the conviction con-
tains an elemen reflecting on the defendant's honesty; the nearness or remote-
ness of the por conviction; whether the conviction involved the same or
substantially siri lar conduct for which the accused is on trial; and what the effect
would be if the defendant does not testify for fear of being prejudiced because of
impeachment by prior convictions.
13. 33 Cal. 30 at 121, 654 P.2d at 1245, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
14. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
II. BACKGROUND
In Beagle, the defendant was convicted of arson and attempted
arson. A prior conviction for issuing a check without sufficient
funds was charged and admitted. In rejecting all of defendant's
contentions and in affirming the judgment of conviction, the
Supreme Court of California addressed its discussion to the rela-
tionship between Evidence Code section 788,15 authorizing im-
peachment by evidence of a felony conviction, and Evidence Code
section 352,16 giving the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence
under certain conditions. The court expressly disapproved of a
line of courts of appeal decisions adhering to the view that the
trial judge does not have the discretion to exclude evidence of a
prior felony conviction where the lawfulness of the conviction has
been established or uncontested.' 7 The court concluded that
when read together, sections 788 and 352 give the trial judge dis-
cretion to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions offered for
impeachment purposes where the probative value of the evidence
with regard to credibility is outweighed by the risk of undue
prejudice.18
In order to guide the trial courts in their exercise of discretion
under the above sections, the supreme court set forth the key fac-
tors to be considered.' 9 These factors were quoted from Judge
15. See supra note 2.
16. See supra note 3.
17. Numerous court of appeal decisions were overruled by Beagle. See People
v. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d 756, 90 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1970); People v. Grant, 11 Cal. App.
3d 687, 89 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1970); People v. Stewart, 11 Cal. App. 3d 242, 89 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1970); People v. Sneed, 8 Cal. App. 3d 963, 88 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1970); People v.
Tiner, 11 Cal. App. 3d 428, 89 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1970); People v. Goodman, 8 Cal. App.
3d 705, 87 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1970); People v. Hall, 7 Cal. App. 3d 562, 86 Cal. Rptr. 504
(1970); People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1970); People v.
Savala, 2 Cal. App. 3d 415, 82 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1969); People v. Romero, 272 Cal. App.
2d 39, 77 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); People v. Donovan, 272 Cal. App. 2d 426, 77 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1969); People v. Aulisi, 264 Cal. App. 2d 149, 70 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1968); People v.
Kelly, 261 Cal. App. 2d 708, 68 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1968).
18. 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320. With specific regard to
section 788, the court in Beagle noted that by the very language of the statute,
"[t he trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction every
time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense." 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at
7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (emphasis in original). Since the Beagle decision, the rela-
tionship between California Evidence Code sections 788 and 352 has been analo-
gized to the relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence rules 402 and 403.
Federal Rule 402 states that "[all relevant evidence is admissible." However,
under rule 403, relevant evidence can be excluded on the grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
19. The California Supreme Court emphasized that these were merely discre-
tionary guidelines, stating: "We do not purport to establish rigid standards to gov-
ern that which in each instance must depend upon the sound exercise of judicial
discretion." Id. at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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(now Chief Jtistice) Burger's opinion in Gordon v. United States20
and include an analysis of the elements of the prior conviction to
determine wlhether it reflects on the defendant's honesty, the re-
moteness of the prior conviction, the similarity of the prior con-
viction to the crime currently at issue, and what the effect will be
if the defendant does not testify out of fear of the jury being
prejudiced by evidence of the prior convictions. 2 1 A motion to ex-
clude, in cases where the defense asserted that these factors did
not support admissibility of the prior conviction for impeachment
purposes, became known as a Beagle motion.22
After Beagl in cases where the defendant took the stand and
an attempt was made to impeach him by means of a prior felony
conviction, silmilar to the one for which he was on trial, the prac-
tice among prosecutors was to "sanitize" or ease the prejudicial
impact of the impeachment by changing the nature of the ques-
tion. Rather than asking if he had ever been convicted of a spe-
cific felony, the defendant would be asked: "Have you ever been
convicted of a felony involving theft?"23 This method was thought
by many trial courts to be sufficient to dispel the potential
i
20. 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
21. The couri stressed the importance of considering the effect of making the
defendant hesitant to testify out of fear that he or she would be prejudiced by
prior convictions. In such an instance, the judge may decide that it is more benefi-
cial to have the jury hear the defendant's testimony than to have the defendant
"remain silent oust of fear of impeachment." 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal.
Rptr. at 320. See infra note 73. As a general rule, character evidence is not admis-
sible to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he is
charged. See CAIJ. EVID. CODE § 787, supra note 2. Beagle is based on the proposi-
tion that althougl a prior offense is otherwise admissible under rule 788 as an at-
tack on credibility, the jury may use that evidence to consider the propensity of
the defendant to commit the offense for which he is on trial, a result which is
clearly impermiss ible under rule 787.
22. Beagle has been held applicable to impeachment of prosecution witnesses,
although the court's discretion is more limited. People v. Carr, 32 Cal. App. 3d 700,
102 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1973). A motion by the prosecution to exclude evidence of a
prior conviction should be heard before or during the presentation of the prosecu-
tion's case. Where the defense moves to exclude evidence of a prior conviction,
the motion should be considered at the close of the People's case in chief or there-
after before the defendant takes the stand to testify. People v. Delgado, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 242, 252-53, 102 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1973); see also People v. Carr, 32 Cal. App. 3d
700, 102 Cal. Rptr.1 75 (the court rejected appellant's argument that the rule in Bea-
gle be restricted to defendants in criminal actions).
23. Such was the phrasing of the question in Barrick. 33 Cal. 3d at 122, 654
P.2d at 1246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 719. Variations in the cases included: "Have you ever
been convicted ofl a felony?" and "Have you ever been convicted of a felony involv-
ing dishonesty?'
prejudice in telling the jury that the defendant had previously
been convicted of the same or similar crime for which he was
currently on trial.24
Two California courts of appeal decisions relied upon by the At-
torney General in Barrick25 expressly approved of the procedure
of sanitizing prior convictions for impeachment. In People v.
Moultrie,26 the defendant was charged with five counts of rob-
bery. The trial court denied the defendant's Beagle motion to ex-
clude evidence of his prior attempted robbery conviction, but
allowed the prosecution to ask: "Have you ever been convicted of
a felony involving theft?" In People v. Madaris,27 the defendant
was charged with possession of a concealable firearm. A Beagle
motion to disallow evidence of a prior robbery conviction was de-
nied; however, the court allowed the defendant to be impeached
by proof of his conviction of a "felony involving theft." In both
cases, the courts of appeal sustained this method as an acceptable
procedure for introducing evidence of the prior conviction without
prejudicing the defendant. The question was held to be a fair
compromise between portraying the conviction as more serious
than it was and cloaking the defendant with "a false aura of
veracity." 28
In contrast, when the Second District Court of Appeal was
presented with facts similar to those in the Madaris and Moultrie
decisions, it reached a different conclusion. In People v. Betts, 29
the defendant was charged with attempted grand theft. Attempt-
ing to sanitize two prior convictions for burglary and unlawful
taking of a vehicle, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask if
the defendant had ever been convicted of a "felony involving the
trait of honesty." The appellate court held that the trial court
erred in allowing the question.3 0 Relying on the California
Supreme Court decision of People v. Rollo, 31 which held identical
prior offenses may not be used to impeach,3 2 the Betts court noted
that "the trier of fact could well 'imagine that the appellant's prior
convictions were similar to or identical with the charge for which
24. The defense counsel in Barrick obviously did not agree; when this ques-
tion was presented to his client, the defendant was advised not to testify. 33 Cal.
3d at 122, 654 P.2d at 1246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
25. 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716.
26. 99 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86, 160 Cal. Rptr. 51, 55 (1979).
27. 122 Cal. App. 3d 234, 239, 175 Cal. Rptr. 869, 871 (1981).
28. People v. Moultrie, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 61; People v.
Madaris, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 239, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 871. See supra notes 26, 27 and
accompanying text.
29. 110 Cal. App. 3d 225, 167 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1980).
30. 110 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230-31, 167 Cal. Rptr. 768, 774 (1980).
31. 20 Cal. 3d 109, 569 P.2d 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1977).
32. Id. at 120, 569 P.2d at 777, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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he was on trial.'3"
At the time of the Barrick decision, the California Supreme
Court was presented with a split of authority among the Califor-
nia courts of appeal concerning sanitizing prior convictions for
impeachment purposes. One line of authority noted that sani-
tizing was a proper means of eliminating the prejudice to the de-
fendant arising from a prior similar felony conviction, while
another felt that prejudice could actually be fostered because the
method left t~o much to the imagination of the jury.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 29, 1980, a Riverside police officer received a report of a
man lying in I the front seat of a car parked in an empty parking
lot. After proceeding to the area, the officer found Michael Bar-
rick asleep inl a 1969 Datsun. After attempting for several minutes
to awaken hiIn by calling out and by rocking the vehicle, the of-
ficer was finally able to unlock the Datsun and shake the defend-
ant awake.
The defendant was questioned as to his name and the reason
he was present in the otherwise deserted lot. Barrick responded
that he was driving a friend's car, became sleepy, and pulled over
into the parking lot to rest. He did not remember the name of the
friend who had lent him the car. Barrick identified himself as
"Steven Johnson," but could not produce any form of identifica-
tion. The officer returned to the patrol car to check the defend-
ant's name with police records and to determine the ownership of
the Datsun.
Unsure ofl how "Johnson" was spelled, the police officer re-
turned to th6 vehicle and asked Barrick for the correct spelling of
33. 110 Cal. App. 3d 225., 230, 167 Cal. Rptr. 768, 774 (citing Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d at
119, 569 P.2d at 776, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 182). With regard to this matter the court
stated:
To begin with, it is highly unlikely that a jury which is advised only that
the defendant has been convicted of "a felony" will let the matter rest.
Normal huinan curiosity will inevitably lead to brisk speculation on the
nature of tl4at conviction, and the range of such speculation will be limited
solely by tl~e imaginations of the individual jurors. Some may assume, for
example, that the defendant's prior conviction was similar to or identical
with the charge for which he is on trial. Others may speculate that the
conviction involved some form of unspeakable conduct, such as torture
murder, gaoig rape, or child molestation. Why else, the jurors might natu-
rally ask, was the name of the crime withheld from them?
Betts, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
his name, to which he replied "B-A-R-R-I-C-K." After this re-
sponse, the officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and
inquired as to whether he had been drinking. The defendant re-
plied that he had drank some beers and smoked some marijuana
at a party. The marijuana, Barrick felt, was "sprayed with
something."34
On returning to his patrol car, the police officer learned that the
Datsun was stolen. The defendant was arrested, advised of his
Miranda rights,35 and placed in custody.
At the trial, a witness for the defense testified that Barrick had
been at a party earlier in the evening where he had consumed
beer and marijuana laced with PCP.36 One witness stated he ob-
served that the defendant was getting very intoxicated. Barrick,
according to the witness, left the party at 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. and
stumbled off down the street.
Prosecution witnesses revealed that a different ignition and tog-
gle switch had been installed in the stolen vehicle and the locked
gas cap had been bent in order to allow gas to be poured into the
gas tank. The defendant's wallet was found underneath the front
seat.
Prior to the trial, the defendant's counsel made a Beagle mo-
tion 37 to prohibit the prosecution from impeaching Barrick with a
prior felony conviction for automobile theft. Recognizing the po-
tential prejudice of allowing a jury to hear that the defendant had
a prior conviction for automobile theft, the trial court ruled that
the prosecution could only ask if he had ever been convicted of a
"felony involving theft."38 This was done in an attempt to remove
the prejudicial impact of the earlier conviction. The defense attor-
ney obviously was not satisfied and advised the defendant not to
testify.39
Barrick was convicted for the unlawful driving or taking of a ve-
hicle4O and acquitted of the charge of receiving stolen property.4 1
34. 33 Cal. 3d at 121, 654 P.2d at 1246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. "PCP" is an abbreviation for Phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer.
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. By requiring that the question be phrased in such a manner, the trial court
was obviously following the example set forth in People v. Moultrie, 99 Cal. App.
3d 77, 160 Cal. Rptr. 51, which was handed down a year earlier. See supra notes 25-
28 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 24.
40. CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851 (West Supp. 1983). The section reads in full:
Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his own, without the consent
of the owner thereof, and with intent either permanently or temporarily to
deprive the owner thereof of his title to or possession of the vehicle,
whether with or without intent to steal the same, or any person who is a
party or accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized tak-
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The California Supreme Court granted a hearing "to consider the
propriety of impeaching a defendant by a 'sanitized' reference to
a prior convicton as a 'felony involving theft.'42
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING
The primary issue presented to the California Supreme Court
was whether ithe trial court erred in ruling that if the defendant
testified, the prosecutor could attempt to impeach the defendant
by asking wIether the defendant had ever been convicted of a
"felony involv4ing theft." In an opinion authored by Justice Brous-
sard, the court concluded that the trial court had erred,, and held
that where similar offenses are involved, the technique of sani-
tizing the prior crime is ineffective to dispel the prejudice of ad-
mitting evidence of it.43
A. Factors to Consider Regarding the Probative Value of a Prior
Felony Conviction
After an initial discussion of the Beagle decision and the effect
it has had on California Evidence Code section 788,44 the court
ing or steali g is guilty of a public offense, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in the county
jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars ($5,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment. The consent of
the owner of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall not in any case be pre-
sumed or implied because of such owner's consent on a previous occasion
to the taking or driving of the vehicle by the same or a different person.
Id. The prosecutor also charged two prior felony convictions for the purposes of
sentence enhancement (CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b)) and to preclude probation
(CAL. PENAL CObE § 1203(e)(4)).
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4196 (West Supp. 1983). Subdivision 1 of section 496
reads in full:
Every person who buys or receives any property which has been stolen or
which has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion,
knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells,
withholds o aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property
from the ownier, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, is pun-
ishable by irprisonment: in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more
than one yea.r; provided, that where the district attorney or the grand jury
deternines that such action would be in the interests of justice, the dis-
trict attorney or the grand jury, as the case may be, may, if the value of
the property does not exceed four hundred dollars ($400), specify in the
accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor, punishable
only by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year.
Id.
42. 33 Cal. 3d at 121-22, 654 P.2d at 1246, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
43. Id. at 128, 654 P.2d at 1251, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
44. See supra notes 2, 15-18 and accompanying text.
lists four criteria which must be examined by the trial judge to
determine the probative value of the prior felony convictions:
1. The prior conviction must contain an element reflecting on
the defendant's honesty.45
Before admitting evidence of the prior felony conviction, trial
courts have the duty to determine whether it has "any tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action." 46 Whenever a witness
takes the stand, the fact of consequence involved is the defend-
ant's credibility. 47 Evidence Code section 786 further limits the
judge's line of inquiry by providing that the sole trait relevant to
the witness' credibility is truthfulness. 48 Therefore, if a prior fel-
ony does not reflect on the character trait of truthfulness, it must
be excluded as irrelevant at the outset, since Evidence Code sec-
tion 350 unequivocably provides that "no evidence is admissible
except relevant evidence."49
According to the majority in Barrick, the "initial determination
regarding the probative value of the prior felony conviction is
made by examining the elements of the offense itself."50 While an
earlier conviction may be probative of one or more separate traits
of character, it may not involve the one trait that is relevant to im-
peaching credibility-truthfulness. Unless the evidence contains
an element reflecting on the defendant's honesty, it should not be
admitted.51
The court also noted that varying types of offenses are entitled
to differing degrees of weight in balancing the probative value
with the prejudicial effect of the past offense. 52 Some offenses,
such as perjury, impact heavily on truthfulness; these should be
45. 33 Cal. 3d at 123-24, 654 P.2d at 1247-48, 187 Cal. Rptr. at. 720-21.
46. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966). Section 210 reads in full:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence, including evidence relevant to the
credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in rea-
son to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.
Id. Note that under section 210, "relevant evidence" includes not only evidence of
the ultimate facts actually in dispute, but also evidence of other facts from which
such ultimate facts may be presumed or inferred.
47. See B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 28.4 (1982). The
credibility of a witness is always an issue.
48. Section 786 reads in full:
Evidence of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity, or their
opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 786 (West 1966).
49. CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1966).
50. 33 Cal. 3d at 123, 654 P.2d at 1247, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 124, 654 P.2d at 1248, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
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given a great deal of probative value on the issue of credibility.
On 'the other hand, offenses in which the behavior is assaultive
have little to do with the defendant's credibility as a witness and
should be given little or no weight in the balance.53 Certain theft
crimes contain elements that are both larcenous and assaultive,
and thus bealr only in part on the individual's veracity. Such of-
fenses shoul9 be given only a moderate amount of weight in the
balancing process. 54
2. 'The prpr felony conviction must not be too remote.55
According to Barrick, "the second factor for the trial court to
consider is the nearness or remoteness in time of the prior felony
conviction"156 1As a general guideline, the ten-year rule prescribed
by the Feder~l Rules of Evidence has been followed.57 Unless the
probative value of the prior offense substantially outweighs its
prejudicial impact, it will not be admitted.5 8
3. The prior felony conviction should not be for the same or
substa tially similar conduct for which the accused
is on trial.59
In examining this factor, the Barrick court focused on the pro-
53. Id. In 1667, the court in Gordon v. United States, supra note 5, noted that:
In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing,
for example are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely
on a man's }honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on the other hand,
which may result from a short temper, a combative nature, extreme provo-
cation, or other causes, generally have little or no direct bearing on hon-
esty and veracity. A "rule of thumb" thus should be that convictions
which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of vio-
lent or assaultive crimes generally do not.
383 F.2d at 940.
54. An example is a crime such as robbery.
55. 33 Cal. 3'1 at 125, 654 P.2d at 1248, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
56. Id. The courts have approved the admission of offenses in numerous
cases. In Peopllrv. Lassell, :108 Cal. App. 3d 720, 166 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1980), a felony
conviction occurring four years prior was admissible. In People v. James, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 150, 1511 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1978), an offense occurring five years prior was ad-
mitted. In the instant case the prior conviction occurred two years before the trial.
57. Under Rlule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a conviction is not ad-
missible to impeach if more than ten years have passed since the date of the con-
viction or the witness' release from confinement (if the witness was in fact
confined), whichever is later, unless the trial judge determines that the probative
value of the pri~r conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
58. See supia note 57.
59. 33 Cal. 3d at 125-26, 654 P.2d at 1248-49, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
pensity issue which was specifically addressed in Beagle. 60 As a
general rule in California, evidence of specific instances of con-
duct is inadmissible to show that the defendant has the propen-
sity to commit the crime with which he is charged.6 1 The rule is
subject, however, to section 788, which permits certain kinds of
criminal convictions to be used for the purpose of attacking a wit-
ness' credibility.62
This third factor is relevant in cases where the witness whose
testimony is sought to be impeached is also the defendant.
Where the earlier conviction is for the same or substantially simi-
lar conduct for which the accused is on trial, a special danger
arises in that the jury is likely to consider the prior offense not
only on the issue of credibility, but also on the question of
whether the accused is the type of person who would commit the
charged crime.63 Such use clearly violates the general rule re-
garding the use of character evidence. As the supreme court
stated in the earlier case of People v. Antick, 64 "only the most dis-
ciplined minds would be able to restrict their use of the prior fel-
ony evidence to assessing the defendant's credibility as a witness
and disregard its obvious implications with respect to his tenden-
cies in the area of unlawful conduct." 65
The court also noted two other reasons why the use of similar
prior convictions for impeachment must be closely circumscribed.
First, the jury may decide that due to the earlier offense, the de-
fendant is the type of person who should be "put away," regard-
less of whether he or she is guilty or innocent of the charged
crime.66 Second, the admission will draw the jurors away from
the central issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused and fo-
cus them on his or her past criminal history.67
Accordingly, the court noted that "[a] strict limitation on the
admission of similar prior convictions is . . . necessary."68 In the
60. 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 12, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 324. Evidence Code section
788 is the only exception to this general rule. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
61. California Evidence Code section 787 (West 1966) provides that "[sI ubject
to [s Iection 788, evidence of specific instances of his conduct is inadmissible to at-
tack or support the credibility of a witness."
62. See supra note 2.
63. This issue was specifically addressed in People v. Rolo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 569
P.2d 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1977), where the court held that identical prior offenses
may not be used to impeach.
64. 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
65. Id. at 97, 539 P.2d at 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472. This exact language is relied
upon by the Barrick court. 33 Cal. 3d at 125, 654 P.2d at 1249, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 126, 654 P.2d at 1249, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 722. This limitation is necessary
because "[w I hile the risk of undue influence is substantial when any prior convic-
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balancing process, such evidence should be given a great deal of
weight in favor of the inadmissibility of the conviction for pur-
poses of impeachment.
4. The trial court must consider the effect on the defendant if
the defendant does not testify out of fear of being
prejudiced due to impeachment by prior
convictions. 69
As with the third factor, this element is relevant when the wit-
ness whose testimony is sought to be impeached is the defendant.
Allowing impeachment by a prior felony conviction will in most
cases chill the defendant's testimony on the stand.70 This danger
is most acute where the only evidence in the accused's defense is
his or her own version of the facts.
All relevant I evidence should be offered to the jury to assist it in
its fact-findi g process. 71 In cases where the only evidence on be-
half of the d fendant is his own testimony, this fourth element in
and of itself should be sufficient to prevent the prosecution's use
of the earlier offense to impeach.72
While Bar ick's conviction two years earlier contained an ele-
ment reflectiig on his honesty, it was for an offense similar to the
charged crine. On that basis, the court held that the type of sani-
tized impeachment involved was not permissible.73
B. Criticis,,,& ,f the Ruling
In Barrick Lhe California Supreme Court continued its gradual
tion is used to impeach the credibility of a defendant-witness, it is far greater
when the prior conviction is similar or identical to the crime charged." Id.
69. Id. at 19, 654 P.2d at 1251, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
70. Where the defendant has numerous prior convictions, the possibility of the
chilling effect of priors similar to the crime for which the defendant is on trial
mandates that those prior offenses be excluded.
71. Cal.foria Evidence Code section 351 (West 1966), provides: "Except as
otherwise prod ded by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."
72. A final consideration which was deemed important in Beagle and in the
decisions upon which the Beagle court relied is the desirability in a particular
case that the jt ry hear the defendant's version of the conduct charged as criminal.
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are relevant to credibil-
ity and the risl4 of prejudice to the defendant does not warrant their exclusion, he
may nevertheless conclude that it is more important that the jury have the benefit
of the defendan t's version of the case than to have the defendant remain silent out
of fear of impeachment.
73. 33 Cal. 3d at 130. 654 P.2d at 1252, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
destruction of the legislative principle established in section 788,
that allows a criminal defendant to be impeached by the use of a
prior felony conviction. Although several previous decisions had
continually narrowed the discretion of the trial judge, the Barrick
court has effectively erased section 788 from the Evidence Code.
Section 788 provides that "for the purpose of attacking the cred-
ibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the
witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been con-
victed of a felony." 74 In Beagle, the court held that the trial judge
had discretion under section 788 to exclude evidence of prior con-
victions "when their probative value on credibility is outweighed
by the risk of undue prejudice."75 The court stated, however, that
it was not attempting to set forth "rigid standards" to dictate that
which should be dependent upon the exercise of the trial court's
discretion.76 In addition, the court emphasized that a defendant
who decided to take the witness stand on his or her behalf is not
"entitled to a false aura of veracity." The general rule is that fel-
ony convictions bearing on veracity are admissible.77
Regardless of the court's assurance made in Beagle that it
would not specify "rigid standards" of admissibility to govern the
trial court's discretion in these cases, subsequent decisions have
proved otherwise:
1) People v. Antick78 (1975) - the supreme court held that the
lower court abused its discretion by admitting prior convic-
tions which were too remote in time.
2) People v. Rist 79 (1976) - the supreme court ruled that an
earlier conviction similar to the charged offense could never
be used for impeachment purposes if dissimilar prior convic-
tions were available.
3) People v. Rollo8O (1977) - the court ruled that a trial judge
could not achieve a compromise solution by withholding
from the jury the type, but not the fact, of a prior conviction.
4) People v. Fries8' (1979) - the supreme court held that a
prior robbery conviction impacted only slightly on a defend-
ant's credibility as a witness.
5) People v. Spearman82 (1979) - the court held that a person
CAL. EviD. CODE § 788 (West 1966); see supra note 2.
6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 7-8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
Id.
Id.
15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
16 Cal. 3d 211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976).
20 Cal. 3d 109, 569 P.2d 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1977).
24 Cal. 3d 222, 594 P.2d 19, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979).
25 Cal. 3d 107, 599 P.2d 74, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1979).
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could not be impeached with a prior conviction of possession
of heroin for sale when he was being tried for that same
offense.
6) People v. Barrick'33 (1982) - the court ruled that the tech-
nique of "sanitizing a prior felony is ineffective to dispel the
prejudic e in admitting evidence of the prior conviction;
therefore, such evidence is inadmissible for impeachment
purposeIs.
By permittingF numerous exceptions to section 788, the court has
effectively destroyed the intent of that section, which was to per-
mit evidence of prior felony convictions for the purpose of im-
peachment, subject, of course, to the trial court's sound
discretion. T e supreme court has assumed the role of legislative
draftsmen, a function far beyond its power.
The court :pecifically stated in Beagle that the defendant, if he
or she decid( s to testify, is not to be cloaked with a false appear-
ance of trut fulness.84 However, the future ramifications of Bar-
rick and its predecessors will be to allow defendants in similar
cases in the luture to assume that "false aura of veracity" which
was expressly condemned in Beagle, even if the accused has com-
mitted recent numerous offenses of the same type.
V. IMPACT OF BARRICK
Any analysis of the Barrick decision necessarily entails a dis-
cussion of the effect of the recent passage of Proposition 8, the
"Victim's B I of Rights." 85 The general theme of Proposition 8 is
that all releyant evidence should be admissible. As the amend-
ment to article 1, section 28, subdivision (d) of the state constitu-
tion provide :
RELEVANT EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE EXCLUDED IN ANY CRIMI-
NAL PROCEEDING, INCLUDING PRETRIAL AND POST CONVICTION
MOTIONS AND HEAR]-NGS 86
In addition, he section goes on to provide in subdivision (f):
Any prior Conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether
adult or juyenile shall subsequently be used without limitation for pur-
poses of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal
83. 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982).
84. 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
85. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 235, 650 P.2d
274, 185 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982). The California Supreme Court held that Proposition 8
was fundamentally constitutional.
86. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28, subd. (d).
proceeding.87
The majority in Barrick makes no mention of this provision.
However, as Justice Richardson points out in the dissenting opin-
ion, the amendment clearly destroys the Beagle-Barrick line of
decisions.88 In contrast, Justice Kaus, in his dissenting opinion,
stated that he did "not believe it [was] necessary at this time to
decide what effect Proposition 8 will have on the resolution of
similar issues in the future."89
VI. CONCLUSION
The Barrick decision is certain to have a restrictive effect on
impeachment through the use of prior felony convictions. The
California Supreme Court has further limited the scope of trial
court discretion in admitting evidence of the earlier offense to at-
tack the credibility of the defendant-witness. As it stands, very
little remains for the trial judge to determine, and very few prior
convictions will be admissible for purposes of impeachment.
Proposition 8, however, will remedy this situation provided its
specific provisions are upheld by the supreme court.90 If such is
the case, there will be a return to the original legislative intent
underlying Evidence Code section 788.
B. Admission of temporary restraining order held
prejudicial: Stafford v. United Farm Workers of America.
In Stafford v. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 33
Cal. 3d 319, 656 P.2d 564, 188 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983), the court held
that it was prejudicial error to admit evidence of a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) issued previously against the defendants.
The personal injury case arose out of a three-car collision, which
occurred when a union member parked his truck on the side of
the road in violation of the TRO. The order had been issued
87. Id. at § 28, subd. (f).
88. 33 Cal. 3d at 136, 654 P.2d at 1257, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Richardson stressed that in light of the passage of Proposition 8
and the adoption of section 28(f) of the California Constitution:
"Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation
for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal
proceeding. . . ." (Italics added.) Assuming that this new constitutional
provision is not misconstrued, persons such as defendant upon taking the
witness stand will no longer be able to suppress the fact of their prior fel-
ony convictions.
Id.
89. Id. at 137, 654 P.2d at 1257, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
90. See The California Supreme Court Survey, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 835, 895,
897 n.9 (1983). The author analogizes to Proposition 13 and concludes that Proposi-
tion 8 may be severely limited in the future.
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about a week before the accident in order to keep the union from
blocking access to a tomato field, and also prohibited other con-
duct, including rock throwing, violence, and threatening behavior.
Because the TRO had no bearing on the issues of vicarious liabil-
ity and negligence, it was erroneously admitted into evidence at
trial.
IX. FAmViLY LAW
A. fost judgment events may be considered in child
custody determinations: In re Elise K.
In re Elise K., 33 Cal. 3d 138, 654 P.2d 253, 187 Cal. Rptr. 483
(1982), presented the supreme court with a question that had
been thought to be well settled: an appellate court's authority to
consider pos -judgment events. However, in the context of a diffi-
cult factual etting involving a child custody issue, the general
rule that "a appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of
the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were
before the tlial court for its consideration" can have a harsh re-
sult. Appellint, the mother of Elise K., appealed from a judgment
entered pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code section
232(a) (7) (V. est Supp. 1983), which had terminated her custody of
the child. Along with the Los Angeles County Department of
Adoptions, she urged the appellate court to consider all the cir-
cumstances arising since the custody termination. Both parties
felt that new information would provide a basis for the court to
return the cl ild to appellant instead of leaving her homeless.
The court found that the general rule was not absolute, through
the application of California Civil Procedure Code section 909
(West Supp.1 1983). This statute permits appellate courts, in cases
where trial by jury is not a matter of right or has been waived, to
make "factual determinations contrary to or in addition to those
made by th trial court." Furthermore, under section 909, the re-
viewing court may consider "additional evidence of or concerning
facts occ urrng at any time prior to the decision of the appeal."
Therefore, t e court was able to consider post-judgment events
which were compelling enough to reverse the previous judgment
terminating Ithe custody and control of appellant Sandra K. over
her daughtet Elise.
x. GOVERNMENT TORT LiLABrrY
A. Civil Procedure Code section 12(a) applies to
Government Code section 945.6: DeLeon v. Bay Area
Rapid Transit District.
The case of DeLeon v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART),
33 Cal. 3d 456, 658 P.2d 108, 198 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1983), makes Cali-
fornia Civil Procedure Code section 12(a) (West Supp. 1983) ap-
plicable to California Government Code section 945.6 (West 1980).
This entitles plaintiffs with a cause of action against a public en-
tity to the same extension on the six month statute of limitations
afforded to plaintiffs with civil actions, when the last day of that
limitations period is a holiday. Here, plaintiff had filed her com-
plaint against BART on December 26, 1979, six months and one
day after her first claim had been denied by the public entity on
June 25, 1979. The supreme court found section 12(a) to state a
general rule for the computation of time for statutes of limitation.
Citing the need for consistency and certainty in computing these
time periods, the court found no reason to depart from this gen-
eral rule, as a case will not be found to come under an exception
unless there is "a clear expression of provision for a different
method of computation."
XI. JUDGMENTS
A. Attorney neglect and clients' rights: Carroll v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.
Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 892, 654 P.2d 775,
187 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1982), presents the issue of when an attorney's
neglect should be grounds for vacating the dismissal of a lawsuit.
In this case, counsel for defendant requested production of docu-
ments in plaintiff's possession. Plaintiff's counsel asked for and
received four extensions of time, but still failed to produce the re-
quested documents. After plaintiff's counsel failed to appear at
the hearing on defendant's motion to compel, the court served
him with an order compelling production of the documents.
Counsel then failed to comply with the court's order, as well as a
second order compelling production, and plaintiff's action as to
this defendant was dismissed.
Several days after the dismissal, counsel fied a motion for re-
lief from dismissal, claiming that neither he nor his client pos-
sessed the requested documents. Counsel also admitted a total
lack of communication with his client for about five months.
Counsel's motion was granted on the condition that both he and
his client fie declarations stating that they did not know the loca-
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tion of the req~ ested documents. This condition was not fulfilled,
however, and qounsel filed a second motion for relief, stating that
his client clainied she had given the documents to him and he had
later returned them to her.
The trial cot t ultimately found that counsel had substantially
complied with the court order compelling production. The court
stated, howev r, that counsel had been "grossly negligent in the
representation of plaintiff's interest," and that the dismissal was
set aside only because it was an inappropriately harsh penalty.
In reviewin the trial judge's decision, the court noted that in
order to obtaiA relief under California Civil Procedure Code sec-
tion 473 (Wesi Supp. 1983), the attorney must show that the ne-
glect was excl sable. Generally, "the negligence of the attorney
* . . is impute to his clent and may not be offered by the latter
as a basis for elief." However, in cases where the attorney's ne-
glect is essertially positive misconduct which obliterates the
existence of the attorney-client relationship, and unknowingly de-
prives the client of representation, the attorney's negligence
should not be imputed to the client.
In this case, counsel continued to act for his client, although in
a grossly ineflectual manner. His actions did not supersede the
existence of tl~e attorney-client relationship nor constitute a total
failure to represent his client. This case did not, therefore, fall
under the ex mption for excusable neglect, and the relief from
dismissal sho ld not have been granted. The trial court's decision
was accordingly reversed.
XII. JUDI&IAL REVIEW
A. A judge who is not present at oral argument may not
participate in the decision: Moles v. Regents of the
iJniversity of California.
The case of Moles v. Regents of the University of California, 32
Cal. 3d 867, 65 P.2d 740, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1982), resolves the is-
sue of whether a judge who did not hear the appellant's oral argu-
ment can part cipate in the judicial panel's written decision.
The plaintif-appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the
superior cour . He claimed that the defendants had violated his
due process rights under both the state and federal constitutions,
as well as the rights accorded him under university regulations.
After the superior coturt denied his petition, plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, a three-judge court of appeal panel heard oral argu-
ment; however, one justice was replaced before the written deci-
sion was prepared. The new panel's decision unanimously
affirmed the decision of the superior court.
Appellant claimed that it is "inherently unfair" for a judge not
present at the oral argument to participate in the decision. Find-
ing no authority that would allow a justice who had not heard the
oral argument to participate in the final decision, the court stated
that law and policy compel the conclusion that such a practice
should not be permitted. "To hold otherwise would inevitably in-
fringe on the rights of litigants to oral argument or appeal." The
case was returned to the court of appeal for reargument.
XIII. JURISDICTION
A. Review of in personam jurisdiction standards:
Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court.
In Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 664, 660
P.2d 399, 190 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1983), the supreme court reviewed the
policy considerations governing in personam jurisdiction. If any-
thing, the case may have broadened California's long-arm statute,
because it certainly did not narrow it.
Defendant Secrest was the builder of a specialized type of level-
ling machine with its principal place of business in Virginia.
Much of Secrest's manufacturing was performed in Virginia. Se-
crest was a Delaware corporation and maintained no offices in
California and had no employees in California.
The president of F & S, a California company, heard of Secrest
by word of mouth and decided to investigate the purchase of a Se-
crest levelling machine. He sent an F & S employee to Virginia to
negotiate the purchase. After lengthy negotiations, an agreement
was reached whereby the California company would take delivery
of a leveller in Virginia, but acceptance of the merchandise was
conditioned upon the machine rendering satisfactory perform-
ance in the F & S California plant. Secrest sent an employee to
California to install the machine and ensure its proper operation.
The employee remained in California for two days.
F & S consulted with Secrest about maintaining the leveller and
received drawings detailing various modifications that could be
made for certain non-Secrest accessories. Before the incident in
question, Secrest twice sent F & S sales circulars and advertised
six times in a nationally distributed trade magazine.
Ruben Ramos lost five fingers while using the machine. He
brought a products liability action against Secrest in California
asserting California's "long arm" statute as a basis for the court's
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personal jurisdiction over Secrest. Secrest made a special ap-I•*
pearance to quash service; however, the trial court denied the
motion.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The court observed that the reach of personal jurisdiction cannot
be delineated on a mechanical basis. The court held that the
quality and nature of the party's contacts must be considered in
light of the requirements of due process and fairness.
Applying thlse standards to Secrest Machine Corp., the court
found that Secrest was subject to service of process. The com-
pany was held to have established minimum contacts related to
the cause of action through its sale and continued service of the
levelling machine in California.
Having found the requisite contacts, the court turned to the
question of whether it would be "fair" to require Secrest to liti-
gate the claim in California. In short, the court found that it
would be less lof a burden for Secrest to come to California than it
would be for Ramos to go to Virginia to pursue the claim. Se-
crest's writ of Imandate was denied.
XIV. JUVENILE LAW
A. Juvenile court must specify whether an offense is a
felony or misdemeanor: In re Kenneth H.
In re Kenneth H., 33 Cal. 3d 616, 659 P.2d 1156, 189 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1983), presented the court with two straightforward questions of
statutory interpretation. Juvenile Kenneth H. was charged with
burglary. The I "accusatory" pleadings .filed against him character-
ized the offe se as a felony. At a jurisdictional hearing, the
charges were ]found to be true and this finding was in turn refer-
enced at Kenneth's dispositional hearing. However, the juvenile
court never expressly characterized Kenneth's conduct as a fel-
ony or a misdemeanor before revoking his home probation and
sending him to a county camp.
Kenneth's counsel argued that the juvenile court erred in not
specifying whether his offense was a felony or a misdemeanor.
The court, pointing to California Welfare and Institutions Code
section 702 (West Supp. 1983), noted that the issue had already
been resolved by the court of appeal in In re Dennis C., 104 Cal.
App. 3d 16, 163 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1980). The court held that a juvenile
court must state whether the crime found would be a felony or a
misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
It was also contended that the trial court failed to make neces-
sary findings of fact justifying its order that Kenneth be removed
from his parents' custody. California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 726 (West Supp. 1983) requires a court to make one
of the following findings before removing a child from his or her
parents' custody:
(a) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or
neglected to provide proper maintenance, training and education for the
minor.
(b) That the minor has been tried on probation in such custody and has
failed to reform.
(c) That the welfare of the minor requires that his custody be taken from
his parent or guardian.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1983). The disposition
order signed by the judge included printed recitals of the provi-
sions of section 726. A check mark was placed next to subsection
(b) indicating that Kenneth had been "tried on probation and
failed to reform." No other relevant references to section 726
were made. Kenneth contended that this was not sufficient to sat-
isfy the finding requirement. The justices disagreed. In In re
John H., 21 Cal. 3d 18, 577 P.2d 177, 145 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1978), the
court held that an order including only a printed statement of
statutory language satisfied the statute's requirement that a de-
termination of "probable benefit" be established by the Youth Au-
thority before commitment. In reaching this holding, the John H.
court found it necessary to reverse a court of appeal decision
holding that orders supported only by findings "couched in the
language of 726 were insufficient to support the trial court's deci-
sion." The court in Kenneth H. found no significant difference be-
tween merely reciting the appropriate terms of section 726 and
checking a box next to the appropriate clause.
The matter was remanded to the trial court for a determination
of whether the burglary was a felony or a misdemeanor.
XV. LABOR LAW
A. Notice of appeal from Labor Commission must be
timely filed: Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co.
In Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co., 32 Cal. 3d 831, 654 P.2d 219, 187
Cal. Rptr. 449 (1982), a dispute arose between an employee and
his former employer. The employee filed an action with the Labor
Commission to recover amounts which he claimed were owed him
under the employment contract. An informal administrative hear-
ing was held and the former employee was awarded the full
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amount claimed under the contract. Each party received a certi-
fied copy of the decision; a notice of appeal was filed by the em-
ployer thirte n days later, three days after the statutory period
had expired. California Labor Code section 98.2(a) (West Supp.
1983) requires that notice of appeal be filed within ten days of the
service of no ice of an order, decision, or award.
The court hus faced the issue of whether an untimely appeal
from a Labo Commission decision may be heard. In a conven-
tional appeal the failure to file a timely notice leaves the appel-
late court no discretion but to dismiss the appeal. Although an
appeal from a Labor Commission decision is distinguishable be-
cause it prov des for de novo review by the courts, the result of an
untimely notice is the same: failure to appeal within the pre-
scribed period results in the decision or award becoming final. It
is clear from the statutory language and its underlying legislative
purpose that the prescribed deadline is "mandatory and jurisdic-
tional" and c nnot be waived for "mistake, inadvertence, or other
similar excuse." 32 Cal. 3d at 837-38, 654 P.2d at 223, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 453.
B. Poncompliance with organizational security
provisions: San Lorenzo Education Association v. Wilson
In San Loirenzo Education Association v. Wilson, 32 Cal. 3d.841,
654 P.2d 202, 187 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1982), modified, 33 Cal. 3d 399a
(1983), a collective bargaining agreement existed between the
plaintiff, Sari Lorenzo Education Association CTA/NEA, and the
San Lorenzol Unified School District. The agreement contained an
"organizational security" clause which required all employees to
either join the union or pay a service fee to the union. Defend-
ants, districi employees, refused to comply with this provision.
The Association successfully brought suit in several small claims
cases and d~fendants appealed to the Alameda County Superior
Court which found in favor of the Association. On appeal to the
California Supreme Court, defendants argued that plaintiff had
incorrectly brought suit, claiming that section 3540.1, subdivision
(i) (2) of the California Government Code provides dismissal as
the sole renIedy for failure to pay the service fee.
Organizational security is defined in the Government Code as
"[ain arrangement that requires an employee, as a condition of
continued e~nployment," to join the union or alternatively pay a
service fee. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(i) (2) (West 1980) (empha-
sis added). Defendants urged that this terminology prescribes
the dismissal of a noncomplying employee to the exclusion of all
other remedies, such as private civil actions.
The court, however, held that this section "does not prescribe a
remedy at all, let alone an exclusive one." 32 Cal. 3d at 845, 654
P.2d at 205, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 435. It is merely a definitional section,
and is not intended as a substantive limitation on remedies.
Thus, plaintiff's civil suits were properly filed.
XVI. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. Civil Procedure Code section 337.15(c) provides an
exception to the application of the ten year
limitation period for cross-complaints for indemnity:
Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc.
The court in Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 33
Cal. 3d 604, 659 P.2d 1160, 189 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983), was presented
with a straightforward but interesting question of statutory inter-
pretation. Consider the following hypothetical:
S is a seller and developer of residential real property who contracts with
civil engineer E to grade and survey a particular piece of property called
Redacre. The grading is completed by E in year 6 and a house is com-
pleted by S and persons other than E in year 8. Redacre is eventually sold
to plaintiff P. The soil on Redacre settles, causing damage to P's home. P
sues both S and E. S cross-claims against E for indemnity.
California Civil Procedure Code section 337.15 (West 1982) pro-
vides in part:
(a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any person...
who develops real property or performs ... surveying ... or construc-
tion of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the sub-
stantial completion of the development or improvement for any of the
following:
(1) Any latent deficiency in the... surveying ... or construction of an
improvement to, or survey of, real property.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such latent
deficiency....
(c) As used in this section, "action" includes an action for indemnity
brought against a person arising out of that person's performance or fur-
nishing of services or materials referred to in this section, except that a
cross-complaint for indemnity may be filed . . . in an action which has
been brought within the time period set forth in subdivision (a) of this
section.
E moves for dismissal of all claims against him. The trial court grants
his motion. What result on S's appeal?
Such were the facts in Valley Circle. Defendant VTN (a.k.a. E)
argued that the limitations in subparagraph (a) applied with full
force to the cross-claims contemplated in subparagraph (c). The
court disagreed. Looking to the "clear, unambiguous, and reason-
able" language of the statute, the court found one "clear" excep-
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tion to the ten-year limitation: cross-claims. "[A] defendant
timely sued [under subdivision (a)] may file under subdivision
(c) a cross-complaint for indemnity against a third party who
could not otherwise be reached by a direct action for indemnity
filed by the defendant, or by a direct suit for damages filed by the
plaintiff." This result was consistent with the common law rule
that a cause qf action for indemnity does not accrue until the in-
demnitee has suffered a loss through payment of an adverse judg-
ment or settl ment.
The court pointed out that its decision did not create an "infi-
nite period" of liability for subcontractors. Rather, the period in
which a claim could arise would be limited by the section's over-
all ten-year limitation which would begin to run upon completion
of the general contractor's work. Hence, the correct answer to the
hypothetical as evidenced by the result in Valley Circle) is re-
versal of the trial court's judgment.
xVII. NUISANCE
A. Statutory interpretation of red light abatement law:
People ex re, Van de Kamp v. American Art Enterprises,
Inc.
In the case of People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art.En-
terprises, Inc., 33 Cal. 3d 328, 656 P.2d 1170, 188 Cal. Rptr. 740
(1983), the court was faced with the interpretation of California
Penal Code section 11225 (West 1982), known as the Red Light
Abatement Law. The state had fied this action, under California
Penal Code section 11230 (West 1982), alleging that the defend-
ants, owners of a building in Chatsworth, California, used the
structure as headquarters for the publishing and distribution of
sexually explicit material, constituting a nuisance under section
11225. The couirt was called upon to determine whether the provi-
sions of the Red Light Abatement Law required a damages award
against the owners of property that had been judicially declared a
nuisance.
In its search through the various code sections that comprise
the Red Light Abatement Law, the court could find no provisions
purporting to authorize the imposition of a monetary damages
award as an alternative to abatement of the nuisance. The court
refused to impose the damages award upon the defendants, find-
ing that the primary objective of an abatement action is "to 're-
form' the property and ensure that the nuisance is abated, not to
punish for past acts." Although the court recognized the statute
as authorizing "a variety of sanctions to cover the costs of closing
the property and the costs of prosecution," because those reme-
dies are in rem, such costs can only be attained through a sale of
the property.
XVIII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Disassociation from a partnership does not terminate
fiduciary duties: Leff v. Gunter
In Leff v. Gunter,' the defendant partnership appealed from a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 2 after the jury entered a verdict
finding the defendants liable for unfair competition by reason of a
breach of fiduciary duty.3 The defendants challenged portions of
the jury instructions, 4 contending they misstated the law by "ac-
1. 33 Cal. 3d 508, 658 P.2d 740, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1983). The defendants, a co-
partnership, consisted of William L. Gunter, Robert B. Russell, and Robert B. Rus-
sell & Associates.
2. The judgment was in the amount of $416,666, based on a one-sixth share of
lost profits. Id. at 513, 658 P.2d at 743, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
3. Plaintiff Ted Leff, along with Henry Sender, an architectural engineer,
agreed to enter a joint bid on a United States government project involving the
construction of an Internal Revenue Service Center in Fresno, California. The
terms of the contract did not require the bid to be awarded to the lowest bidder;
however, it did require that the bidder have control over any site proposed for the
center.
Shortly thereafter, Leff and Sender orally agreed to form a partnership with the
defendants. Sender had previously formed such an arrangement on a project in
Memphis, Tennessee with the same parties (except Leff) and under the same
terms.
Upon formation of the partnership, Leff began to forward Sender all information
he had obtained concerning proposed sites for the center. Sender relayed all the
materials to the partners, now defendants. Plaintiff was the only bidder to select
and include a site known as the Pilobos site in his initial bid. After defendants
had received the proposed final bid and related information, they informed Sender
they had decided to withdraw from the Fresno joint venture. This occurred be-
tween February and March, 1970. At this time the defendants did not intimate
that they intended to bid independently on the Fresno project. However, on April
10, 1970, defendants submitted their own joint bid for the same Pilobos site. It was
later discovered that the defendants, having made the successful bid under the
name of Russell and Associates, had created the new partnership by oral agree-
ment sometime in mid-January of 1970. Plaintiff and Sender were unaware of the
existence of that association. Id. at 511-12, 658 P.2d at 742-43, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 379-
80.
4. The challenged jury instructions read as follows:
No. 44 stated: You are instructed that where one partner secretly enters
into a contract sought to be contracted by the partnership which another
partner is negotiating on behalf of the partnership such partner is in viola-
tion of his fiduciary duty to the excluded partner.
No. 45 directed: You are further instructed that such fiduciary duty con-
tinues for so long as the other party is negotiating on behalf of the original
partnership.
33 Cal. 3d at 513, 658 P.2d at 743, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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knowledging 'a previously unrecognized cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty through fair competition by a former partner af-
ter terminatI n of the partnership."5 Acknowledging that any "se-
cret preemptive activities" 6 conducted by a partner during an
agreed upon association would constitute an impropriety, defend-
ants contended that any such impropriety was removed by virtue
of their disa sociation with plaintiff before they submitted their
own bid. Thl California Supreme Court disagreed with each of
the defendants' objections. 7
The court, relying heavily upon well established precedent, rea-
soned that post-dissolution competition with a former partner
would be grdatly facilitated by the partner's access to relevant in-
formation, available only as a result of the partnership relation-
ship. The court concluded that a formal disassociation from a
partnership or joint venture, therefore, does not relieve a former
partner of fiduciary duty unless the parties specifically agree
otherwise.8 This principle also applies to transactions which are
merely contemplated and which "constitut[e] the object or pur-
pose for which the partnership was formed."9 However, the court
noted that benefits resulting from the partnership arrangement
after dissolution may be allowable only if each partner "fully com-
pensates hi T co-partner[s] for [their] share of the prospective
.business opportunity."10 Thus, inherent in the copartnership ven-
ture is a fiduciary duty which continues to exist even after
5. Id. (emphasis added).
Defendants contended that since the partnership was fully dissolved, there re-
mained no fiduciary duty. However, when plaintiff met with a government repre-
sentative on M~rch 27, 1970, to discuss the joint bid, he asserted he was not aware
of any disassoclation at the time.
6. Id.
7. "Defendants have cited no contrary authority. Nor do defendants assert
any persuasivel reason in logic or principle which relieves a partner from such con-
tinuing [fiduciary] duty." Id. at 514, 658 P.2d at 744, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
8. This principle had been firmly established by the court in Page v. Page,
which held: "Partners are trustees for each other, and in all proceedings con-
nected with thie conduct of the partnership every partner is bound to act in the
highest good faith to his copartner." 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr.
643, 646 (1961).1 See also Sadugor v. Holstein, 199 Cal. App. 2d 477, 483, 18 Cal. Rptr.
859, 862 (1962) (with respect to copartnership to acquire land: "A joint venturer
holding the property for the joint venture is a trustee for his coventurer and this is
so though he purchased the property with his own funds."); Lasry v. Lederman,
147 Cal. App. 2d 480, 487, 305 P.2d 663, 667 (1957).
9. Kayer v. Wilimon, 150 Cal. 785, 787, 90 P. 135, 136 (1907).
10. Page v! Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 647 (1961).
dissolution.l"
Reliance upon basic equitable principles of partnership also as-
sisted the court in reaching its ultimate decision. The defendants
argued they were under no duty to share profits with their former
partners where those profits were obtained from their separate
activities after dissolution of the partnership. The court stated,
however: "From the evidence in the instant matter, the jury could
well have concluded that defendants secretly began work on their
independent bid during their participation in the joint ven-
ture. .. "12 Instituting a formal bid after dissolution of the part-
nership failed to remove the impropriety of their conduct during
the partnership. The court recognized that focusing only upon
the formal bid date in conjunction with the status of the partner-
ship would be deceptive. The fact remained that the "defendants
here sought to appropriate a partnership opportunity for them-
selves. Their hands are no cleaner because of a more careful
orchestration of their clandestine competition."13
Upon resolution of defendants' appeal, the court addressed
plaintiff's cross-appeal wherein plaintiff alleged that the trial
court erred in denying him prejudgment interest on his subse-
quent recovery. Plaintiff based this appeal on section 3287(a) of
the Civil Code which allows prejudgment interest on damages
which are calculable.14 Defendants never challenged the basis of
computation of plaintiff's recovery although they contested the
underlying issue of liability giving rise to the damages. The court,
however, quickly distinguished these objections:
Damages are deemed certain or capable of being made certain within the
provisions of subdivision (a) of section 3287 where there is essentially no
dispute between the parties concerning the basis of computation of dam-
ages if any are recoverable but where their dispute centers on the issue of
liability giving rise to damage.1
5
Thus, the court concluded that once plaintiffs entitlement to dam-
11. See Donleavey v. Johnston, 24 Cal. App. 319, 328-29, 141 P. 229, 233 (1914)
('"The sound rule is, that [a former partner] cannot make any profit to himself
from a secret transaction initiated while the relation of trustee and cestui que
trust exists, no matter when it springs into actual operation.") (citation omitted).
See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 15021(1) (West 1977).
12. 33 Cal. 3d at 516-17, 658 P.2d at 746, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
13. Id. at 517, 658 P.2d at 746, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
The court completely rejected defendants' claim that the imposition of fiduciary
obligations on joint venturers violates public policy designed to encourage compet-
itive bidding on public projects. Id. at 518, 658 P.2d at 747, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
14. Plaintiff relied on California Civil Code section 3287(a) (West 1970), which
provides in relevant part:
Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of be-
ing made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in
him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from
that day.
15. 33 Cal. 3d at 519, 658 P.2d at 748, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (quoting Esgro Cen-
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ages was established, as to those damages calculable and actually
calculated mechanically, the prejudgment interest on the sum
awarded became due from the time the damages became due.
Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court for the
purpose of calculating and awarding the plaintiff the appropriate
prejudgment interest.
XIX. PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONSI
A. By statute, California prisoners retain all free pressI
rights except where curtailed for institutional
security and public safety: Bailey v. Loggins
Prior confli'cts, and the desire to avoid confrontation between
the executive branch of the government and the judiciary, have
resulted in an abyss where the constitutional rights of prisoners
are concerne I.1 In the past, high courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have dealt with prisoners' rights on an is-
sue-by-issue basis. 2 Thus, clear guidelines for the degree of con-
stitutional protections afforded prisoners have never materialized.
Although thie harshness of the "hands off" doctrine has sub-
sided,3 it has not been fully laid to rest.4 However, the California
Supreme Court recently made the most successful attempt to
date to shed the remaining fragments of the doctrine. In Bailey v.
tral, Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 1060, 98 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1971)
(citation omitted)).
1. Historically, courts have adopted a "hands off" approach, avoiding almost
all consideration of prisoners' constitutional rights. This doctrine has been effec-
tuated by denying claimants the courts' jurisdiction to hear such cases. See gener-
ally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints $f Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
2. Recently the courts have taken a stance on certain isolated issues. How-
ever, each decision has been tempered by the acknowledgment that final defer-
ence should be iccorded the Department of Corrections. See, e.g., Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132-36 (1977) (prison officials
deserve substantial latitude in decision making and their decisions should be up-
held unless conclusively proved incorrect).
3. See supra note 1. 'When the United States Supreme Court initially ad-
dressed the first amendment rights of incarcerated persons, it stated that "federal
courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)).
4. See generally Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights
of Prisoners: A Reappraisai!, 4 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 219, 223-25 (1977) (author
comments that Yourt's rationale underlying the Martinez decision perpetuated the
"hands off" docti-ine it attempted to discard).
Loggins, 5 a four to three decision, the court limited the "usual
deference" 6 traditionally afforded the Department of Corrections.
The court stated that prison officials "[do] not have total or arbi-
trary power, but must exercise [their] authority even-
handedly. . . "7 While the California Supreme Court did not
completely dismiss the realities underlying the "hands off" doc-
trine, its decision in Bailey should be viewed as the most notable
attempt to analyze and delineate the scope of constitutional pro-
tections to which prisoners are entitled.
Superintendent Otis Loggins, representing the California De-
partment of Corrections, appealed a judgment ordering: (1) the
publication of two articles in the Soledad prison newspaper; (2)
the enactment of specific guidelines limiting administrative cen-
sorship of prisoner-authored articles; and (3) the formulation of
procedures for expeditious review of those articles administra-
tively deemed "controversial" and thus unsuitable for publica-
tion.8 Initially, the suit was instituted by Artie Bailey, the inmate
editor of the Star News, after two prisoner-authored articles were
rejected for publication on a content basis.9 After complying with
5. 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982).
6. The phrase "usual deference" had been used consistently in prisoners'
rights cases, seemingly as an offshoot of the "hands off" doctrine. As the judiciary
began to relax the doctrine and acknowledge its jurisdiction in such cases, it tem-
pered the final result of its decisions by granting prison officials, in essence, the
ultimate determination.
7. Id. at 922, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
8. Bailey v. Loggins, No. 73331 (Superior Court of Monterey County, Feb. 14,
1978) (Silver, J.). The trial court issued a peremptory writ mandating the officers
of the Department to publish two articles in the Star News, the prisoner-authored
publication for Soledad Prison. The articles had previously been rejected by
Soledad Prison's Associate Superintendent, who was acting as supervisor of the
content of the publication. In addition, the trial court ordered the formulation of
guidelines in an effort to limit administrative censorship of the Star News to mat-
ters which could reasonably be deemed a threat to institutional security or which
described the construction of weapons or similar dangerous devices. The court
found the existing censorship regulations overbroad and also deemed the appeal
procedure inadequate. See 32 Cal. 3d at 910-13, 654 P.2d at 760-62, 187 Cal. Rptr. at
577-79.
9. In September 1976, Willie Brandt, an inmate at Soledad Prison, submitted
two articles to Artie Bailey for publication in the Star News. The content of the
articles related to two prison lectures, one of which had been given by the Deputy
Legal Affairs Secretary to the Governor. Both articles had been approved for pub-
lication by Bailey, the inmate editor, and by Estin, the civilian journalism instruc-
tor.
According to prison guidelines, the articles were then submitted to Associate
Superintendent Dobreff for administrative review of content. Both Dobreff and
the acting superintendent declined permission for publication of the articles. Bai-
ley subsequently instituted first and second level appeals, both of which were re-
jected. It was not until February 1, 1977, that Bailey was officially informed of the
reasons underlying the prohibition of publication of the articles. The Director of
Corrections, Enomoto, explained his ruling on the appeal to Bailey, granting the
request for administrative guidelines on content, but denying the request for pub-
[Vol. 11: 187, 1983 California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the Departmdnt of Corrections' appellate procedure, Bailey was
finally informed a year later that the articles were in conflict with
the department s regulationsO because they "spoke favorably of
collective organization and bargaining by the prisoners." The di-
rector concluded that the articles "constituted a subtle--or per-
haps, not so subtle-attack upon administration.""
After the court of appeal affirmed the trial court judgment, the
California Supreme Court granted a petition for hearing consider-
ing the follovxhng issues ripe for determination: (1) the power of
the department to reject an article submitted for publication; (2)
the process of appealing the decision; and (3) the validity of the
trial court's action in issuing a peremptory writ mandating depart-
ment officers Ito publish previously rejected articles.12
The major issue with which the court dealt was the editorial
control of the newspaper by department officials. Recognizing
that Penal Code sections 2600 and 260113 govern the rights of
those incarcerated in California, the court concluded that "by
statute California prisoners retain all rights encompassed under
the heading If the freedom of the press. . "...14 These rights,
however, are limited "to the extent that ... [they] must be cur-
tailed for institutional security and public safety."15 Thus, the
court applied established principles of constitutional law to
lication of the specific articles. See 32 Cal. 3d at 911, 654 P.2d at 760, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 577.
10. Director 'Enomoto found the articles in violation of Section 413.11, Misuse
of Publication, which states that a prison newspaper shall not "be used
to . attack anyl law, rule, or policy to which inmates or employees may ob-
ject .... Grievances will be given consideration when called to attention through
designated chanpiels, and institutional publicatons [sic] shall not be used for this
purpose," For al complete version of the Department of Corrections Regulations
sections concermng prisoner publications, see 32 Cal. 3d at 911 n.2, 654 P.2d at 760
n.2, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 577 n.2.
The original regulations have subsequently been replaced three times by the
Department. Thle new regulations are numbered as Regulations sections 720-26.
11. 32 Cal. 3d at 912, 654 P.2d at 761, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
12. Id. at 914, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
13. See CAL. PENAL COD:E §§ 2600-2601 (West 1982). Section 2600 provides that
[a] person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such
period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is nec-
essary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he
is confined and Ifor the reasonable protection of the public." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 2600 (West 1982) (emphasis added).
14. 32 Cal. 3'd at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (emphasis added).
The court further clarified these rights as those originating in the first amendment
of the United States Constitution, and in CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
15. 32 Cal. 34 at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
prisoners. 16
This application required the court to recognize the rule which
provides that a state, after establishing a forum for the expression
of ideas, may not prohibit the public from using the forum be-
cause the state disapproves of the content of ideas, expressions,
or beliefs.17 In addition, a "state may not condition the exercise
of a privilege ... on the renunciation or nonexercise of constitu-
tionally protected rights."18 However, application of these princi-
ples to a prison publication depends upon the purposes served by
that newspaper, the governing regulations in effect, and the
method of application of those regulations by prison authorities.
Prison officials are not compelled to authorize a publication of
any type within their particular institution.19 However, once a
newspaper is established with the stated purpose of serving as a
forum for inmate expression,20 some constitutional safeguards au-
16. The court appeared to rely upon the United States Supreme Court ruling
in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Although the Court had declined to
precisely enumerate the scope of prisoners' first amendment rights, it did set forth
for the first time a constitutional standard of review.
Martinez involved the constitutionality of regulations enabling prison officials to
censor prisoner-authored mail or mail addressed to prisoners. The court held that
such censorship must meet two standards. The restrictions "must further an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression," and the officials could not use the censorship regulations merely "to
eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements."
416 U.S. at 413. In addition, the court held that restrictions should be drawn as
narrowly as possible, so that the authorized limitations on first amendment rights
would not be overly broad in protecting the particular governmental interest in-
volved. Id.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed the
scope of prisoners' rights under the first amendment. In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974), the Court stated, "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." 417 U.S. at 822. Cf Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). See also
ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, The Legal Status of Pris-
oners, 14 Am. CRim. L. REv. 377, § 1.1, at 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Legal
Status of Prisoners].
17. 32 Cal. 3d at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580. See Wirta v. Ala-
meda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
18. 32 Cal. 3d at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580. This doctrine in-
cludes the privilege of using state property. See also Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
19. See Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 499 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dis-
missed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975). Prison officials may sponsor journalism
classes without publishing inmates' work. They also may use prisoner labor to
produce a "house organ" wherein only the views of the administration are ex-
pressed. 32 Cal. 3d at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
20. 32 Cal. 3d at 916, 654 P.2d at 764, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The trial court con-
cluded that the Star News was in fact a limited forum for prisoner expression.
The court based this conclusion upon several factors:
(1) the regulations in and of themselves emphasized the nature of the
publication, stating that its purpose was to "supply inmates with news
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tomatically come into play.2 1 The standard of review is at least
that of a "reasonable basis." 22 Yet, it appears that the court has
been inclined to adopt a more stringent standard of review when
dealing specifically with the first amendment right of free speech
happenigs within the institution and department;" Reg. 721; that it
should appeal to all inmates, Reg. 723; and that it must conform to
journalistic standards, Reg. 725;
(2) the publication served an important communicative purpose;
(3) it was freely circulated among the inmates and staff and was also dis-
tributed ,to other similar institutions;
(4) subscriptions were accepted from interested persons, organizations
and agencies; and
(5) developmhent of the morale of the prisoners' families was another pur-
pose of the publication.
Thus, it is clear that the department's own regulations and practices consistently
categorized the Star News as a publication authorized to express the ideas, be-
liefs, and views of the prison population. These elements constituted the major is-
sue of concern to the court, whether the publication was essentially an "in house
organ," or was actually a forum for prisoner expression.
21. Two federal decisions directly address the first amendment protection is-
sue. In Luparar v. Stoneman, the Department of Corrections sought to limit distri-
bution of a prisoner-authored, partially state funded publication. The court
rejected the argument that state funds entitled the department to act as a pub-
lisher and therefore exercise complete control over its contents. The district court
ruled that:
[tihe state i' not required to establish or support an inmate newspaper,
and once it does so, it can withdraw its approval or support for any reason,
except those impermissible under the first amendment. However, once
the state has allowed a newspaper to be established, the objection of
prison officials, or those in the Department of Corrections, to its editorial
content is not a permissible reason under the first amendment to prohibit
its distribution.
Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. at 499.
In Pittman v. Hutto, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of censorship, hold-
ing that:
prison officials may limit first amendment rights .... whenever they rea-
sonably conclude that the exercise of such rights possesses the likelihood
of disruption of prison order or stability or otherwise interferes with the
penological 6bjectives of the institution.
Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129-32 (1977)).
The Californial Supreme Court merged the two rules and stated that both the
district court and the circuit court "essentially agree that the administration can-
not exercise arbitrary control; censorship can only be imposed to protect prison
order and securiiy, or to further some substantial state interest." 32 Cal. 3d at 918,
654 P.2d at 765, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
22. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. at 132.
The Court's miost extensive review of first amendment rights of prisoners oc-
curred in Jones, 1which dealt with the right of association by inmates. The Court
held that the right of association, "necessarily curtailed by the realities of confine-
ment," may be limited by department officials upon a reasonable determination
that association by an inmate group was likely to interfere with the state's legiti-
mate interests in security, order and prisoner rehabilitation. Id.
for prisoners.23 Generally, most courts have required department
officials to justify any content-based prohibitions.24 However, the
range of that burden has varied drastically from a showing that
the restriction is vital to protect against a "clear and present dan-
ger,"25 to a requisite showing that "it is necessary to avoid sub-
stantial interference with prison discipline."26
The defendants in this case argued that because a prison is not
a "public forum," 2 7 the prisoners should not be afforded any
rights concerning a prison publication. However, the court re-
jected this contention and distinguished the Jones ruling,2 8 stat-
ing that the facts in Jones did not "involve a prison newspaper,
and nothing in that opinion indicat[ed] that a newspaper cannot
serve as a forum for prisoner expression." 29 The court further
stated that "all [courts] recognize that prison administrators do
not have total and arbitrary power, but that First Amendment val-
ues appropriate to expressive forums enter into the balance."30
The court analyzed the first amendment values involved by the
use of two traditional theories. The first of these theories was
premised on the Star News being a public forum. Once estab-
lished as such, the state "[could] not infringe the right of free ex-
pression within the parameters of the forum."31 The department
23. In Jones, the standard of review was formulated primarily for the first
amendment right of association. The restrictions were content-neutral and geared
to group activity. Upon adoption of the reasonable basis standard, the Court em-
phasized that group activity posed a more severe threat to legitimate penological
objectives than did the rights of free expression and beliefs. But see Pittman v.
Hutto, 448 F. Supp. 61, 65-66 (E.D. Va. 1978) (court argued that the restriction on
group activity in Jones was content based), affd, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
Thus, the decisions reached in Luparar and Pittman evidenced a higher level of
review. See supra note 21.
24. See generally Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976); Jackson v.
Ward, 458 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (prison officials' censorship of inmates' ac-
cess to published materials); O'Connell v. Southworth, 422 F. Supp. 182 (D.R.I.
1976) (prison officials' denial of use of monies from inmates' welfare fund to dis-
tibute leaflets); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. See The Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 16, § 6.5, Commentary at 526
(advocating no content-based censorship "except where that content could other-
wise be prohibited under the 'clear and present danger' standard.").
26. Martinez v. Oswald, 425 F. Supp. 112, 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
28. Id. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
29. 32 Cal. 3d at 918, 654 P.2d at 766, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The court does ac-
knowledge that many courts have offered differing opinions as to the amount of
discretionary control granted prison officials in first amendment speech cases. See
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
30. 32 Cal. 3d at 918, 654 P.2d at 766, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See also Pittman v.
Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 1979); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 186 (3d Cir.
1972); Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 499-501 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dis-
missed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191, 1193
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
31. 32 Cal. 3d at 919, 920, 654 P.2d at 767, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (citing Wirta v.
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could, however, uensor the publication in accordance with estab-
lished constitutional guidelines, to provide for reasonable security
within the institution and the reasonable protection of the pub-
lic. 32 Thus, thj court authorized limited control over such a publi-
cation, but only that amount of control necessary to serve "valid
penological objectives. '"3 As a result, the court mandated the
drafting of reghlations to evidence sensitivity to first amendment
values and, fuither, the avoidance of prohibitions unnecessary to
any institutionlal or penological purpose.
The second theory concerned the application and enforcement
of departmentiimposed regulations. Those regulations which pro-
vide "extraordinary latitude for discretion," possibly resulting in
"invit[ing] prion officials and employees to apply their own per-
sonal prejudices and opinions as standards for [prison] censor-
ship,"34 are unconstitutional. The court ruled that in applying and
enforcing regulations, the department must act in a "non-arbi-
trary, neutral, even-handed manner."3 5 The court required that
future regulatipns drafted by the department be "framed and ap-
plied uniformly with due regard for constitutionally protected
rights of free expression." The regulations should also be in ac-
cord with the standards of Procunier v. Martinez and Penal Code
section 2600.36
Alameda-Contra 6osta Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430
(1967)).
The Departmen also argued that the state as publisher enjoyed the same com-
plete control over the publication as do private publishers. The court summarily
rejected this argument, stating that the Department of Corrections "is clearly an
arm of the state and this fact will always distinguish it from the purely private
publisher as far a. censorship rights are concerned." 32 Cal. 3d at 919, 654 P.2d at
766, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (quoting Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574, affd, 489 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1973)1 cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). For an excellent historical ac-
count of the state Ipublisher versus private publisher rule, see Gambino v. Fairfax
City School Bd., 419 F. Supp. '731 (E.D. Va. 1977), affid, 564 F.2d 157 (1977); Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of 'Va. v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va.
1970); Antonelli v.IHammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
32. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2600-2601 (West 1982).
33. 32 Cal. 3d 't 920, 654 P.2d at 767, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
34. Procunier v Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974).
35. The court did not discuss the validity of Department Regulations §§ 723
and 724, except to imply that they may "risk being applied in a manner which is
not neutral with regard to elements of protected expression." 32 Cal. 3d at 920, 654
P.2d at 767, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 584. The court concluded that determination of the
constitutionality of the regulations was unnecessary, since those regulations were
no longer in effed and there remained no controversy over publication of a spe-
cific article.
36. 32 Cal. 3d at 921, 654 P.2d at 767, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (citation omitted).
The final issue addressed by the court was the availability of
appeals from departmental decisions. Recognizing that delay in
the appellate process may be an effective form of censorship, the
court again turned to the ruling in Luparar: "The prison adminis-
tration must ... ensure an expeditious review procedure. To be
valid, the regulations must proscribe a definite brief time within
which the review of submitted material will be completed."37
Finding the present appellate process inadequate,38 the court af-
firmed the trial court ruling requiring the enactment of depart-
mental rules providing for immediate review.
Finally, the court refused to discard the traditional practice of
affording "usual deference" to the department by refusing to af-
firm the trial court's order for new departmental regulations. The
court reversed3 9 the trial court's order because of the absence of
controversy over publication of specific articles. The court pro-
ceeded no further than to remind the department of the require-
ment of uniformity it had already prescribed in the drafting of
any new regulations.
Justice Newman and Chief Justice Bird, in separate opinions,
concurred with the majority.40 Chief Justice Bird emphasized
that the reissuance of regulations similar to those previously
presented to the court would be unacceptable since all regula-
tions must "hereafter ... comport with the First Amendment
principles applicable to state publications. ... 41 Chief Justice
Bird thus may have implied that she would have struck down
some or all of the existing regulations.
Justice Newman concurred with the result, yet found the major-
ity's reliance on the United States Constitution and Penal Code
section 2600 unacceptable. Justice Newman preferred to rely on
37. 382 F. Supp. at 502.
38. The high court and the trial court both rejected the appeals procedure in
effect at the time of the rejection of the Brandt articles. The process provided for
three levels of appeal and permitted a 45 day period between the initial grievance
and the final ruling. This time limit could be extended in "extraordinary" cases.
The regulations failed to distinguish cases which involved rejection of newsworthy
articles from other prison grievances. This was found to be unsuitable in light of
first amendment considerations. 32 Cal. 3d at 921, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at
585.
39. The court reversed the trial court's order "[iJn deference to the responsi-
bilities and authority of the department." 32 Cal. 3d at 922, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 585. This language is the only evidence that the court refuses to fully
abandon the "hands off" doctrine, and also denotes that there remains some of the
traditional "usual deference" on which officials may rely.
40. The majority opinion was written by Justice Broussard with Justice Rey-
noso concurring.
41. 32 Cal. 3d at 923, 654 P.2d at 769, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring).
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sections 2(a) land 3 of Article I of the California Constitution.42
He also believed legislative standards and objectives should be
based on either security or public protection, rather than on
good" journalistic standards or "valid" penological objectives, in
order to permit restraints on speech and press as afforded by Pe-
nal Code section 2600.
Justice Richardson was joined in his dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Mosk, both of whom emphatically disagreed with the majority
ruling. Justice Richardson stated that "prison authorities should
have broad discretion to select among, and edit or reject, those ar-
ticles submitted for publication. . .. -43 This contention has a
two-fold basis. First, Justice Richardson disagreed with the pur-
pose attributed to the Star News by the majority. He instead clas-
sified the Star News as a "house organ," with provisions for strict
supervisory control by the prison administration.4 4 Secondly, he
found the major premise upon which the majority based its deci-
sion to be inaccurate. Citing Jones, Justice Richardson reiterated
that "a prison is most emphatically not a public forum."45
Justice Richardson delivered an emotional argument through-
out his dissenting opinion. His consistent refusal to acknowledge
even the most basic rights of the incarcerated resulted in his com-
plete rejection of all theories and established constitutional prin-
ciples underlying the majority's ruling. His overwhelming
reliance on Jones, without acknowledgment of any differences,
42. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2(a) & 3 (West Supp. 1983) provide:
Sec. 2. (a) Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not 'restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.I
Sec. 3. The people have the right to instruct their representatives, peti-
tion government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult
for the common good.
Id.
43. 32 Cal. 3d at 923, 654 P.2d at 769, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original). He further stated that such discretion should be
afforded department officials "Without later being required to justify their actions
on institutional, social or penological grounds. Nor would I require the depart-
ment to formulatle elaborate review procedures. Id.
44. "According to the department's administrative manual, the purposes of
publishing Star N~ews are to educate and train participating inmates,.., dissemi-
nate administrative information to inmates, and report activities within the insti-
tution and department." Id. at 924, 654 P.2d at 769, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
45. Id. at 924! 654 P.2d at 770, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 587. But see supra notes 17-21
and accompanyihg text, and notes 27-30 and accompanying text (Jones distin-
guished from freedom of speech cases).
qualifies him as a staunch supporter of the "hands off" doctrine. 46
Justice Kaus' dissenting opinion offers the most realistic and
thus the most persuasive argument against first amendment pro-
tection for prison newspapers. While he conceded that "reason-
able persons can differ on the threshold question whether the
paper is established as an educational-rehabilitative exercise or
as a market place for ideas," he urged adoption of the former in
order to limit the 'rolling barrage of First Amendment artillery"
on the department so that such newspapers may ultimately flour-
ish. Justice Kaus noted that if the department found the imposed
guidelines to be intolerable, the authorization of worthwhile pub-
lications could cease, as prison officials are not compelled to pub-
lish inmate newspapers.47
In accord with Justice Richardson, Justice Kaus found the ma-
jority ruling to be based on an inaccurate foundation, as he did
not view a prison newspaper as a '"public forum." He supported
this contention with the department's administrative manual
which provides that a "newspaper" or "house organ" shall be a
"part of the educational and vocational training programs."48 He
further admonished the majority for, in effect, telling the defend-
ants "first, what type of publication they ought to permit and, sec-
ond, that they are not doing it right."49 Justice Kaus' description
of the function of the newspaper reveals the crux of his conclu-
sion: "its mission is to educate, to rehabilitate and to inform
within clearly designated limitations. It is not intended as a 'fo-
rum for the expression of ideas.' "50
The effect of the court's ruling does not finally abolish the his-
torical approach of the "hands off" doctrine, but it does provide
more insight than previous attempts through a cohesive analysis
of first amendment rights of the incarcerated population. Distin-
guishing between the first amendment freedom of speech and the
46. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and profes-
sional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial
evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their
expert judgment in such matters.
32 Cal. 3d at 925, 654 P.2d at 771, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)) (emphasis in original).
47. 32 Cal. 3d at 930, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
48. 32 Cal. 3d at 929, 654 P.2d 773, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
Justice Kaus held that the majority erroneously based its review on the regula-
tions which were in effect at the time of the original trial. In Kash Enters., Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 572 P.2d 1302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977), the court
stated, "[u] nder settled principles, the version of the [regulation I in force at pres-
ent is the relevant legislation for purposes of this appeal." See 32 Cal. 3d at 927 n.2,
654 P.2d at 773 n.2, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 590 n.2.
49. 32 Cal. 3d at 929, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 930, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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freedom of association protection, the court avoided the necessity
of offering a hard and fast ruling on the broad scope of prisoners'
first amendment rights. The court acknowledged that the case
dealt solely with the freedom of speech issue. An attempt to
broaden the scope of this ruling to other first amendment protec-
tions may be a difficult task. As Justice Richardson noted, a
prison setting is unique;5 1 it seems unlikely that the majority
would advocate the present result beyond the prison-publication
issue.
Furthermore, the Department of Corrections may not be seri-
ously affected by the court's ruling. Justice Kaus stated, "the
practical effect of the majority decision is likely to be nil. There is
obviously enough leeway in the court's criteria. . . to enable a so-
phisticated prison administration to regulate the content of a
prison newspaper pretty much as it wants, provided it is done in
slightly less ham-handed fashion than heretofore."52 However, as
a result of the majority's ruling, the department must establish
guidelines to follow in a more "even-handed" manner. In addi-
tion, inmates may have judicial recourse as a result of unfair cen-
sorship. It was not the court's intention to strip the department of
all authority, but it has attempted to achieve uniformity and thus
fairness when dealing with a segment of the population that may
be at an unfair disadvantage.
XX. PROBATE
A. tocal subdivision ordinance cannot bind probate
Iourt's discretion: Wells Fargo Bank v. Town of
Woodside
In interpreting whether a subdivision ordinance has binding ef-
fect on a probate court's order providing a widow with her allotted
homestead property in an estate, the supreme court in Wells
Fargo Bank v. Town of Woodside, 33 Cal. 3d 379, 657 P.2d 819, 189
Cal. Rptr. 411 (1983), held that the court order takes precedence.
The probate court is statutorily invested with broad discretion to
accommodate the interests of the decedent's family and creditors;
51. Id. at 926, 654 P.2d at 771, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(granting deference to prison officials "[gliven the highly volatile and unpredict-
able environment existing behind prison walls, and the complexity of balancing
rehabilitative efforts with overall prison security and discipline..
52. Id. at 98, 654 P.2d at 772, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (Kaus, J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted).
thus, the locality "has no power, in essence, to 'veto' a division ac-
complished by the probate court. .. ." In this case, the laws were
in direct conflict, but because the order which set the homestead
apart effectively vested title with the widow, the local ordinance
was superseded.
XXI. PUBLIC UTILrrY LAW
A. Distribution of unclaimed refunds: Cory v. Public
Utilities Commission
As a result of a series of court decisions regarding its account-
ing practices, Pacific Telephone had overcharged its customers by
approximately $381 million. The Public Utilities Commission
(PUC) ordered Pacific to refund the excess charges to customers
or former customers who could be located and then to distribute
any unclaimed funds on a pro rata basis to current customers. In
Cory v. Public Utilities Commission, 33 Cal. 3d 522, 658 P.2d 749,
189 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1983), the California State Controller, Kenneth
Cory, petitioned the supreme court for review of the PUC deci-
sion asserting that the excess funds should be paid to the state
under the Unclaimed Property Law. See CAL. CMy. PROC. CODE
§§ 1500-1589 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983). The PUC contended that
various comments in 1967 by the California Law Revision Com-
mission suggested that the unclaimed refunds fell outside the
bounds of the Unclaimed Property Law, and that the statute em-
powered the PUC to determine how overcharge refunds should be
distributed.
After reviewing the history of the state's handling of unclaimed
utility refunds, the court concluded that the state controller had
correctly asserted that the money should be paid to the state
fund. The court stated:
[The Public Utilities Code] does not authorize the commission's order to
pay the unclaimed refunds to current customers. The section authorizes
refund orders; it does not deal with unclaimed property .... There is
nothing in the section indicating that the commission having ordered the
refunds is authorized to subsequently repudiate the property rights of un-
located former customers, declare a forfeiture, and provide a windfall for
current customers who have already received the full refund to which
they are entitled under section 453.5 [CAL. PUB. Ura. CODE § 453.5 (West
Supp. 1983) 1.
As to the PUC's allegation that the unclaimed property provi-
sions were not intended to apply to unclaimed refunds, the court
observed that although various dispositions of such property had
been made in the past, under the present law it fell within the un-
claimed property law. "There is no more reason to allocate the
unclaimed rate refunds to current telephone customers than
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there would be tor a bank to allocate unclaimed property to its
current customers." The PUC's order was therefore annulled.
XXII. WATER LITIGATION
A. Pjblic trust doctrine protects navigable waters from
harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable
tributaries: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court*
1. INTRODUCTION
Mono Lake lies nestled at the foot of the Sierra Nevada moun-
tains, near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. For
years, it existed virtually unnoticed by the general public. Today,
it is at the center of a public drama. The California Supreme
Court, using tie Mono Lake controversy as a backdrop, radically
departed from settled principles of California water law, and de-
cided that a py blic trust underlies all navigable bodies of Califor-
nia water. This public trust doctrine should prove to be one of the
most important evironmental tests to emerge in the last decade.
II. THE SUBJECT MATrER
A. Mono Lake
Mono Lake's strange beauty, as well as its ecological value, has
been imperile1i by substantial diversions of the streams which
feed it.' In 1940, the predecessor to the California Water Resource
Board2 granted the Department of Water and Power of the City of
Los Angeles (D)WP) a license to divert water from the lake's trib-
utary streams. The DWP, acting quickly to secure a water supply
for the Los Aigeles area, promptly built facilities and began di-
• This Artile was contributed by Elizabeth M. Buechler, third-year staff
member.
1. For a general discussion of the effects of these diversions on Mono Lake,
see Hoff, The Legal Battle Over Mono Lake, Cal. Lawyer, Jan. 1982, at 28; Young,
The Troubled Waters of Mono Lake, National Geographic, Oct. 1981, at 504; Jehl,
Mono Lake: A Vital Way Station for Wilsons Phalarope, National Geographic,
Oct. 1981, at 520; CAIAF. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ONI MONO LAK:E (Dec. 1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
2. At that tiine, the California Water Resource Board was known as the Divi-
sion of Water Resources. It has endured many name changes over the years, but
shall be referred ito here as the "Water Board." See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424 n.1, 658 P.2d 709, 711 n.1, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348
n.1, modified, 33 Cal. 3d 726a (1983).
verting the stream water to the DWP's Owens Valley aqueduct. 3
These diversions, now equalling 99,580 acre-feet per year, caused
the lake's surface to drop forty-three feet and reduced the surface
area of the lake from 85 square miles to 60.3 square miles. 4
This drastic change is indirectly responsible for a host of ad-
verse environmental impacts. Mono Lake is the second largest
lake in California; it has the highest saline count of any California
lake. The lake has no outlets, and loses water only by evaporation
or seepage, which leaves the natural salts behind. With less
water entering the lake, its saline content has increased dramati-
cally. This, in turn, has upset the natural balance of wildlife
which depends on the lake for its support. While the lake does
not support normal fish life, it does have a large brine shrimp and
brine fly population which serve as food for millions of local and
migratory birds. The increased salinity has reduced the brine
shrimp population, thereby making it harder :for the birds to
feed.5 The diversion has also caused the loss of nesting sites for
the birds which used to nest on the lake's islands. As the lake
lowered, areas that were once islands became peninsulas, giving
natural predators easy access to the nests. 6 This loss in nesting
sites and food stuffs has also affected the birds' migratory pat-
terns.7 The diversions have also had their impact on man. As the
surface level of the lake has dropped, the lake bed has been ex-
posed. It has dried into a highly alkaline silt which is easily pick-
ed up by the winds. This creates an "alkaline smog" that is
irritating to the mucous membranes and respiratory systems of
humans and animals.8 "Mono Lake has long been treasured as a
unique scenic, recreational and scientific resource,"9 but these es-
3. In 1940, only about half of the water from the Mono Lake streams was di-
verted by the DWP. In 1970, however, a second tunnel was constructed. This ena-
bled DWP to take virtually the entire flow of the feeder streams. 33 Cal. 3d 419,
424, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348 (1983).
4. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
5. Birds must maintain "osmotic equilibrium" and can do so only by increas-
ing either their secretion of salts, or increasing their intake of fresh water. The
birds around Mono Lake have already reached their limit of salt secretion. The
Task Force predicts that the raising of young birds will be adversely affected be-
cause the adults will have to devote time to obtaining fresh water that could have
been spent feeding the young. Id. at 430 n.10, 658 P.2d at 715 n.10, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
352 n.10.
6. This loss was hardest felt by the California gull. In 1979, Negret Island,
once one of the gull's favorite nesting sites, was raided by coyotes. The number of
gulls around the lake declined sharply. In 1981, 95% of the hatched chicks failed to
reach maturity. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 35:3.
7. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
8. Id. at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353, DWP claims that the air
quality of the basin has not been affected and presents no hazard to human
health. Id; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
9. 33 Cal. 3d at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (citing City of Los
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thetic values lare also being diminished.O
B. The Controversy
In 1913, thb City of Los Angeles built an aqueduct to carry
water from the Owens River in the Antelope-Mojave plateau to
Los Angeles." The rights to the water in Owens Valley were
hotly, and sometimes violently, contested by Owens Valley resi-
dents and the DVWP.12 But when the fighting was over, the water
went to Los Angeles, leaving the Owens Lake a dry alkali flat.
Soon, however, Los Angeles needed more water. In 1940, the
DWP asked for a permit to divert water from Mono Lake. The
Board, relyigg on a 1921 legislative enactment, to the effect that
domestic use was the highest and best use for water,13 granted
the permit stating that "there is apparently nothing that this of-
fice can do to prevent, it."14 The diversions continued until the
Mono Lake Committee, a citizen's group, began bringing the issue
to the publicIs attention, drawing other interested groups into the
controversy1'5 On May 21, 1979, the National Audubon Society
filed suit for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Superior
Court for Mono County.16 The fight for Mono Lake had begun.
A series of tactical procedural moves followed. First, the DWP
I
Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 462-63, 52 P.2d 585, 586 (1935)); TASK FORCE
REPORT, srupra Aote 1, at 22-24.
10. The results of continued diversion remain a source of controversy. The
Audubon Society believes that in fifty years the lake will have dropped another
fifty feet, and will continue to diminish until it dries up. The DWP disputes this,
contending instead that the lake will be lowered by another forty-three feet over
eighty to one h'undred years, and then will approach an environmental equilib-
rium where the 'inflow equals the outflow despite the diversions. This stabilization
will supposedly[ occur when the lake is about fifty-six percent of the original sur-
face area and forty-two percent shallower than its natural size. 33 Cal. 3d at 429,
658 P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
11. Id. at 426, 658 P,2d at 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
12. After bdilding the aqueduct from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles, the
DWP continued to acquire water rights in the Owens Valley. The Valley's resi-
dents, who depended on the water for their agriculture, raised intense opposition
to the diversiois-including dynamiting the aqueduct on several occasions, and
once forceably seizing possession of the aqueduct gates. County of Inyo v. Public
Utils. Comm'n.,126 Cal. 3d 154, 157, 604 P.2d 566, 567, 161 Cal. Rptr. 172, 173 (1980).
13. This 1921 amendment has since been codified as CAL. WATER CODE § 1254
(West 1971). See also CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 1971), which authorizes the
Board to "reject an application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation
would not best conserve the public interest."
14. 33 Cal. 3d at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
15. Id. at 427, 658 P.2d at 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
16. 33 Cal. 3d at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
contended that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue to enjoin viola-
tions of the public trust. It cited Antioch v. Williams Irrigation
District17 and Miller & Lux v. Enterprise Canal and Land Co., 18
as authority for the proposition that only the state or federal gov-
ernment has standing to contest diversions of water affecting
downstream navigability.19 The court turned to Marks v.
Whitney,20 which expressly held that any member of the public
has standing to raise a claim of harm to the public trust,2 1 and
concluded that plaintiffs did have standing to sue.22
The DWP then moved for a change of venue. The court granted
the motion, and moved the action to Alpine County.23 A trial date
was set for March 1980. In January, DWP cross-complained,
bringing in one hundred and seventeen individuals and entities,
including the federal government. 24 The federal government, as a
cross-defendant, removed the case to federal court.25 The district
court, on a motion by DWP, stayed its proceedings under the fed-
eral abstention doctrine26 in order to allow California courts to re-
solve two important issues of California law: (1) does the public
trust doctrine apply to non-navigable streams that feed a naviga-
ble lake, and how does it function with regard to the California
water rights system-is it subsumed or does it function indepen-
17. 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 770 (1922) (appropriation of water in San Joaquin River
by City of Antioch held not actionable despite subsequent contamination of fresh
water by sea water which began creeping upstream due to a diminished flow of
fresh water).
18. 142 Cal. 208, 75 P. 770 (1904) (appropriator of many years has right to water
as against trespassing appropriator).
19. Williams Irrig. Dist., 188 Cal. at 457, 205 P. at 691; Enterprise Canal and
Land Co., 142 Cal. at 214, 75 P. at 771.
20. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (tidelands are subject to
public trust, and any dispute would be based on an infringement of the jus
privatum or the jus publicum).
21. Id. at 261, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
22. 33 Cal. 3d at 431 n.11, 658 P.2d at 716 n.11, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.11.
23. At this point, DWP sought an extraordinary writ to bar this transfer, per-
haps with the feeling that Alpine County was too rural to appreciate the City of
Los Angeles' position. The court denied the writ. Id. at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 353.
24. Id.
25. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981), federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over federal questions. The case was removed to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California. Id. at 431, 658 P.2d at 716-17, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 353.
26. See id. at 431 n.12, 658 P.2d at 717 n.12, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354 n.12 for full ex-
planation of the doctrine. In essence, it is appropriate for the federal court to ab-
stain from judgment where there are difficult questions of state law presented
which relate to "policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar." Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
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dently of that 'system?27 and (2) must all administrative remedies
be exhausted by plaintiffs before seeking a judicial remedy?28
The Superio r Court for Alpine County examined the questions
presented by the federal court and on November 9, 1981, entered
summary judgment against plaintiffs.2 9 The court's notice of in-
tended ruling stated that the water rights system was comprehen-
sive and exclusive in determining the legality of the diversions
and that the public trust doctrine did not operate independently,
but rather, was subsumed into that system. The court also con-
cluded that plaintiffs were required to exhaust all administrative
remedies before turning to the courts. The National Audobon
Society filed a petition for mandate directly to the Supreme Court
of California to review the order of summary judgment. The
supreme court issued an alternative writ and heard the case.3 0
27. 33 Cal. 3di at 432, 658 P.2d at 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54. The court phrased
the question differently:
What is the imterrelationship of the public trust doctrine and the Califor-
nia water rights system, in the context of the right of the [DWP] to divert
water from Mono Lake pursuant to permits and licenses issued under the
California wter rights system? . . . Stated differently, can the plaintiffs
challenge the [DWNP'sI permits and licenses by arguing that those permits
and licenses are limited by the public trust doctrine, or must the plaintiffs
challenge the permits and licenses by arguing that the water diversions
and uses authorized thereunder are not "reasonable or beneficial" as re-
quired unde the California water rights system?
Id.
28. In response, and in objection to the form of the abstention order, the DWP
petitioned the Umited States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for leave to file
an interlocutory jappeal. This petition was denied. Id. at 432 n.13, 658 P.2d at 717
n.13, 189 Cal. Rotr. at 354 n.13. Plaintiffs responded to the abstention order by
filing a new complaint for declaratory relief. This, DWP claimed, constituted a re-
quest for an advisory opinion which was beyond the jurisdiction of the California
courts. The court refused to accept DWP's interpretation. It noted that this was a
matter of first impression. If the court were to characterize plaintiffs amended
complaint as a request for an advisory opinion, it would be refusing to cooperate
with the federal court which. had decided to abstain from deciding the case until
the state supreme court had decided the applicable law. The court also noted that
this was not a case in which the usual objections to advisory opinions would ap-
ply: "If the issue of justiciability is in doubt, it should be resolved in favor of jus-
ticiability in cass of great public interest." Id. at 432 n.14, 658 P.2d at 717 n.14, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 354 In.14.
29. Id. at 432-33, 658 P.2d at 717-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
30. Id. at 433. 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
III. THE DECISION
A. The Public Trust and the California Water Rights System
1. The Public Trust Doctrine
Despite its deceptively recent appearance, the public trust doc-
trine originated in Roman law31 and has developed into a concept
under which the sovereign must hold "all of its navigable water-
ways and the lands lying beneath them 'as trustee of a public
trust for the benefit of the people.' "32 California acquired title as
trustee to such lands and waterways upon its admission to the
union,33 and has repeatedly recognized and enforced its trust
obligations.34
While the trustee originally held property for the public so that
it could "enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein [free] from the ob-
struction or interference of private parties, '35 the public trust has
evolved to accommodate other uses of the public waterways. In
Marks v. Whitney, 36 the court said that the trust includes the
right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and use for boating and recrea-
tion. The court also acknowledged that "It]he public uses to
which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs."37 In a statement that acknowledges how
the public needs have changed, of particular relevance to the
Mono Lake situation, the court went on to say:
[TJhere is a growing public recognition that one of the most important
public uses of the tidelands ... is the preservation of those lands in their
natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat
31. Id. "By the law of nature, these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea." INSTrruTES OF
JusTiAN 2.1.1. Spanish law, and subsequently Mexican law, also recognized the
public trust doctrine. This is particularly relevant in California because Hispanic
rights were guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 33 Cal. 3d at 434 n.15,
658 P.2d at 718 n.15, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.15. See also Stevens, The Public Trust: A
Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 195, 197 (1980); Dyer, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law
and the Public Trus 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571 (1972).
32. 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (citing Colberg, Inc. v.
California ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416, 432 P.2d 3, 8, 62 Cal. Rptr.
401, 406 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968)).
33. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 365, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, 330, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
34. 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355. See generally Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (giving history of the public trust doctrine).
35. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). See also City of Long
Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
36. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
37. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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for birds and marine life., and which favorably affect the scenery and cli-
mate of the a ea.38
While the Marks39 language and the decisions of Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois4o and City of Los Angeles v. Aitken4 l leave no
doubt that the public trust covers Mono Lake, the question arises
whether it applies to the tributary streams which are not them-
selves navigable, but from which the water is being diverted.
These non-navigable tributaries certainly affect the navigablility
of Mono Lake, but are they protected by the public trust?
The court examined its decisions in People v. Gold Run Ditch
and Mining Co.42 and People v. Russ 43 in reaching its decision
that the trust applies to the Mono Lake tributaries. In Gold Run,
the court upheld an injunction that stopped the defendant mining
companies from dumping sand and gravel into the American
River. The court held that it was "an unauthorized invasion of the
rights of the public to its navigation," 44 and that "the rights of the
people in the navigable rivers of the State are paramount and
controlling. The State holds the absolute right to all navigable
waters and soils under them ..... ,45 In Russ, defendant erected
dams on non navigable sloughs. The court ordered the trial court
to determine if the dams affected the navigability of the river, say-
ing that "[d] irectly diverting waters in material quantities from a
navigable stream may be enjoined as a public nuisance. Neither
may the waters of a navigable stream be diverted in substantial
38. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
39. Id. at 251, 491 P.2d at 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
40. 146 U.S. 87 (1892) (state grants of submerged lands of Lake Michigan sub-
ject to a public trust). The National Audubon court, citing Illinois and others,
states that while earlier decisions applied the public trust only to tidelands, it has
become well settled that the public trust encompasses all navigable lakes and
streams. 33 Cal.1 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
41. 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935) (property owners in the vicinity of
Mono Lake entitled to substantial damages as compensation for appropriation of
their marginal property rights). "Mono Lake is a navigable body of water." Id. at
466, 52 P.2d at 588.
42. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
43. 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901).
44. 66 Cal. at 147, 4 P. at 1156.
45. Id. at 15 , 4 P. at 1159. One wonders whether plaintiffs will be able to use
the court's reliance on this language to their favor in future court battles. Later in
the decision, the court speaks of balancing the public trust interest in Mono Lake
with Los Angel s' need for water. But if the people's rights are "paramount and
controlling" an d the state's right "absolute", is there room for balancing? This is,
in fact, the most difficult issue raised by this case.
quantities by drawing from its tributaries ..... 46
The court, despite DWP's objection that Gold Run did not in-
volve diversion of water and Russ did not actually find an impair-
ment to navigation,47 made no attempt to distinguish the facts,
and held that the priorities in those cases applied fully to the situ-
ation at hand. In what may become buzz words in future cases of
this type, the court reasoned that "if you can't fill it, you can't
drain it."48 One of the most important factors of this decision
concerns the vesting of property. Parties who acquire rights in
property which is covered by the public trust can only acquire
those rights subject to the trust and, therefore, can assert no
vested right to use those ownership rights in a manner that is det-
rimental to the trust.49 The interest in public trust property can-
not be given away.5 0 By making all qualified property subject to a
46. 132 Cal. at 106, 64 P. at 114 (emphasis added).
47. 33 Cal. 3d at 436, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
48. Id. The court's actual words were: "If the public trust doctrine applies to
constrain fills which destroy navigation and other public trust uses in navigable
waters, it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys
navigation and other public interests. Both actions result in the same damage to
the public interest." Id. at 436-37, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357. See John-
son, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
233, 257-58 (1980); see also Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust
Easement for California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L REV. 357, 359-60 (1980). In
narrow language, the court declared that it "need not consider the question
whether the public trust extends for some purposes-such as protection of fishing,
environmental values, and recreation interests-to nonnavigable streams." 33 Cal.
3d at 437 n.19, 658 P.2d at 721 n.19, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358 n.19. See generallyWalston,
The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental
Remedy, 22 SANTA CiARA L. REV. 63, 85 (1982).
49. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (citing City of Berke-
ley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330
(1980), noting that Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), "remains
the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was decided.").
The court originally articulated a possible, but rare, exception to this policy: if
"(a) the Legislature intended to grant a right free of the trust ... and (b) either
the grant serves the purpose of the trust or the grantee, in reasonable reliance on
the grant, has rendered the property unsuitable for trust purposes." 33 Cal. 3d at
440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (emphasis added). The court modified its
opinion by deleting the language quoted above. See 33 Cal. 3d 726a (1983).
Legislative intent as expressed in part (a) of the exception would be difficult to
find under the decision in People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79
(1913) (action for title to tidelands conveyed by state commissioners pursuant to
statutory authorization). That court held that "statutes purporting to authorize
the abandonment of ... public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain whether
or not such was the legislative intention and that intent must be clearly expressed
or necessarily implied. It will not be implied if any other inference is reasonably
possible." Id. at 597, 138 P. at 88 (emphasis added).
50. In Illinois, the Court said: "A grant of all the lands under the navigable wa-
ters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power, and any
attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as
subject to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters ... than it can abdi-
cate its police powers. . . ." 146 U.S. at 453-54.
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public trust, this decision creates a possible taking problem.51
Yet, the court heads off any discussion of this by simply rejecting
the claim. "We do not divest anyone of title to property; the con-
sequence of our decision will be only that some landowners
whose predecessors i:n interest acquired property . . . will ...
hold it subject to the public trust."52 With this language, the court
sidesteps the classically sticky question of what constitutes a tak-
ing. In concl uding its discussion of the public trust, the court says
"[ilt is an a ation of the duty of the state to protect the peo-
ple's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tide-
lands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases
when the a andonment of that right is consistent with the pur-
poses of the trust."53
2. The relationship between the California Water Rights
System and the Public Trust Doctrine.
Water law in California is a combination of riparian and appro-
priative doctrines.54 The riparian doctrine confers upon the land-
owner water rights of any watercourse that is contiguous to his
land and fo use on his land. The appropriation doctrine, on the
other hand, allows for diversion of water for other than riparian
uses. Under either doctrine, water may be used, but not owned.55
To aid in setting priorities for water usage, the Water Commission
Act created the Water Board. The Board was given the duty of
providing an orderly method for the appropriation of the state's
waters,56 but this limited role was radically altered by a series of
events in 1 26. First, the Supreme Court of California decided
51. Taking property without just compensation is prohibited. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See generally Walston, supra note 48, at 85.
52. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 653 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (citing City of Berke-
ley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d at 532, 606 P.2d at 372, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 337). The
court also notes that "any improvements made on such lands could not be appro-
priated by the state without compensation." 33 Cal. 3d at 440 n.22, 658 P.2d at 723
n.22, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360 n.22 (citing Illinois Central. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at
455). The argument remains, however, that if there is a taking of property rights,
there is a "taking" which requires compensation. The counterargument is that
zoning has never been seen as a "taking", and no more rights are surrendered in
the public trust situation than in the zoning situation.
53. 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
54. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 307, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34
(1980) (gives ajbrief summary of early California water law).
55. 3 Wrriq, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, REAL PROPERTY 2232 (1973).
56. Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 95, 280
P.2d 1, 4 (1955)1.
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 57 holding that ri-
parian rights not only took priority over appropriations,5 8 but ri-
parian rights were also not limited by the doctrine of reasonable
use.59 In response to that decision, a constitutional amendment
was passed.60 That amendment established the state water policy
which requires that all uses of water shall conform to the stan-
dard of reasonable use.6 1 While the constitutional amendment it-
self did not actually expand the authority of the Water Board,
later statutory and judicial developments made it clear that the
Water Board had authority to oversee reasonable uses of water,62
safeguard the scarce water resources of the state,63 and in the
57. 200 Cal. 81, cert. granted, 274 U.S. 728 (1926), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 486
(1927) (per curiam) (action by riparian owner for injunction of diversions of water
by appropriator).
58. See also City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105 (1930),
cited by the court at 33 Cal. 3d at 442, 658 P.2d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
59. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison, 200 Cal. 81, 100-01 (1926).
60. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (enacted as art. XIV, § 3) reads in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this
State the general welfare requires that th6 water resources of the State be
put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of
water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be ex-
ercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the in-
terest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the
use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this
State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required
for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use
or unreasonable method of diversion of water. . . . This section shall be
self-executing, and the Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance
of the policy in this section contained.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (West Supp. 1983).
61. Public trust cases must also conform to this standard. Although the 1928
amendment declares in-stream uses as reasonable, the point is settled by statute.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971), provides that "[tIhe use of water for recrea-
tion and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a benefi-
cial use of water."
62. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935)
(rule of reasonable use applies to every water right and every method of diver-
sion); People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d
743, 749-50, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854-55 (1976) (use of water limited to reasonable use;
the court held diversion of water from Napa River for frost protection was reason-
able). See also CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971), which states in pertinent
part: "[T]he board shall consider the relative benefit to be derived from (1) all
beneficial uses of the water concerned" and "[t] he board may subject such appro-
priations to such terms and conditions as in its judgment will best develop, con-
serve and utilize in the public interest, the water sought to be appropriated." See
also Johnson Rancho County Water Dist. v. State Water Rights Bd., 235 Cal. App.
2d 863, 45 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965) (board is to consider variety of beneficial uses).
63. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35
(1980) (decision based on legislative intent to "vest in the board expansive powers
to safeguard the scarce water resources of the state"); see also Temescal Water
Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 280 P.2d 1 (1955) (board's decision
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process, weigh and protect the public trust values. 64
Although the public trust doctrine and the California water
rights system developed independently of one another, they be-
came intertwined through necessity. It is the nature of this rela-
tionship that is at issue. The DWP asserted that the public trust
was subsumed into the water rights system, 65 while the National
Audubon Society urged the court that the public trust is antece-
dent to those rights and thus controlling.66 The court, taking a
middle position, rejected both assertions and advocated a balanc-
ing test, stating that:
(B]oth the public trust doctrine and the water rights system embody im-
portant preceIpts which make the law more responsive to the diverse
needs and interests involved in the planning and allocation of water re-
sources. To embrace one system of thought and reject the other would
lead to an unbalanced structure, one which would either decry as a breach
of trust apprIpriations essential to the economic development of this
state, or denylany duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by
the public trust.6 7
In balancing these two precepts, the court made three conclu-
sions. First, the state, as sovereign, retains supervisory control
over all navigable waters; this "prevents any party from acquiring
a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the in-
terests protected by the public trust."68 Secondly, the Water
Board, by authority from the legislature, may grant permits for
certain parties to take water from flowing streams, "even [if] this
taking does not promote, and may unavoidably harm the trust
uses at the source stream. '69 The court's conclusion demon-
strates its awareness of the existing dependence of California's
economic and population centers upon appropriated water and
the practical need to make efficient use of the state's limited
water resources.7 0 Finally, the court interconnects the first two
to grant application to appropriate water held to be quasi-judicial and not
ministerial).
64. 33 Cal. 3d at 443-44, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
65. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
66. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
67. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
68. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
69. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The court notes, however,
that this does no affect the restrictions imposed by the public trust upon transfers
of properties that are free from the trust. Id. at 446 n.26, 658 P.2d at 727 n.26, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 364 p.26.
70. Id. at 4461 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The court goes so far as to
say that "it woul. I be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations are and have
always been improper to the extent that they harm public trust uses, and can be
conclusions by finding that the state has an affirmative duty to
consider the public trust "in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." 71
This finding imposes a duty on the Water Board to continue su-
pervision of the water supply after water has been allocated. The
result of the court's decision is that the Water Board is not con-
fined by past Board decisions; rather, it may reconsider past deci-
sions, including whether a diminished diversion from Mono Lake
would better serve the public's interest, in light of the impact of
water diversion on the Mono Lake environment.7 2
B. Question Two: Must Administrative Remedies Be Exhausted?
Before addressing the issue of concurrent jurisdiction of the
Water Board, the court questioned whether the plaintiffs had any
Water Board remedy to exhaust. Two possible grounds appeared:
(1) plaintiffs could claim DWP's diversion was an unreasonable
use of water in violation of the California Constitution; or (2)
plaintiffs could invoke California Water Code section 2501,73
which provides that the Board may determine all rights to water
justified only upon theories of reliance or estoppel." Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 364. The court also notes that the population and economy of this
state does not depend upon the conveyances of tidelands. Id. at 446 n.26, 658 P.2d
at 727 n.26, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.26. See also Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine
and California Water Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water
and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 668 (1982).
71. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The court also states
that "the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the
taking on the public trust [cites omitted] and to preserve, so far as consistent with
the public interest, the uses protected by the trust." Id. at 446-47, 658 P.2d at 728,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (emphasis added). The "so far as consistent" language may
be a future loophole for those appropriators who wish to receive more water.
72. 33 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66. The power to
reconsider is given to ,the board even if the public trust was considered when the
allocation decision was made. The case for reconsideration is stronger, however,
when the public trust has not been considered. Id. No responsible body, judicial
or administrative, has ever considered whether the gain of water to Los Angeles is
worth the loss to Mono Lake, or even whether a lesser taking would be a feasible
balance. As the court states, "[i] t is clear that some responsible body ought to re-
consider the allocation of the waters of the Mono Basin." Id. at 477, 658 P.2d at 729,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The court looks to CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 1971), which
states that "domestic purposes [are] the highest use of water and that the next
highest use is for irrigation." The court recognizes that section 106 must be read in
conjunction with later enactments that require consideration of in-stream uses,
such as CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243 and 1257 (West 1971), and also judicial decisions
which explain the policy behind the public trust doctrine. "Thus, neither domestic
and municipal uses nor in-stream uses can claim an absolute priority." 33 Cal. 3d
at 447 n.30, 658 P.2d at 729 n.30, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365 n.30.
73. CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971) states: "The board may determine,
the proceedings provided for in this chapter, all rights to water of a stream system
whether based upon appropriation, riparian right, or other basis of right." Id.
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of a stream system. 74 The plaintiffs carefully avoided and, indeed,
expressly disclaimed any interest in charging that DWP's use of
water is unreasonable, thereby making this remedy unavailable.
Further, by using section 2501, it is uncertain whether plaintiffs
would even be considered "claimants to water."7 5 The court, how-
ever, construed the legislative intent,76 and previous case law77 as
authorizing broad powers and jurisdiction to the Water Board.
The result of this broad authority permits a person claiming that
a use of water is harmful to public trust interests to seek a Board
determination of allocation of water in a stream system. 78 This in-
terpretation gives present and future plaintiffs a remedy that was
previously uncertain.
The existence of such a remedy induces the question of
whether the administrative remedies must be exhausted before
one may resort to the court because, "[ilt is well settled that
where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, that rem-
edy must be pursued and exhausted before the court will act. ' 79
Precedent, however, leads one to believe that the courts have con-
current jurisdiction with the Water Board.80 When the Water
74. Id.
75. CAL. WATER CODE § 2525 (West 1971) requires petitions to the Water Board
to be filed by "claimants to water of any stream system." The full statute reads:
Upon petition signed by one or more claimants to water of any stream
system, requesting the determination of the rights of the various claim-
ants to the water of that stream system, the board shall, if, upon investiga-
tion, it finds the facts and conditions are such that the public interest and
necessity willl be served by a determination of the water rights involved,
enter an order granting the petition and make proper arrangements to
proceed with the determination.
1943 Cal. Stat. ch.368, § 2525 (amended at Cal. Stat. ch. 1932, § 156).
76. 33 Cal. 3d at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366. "[W]e have dis-
cerned a legislative intent to grant the Water Board a 'broad', 'open-ended', 'ex-
pansive' authority to undertake comprehensive planning and allocation of water
resources." Id.
77. See In re jWaters of LDng Valley Creek Stream Sys. v. Ramelli, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 348-49, 599 P.2d 656, 661, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1979) (Board has power to adju-
dicate competing 'iparian claims); People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 308, 605 P.2d
859, 864-65, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35 (1980) (Board has power to adjudicate prescriptive
claims).
78. 33 Cal. 3d lat 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
79. Id. at 453,1658 P.2d at 733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(citing Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 292, 109 P.2d 942, 949
(1941)). It is the court's present interpretation of the power behind Water Code
section 2501, however, which gives the plaintiffs an administrative remedy. See
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. 33 Cal. 3d at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (citing Allen v. Califor-
nia Water and Tel. Co., 29 Cal. 2d 466, 176 P.2d 8 (1946)). Also, all of the public
Board had limited powers, 81 there were cases that the court had
to decide; where jurisdiction existed, claims were often filed di-
rectly in superior court.82 Since then, the court itself decided the
issue in favor of concurrent jurisdiction. In Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal Utility District83 [herein-
after "EDF II"] ,84 the court said:
Apart from overriding considerations such as are presented by health and
safety dangers involved in the reclamation of waste water, we are satisfied
that the courts have concurrent jurisdiction with... administrative agen-
cies to enforce the self-executing provisions of Article X, section 2. Pri-
vate parties thus may seek court aid in the first instance to prevent
unreasonable water use or unreasonable method [sic] of diversion.8 5
After citing EDF II, the court then decided whether it should
overturn that case. Some "overriding considerations" were
presented for granting the Water Board exclusive jurisdiction.
The majority decided to read EDF II narrowly, however, finding
that while health issues were involved with the Mono Lake con-
troversy, they were not of a nature analogous to the EDF II ex-
ception of reclamation of waste water.8 6 This interpretation
affirms the courts' concurrent jurisdiction with the Water Board.
In contrast, the dissent8 7 believed the health considerations of
Mono Lake were comparable to the water reclamation exception
in EDF II and that Mono Lake presented "similarly complex,
overriding and 'transcendent' issues which demand initial consid-
eration by the Water Board."88 The majority turned to balancing
various factors in determining whether EDF II should be over-
ruled.89 On one hand, there is the Water Board's experience and
expert knowledge combined with a duty of comprehensive plan-
trust cases cited in the opinion were filed directly in the courts. 33 Cal. 3d at 449,
658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
81. 33 Cal. 3d at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
82. Id.
83. 26 Cal. 3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980) (action challenging con-
struction and location of a dam and subsequent diversion of water from river;
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with legislatively established state ad-
minstrative agencies).
84. In Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. East Bar Mun. Util. Dist. [hereinaf-
ter "EDF I"], 20 Cal. 3d 327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977), the court held
that the plaintiffs action to enjoin the performance of a contract to build a dam,
thereby diverting water from the American River, was barred by a failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies. The United States Supreme Court, however, va-
cated and remanded in light of California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978),
thereby setting the stage for EDF H. 439 U.S. 811 (1978).
85. 26 Cal. 3d at 200, 605 P.2d at 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
86. 33 Cal. 3d at 450 n.31, 658 P.2d at 730 n.31, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368 n.31.
87. Id. at 453, 658 P.2d at 733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Richardson, J., concurring
and dissenting).
88. Id. at 455, 658 P.2d at 734, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Richardson, J., concurring
and dissenting).
89. See supra notes 10, 11 and 43 and accompanying text.
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ning, and on me other hand, there is a line of precedent and reli-
ance by the plaintiffs on that authority.90 Adding to the side of
precedent and reliance, the apparent legislative intent to have the
Water Board act as a referee or reference to the courts, 9 1 the
court held that EDF I and concurrent jurisdiction must con-
tinue.92 Justice Richardson, in his dissent,93 quoting from EDF I94
which was vacated, believed that the Water Board should have
exclusive juriIsdiction to facilitate full and effective use of its expe-
rience and expertise in balancing all of the competing interests.
95
Justice Kaus( in a concurring opinion,96 expressed a desire to
overturn EDF II, but also stated that it would be improper to ap-
ply the rule of exclusive jurisdiction to the plaintiffs in, the pres-
ent action beIcause of their justifiable reliance on the concurrent
jurisdiction as articulated in EDF II. 97 The Justice, by discussing
plaintiff's reliance, expressed a concept of fairness which was
probably a silent factor in the majority's determination. This con-
cept of fairness is fundamental; one should not switch rules "in
the middle of the game." If the court had accepted the dissent's
view and dismissed the case either by overruling EDF II or by de-
claring that .t fit the EDF H exception of overriding health and
safety issues, years of court time and expense, both for the legal
system and Tlhe parties involved, would have been wasted. Also,
instead of a fair determination of the merits, the complex proce-
dural tactics of the defendant would have prevailed. With the de-
90. 33 Cal. 3d at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368. See also supra notes
13, 75-79 and accompanying text.
91. See CAL! WATER CODE §§ 2000, 2001, 2075 (West 1971). Pertinent parts in-
clude section 200, which states that: "[iun any suit brought in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction in this State for determination of rights to water, the court may
order a reference to the board, as referee, of any or all issues involved in the suit";
section 2001, which states: "the court may refer the suit to the board for investiga-
tion of and report upon any or all of the physical facts involved"; and section 2075,
which states: "In case suit is brought in a federal court for determination of the
rights to water 'within or partially within, this State, the board may accept a refer-
ence of such suit as master or referee for the court."
92. 33 Cal. 3d at 451, 658 P.2d at 731-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
93. Id. at 453, 658 P.2d at 733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Richardson, J., dissenting
and concurring).
94. The United States Supreme Court vacated the court's judgment in EDF I
and remanded the case for consideration in light of California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645 (1978). 1EDF II, 26 Cal. 3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980).
95. 33 Cal. 3d at 455, 658 P.2d at 734, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
96. Id. at 453, 658 P.2d at 733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (Kaus, J., concurring).
97. Id.
cision for concurrent jurisdiction, the case can move forward and
hopefully reach a determination of the merits.
IV. THE IMPACT
Environmentalists may herald this decision as the "Savior of
Mono Lake," but the actual impact on the lake may not be real-
ized for several years. This ruling by the California Supreme
Court on California law will now be taken into federal court on
the district court level 98 where its holdings would be put into
practice. The district court will have to weigh the respective val-
ues of protecting the public trust in Mono Lake against the value
of the water being diverted.99 Each consideration encompasses
many facets; the priceless scenic beauty, the natural environ-
ment, and wildlife will be pitted against the economic and practi-
cal reliance of the Los Angeles basin on Mono Lake water for
domestic use. Regardless of the district court's decision, the de-
termined advocates on either side are unlikely to let the case drop
at the district court level; an appeal to the Ninth Circuit is bound
to follow.100 Despite the judicial system's attempt at effective and
speedy determinations, time, money, and effort will be expended
by both sides for years to come.
Although there is some question as to whether relief will arrive
in time to save the lake from destruction, it is certain that as a re-
sult of the recent court decision, change is imminent. One of the
significant changes will be in future decisions by the Water
Board. Presently the Board must consider the public trust inter-
est when allocating water resources.' 0 ' Delays in Water Board
hearings may arise because more facts must be gathered, but
there may also be a more careful allocation of very precious re-
sources, both in water and natural environments throughout the
state.
Another significant change is in the ownership of property
throughout California. Property subject to the trust and once
98. See generally 33 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 658 P.2d at 716-17, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
99. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
100. Even if the Audubon Society should be the ultimate winner in the courts,
DWP has a near fail-safe alternative-the legislature. Since Los Angeles is an im-
portant economic and population center, a city where the citizens' money and
power seem virtually endless, that city will have a strong lobby and bargaining po-
sition within the legislature. The citizens of Los Angeles hope to change the laws
to overrule the public trust doctrine in situations where water is essential to popu-
lation centers. Of course, this would not be a totally one-sided fight. As we have
seen, the public, represented by such groups as the National Audubon Society and
the Mono Lake Committee, will be sure to let their views be known. Protecting
the environment has become an important interest, but then, so is turning on the
tap and having water readily available for one's use.
101. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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owned totally in fee simple is now owned subject to the public
trust. 0 2 The exact property to which the new restriction will ap-
ply, however, remains in question. The language in Marks, 1 0 3
which makes the public trust flexible so that it can adapt to
changing public needs,l0 4 was interpreted by the court to include
in the public trust all non-navigable streams which affect naviga-
ble lakes. 0 5 The Marks '0 6 language, with the support of this deci-
sion, can be utilized to incorporate other properties into the
public trust as well. This stretching of the public trust ensures
that California's valuable environmental resources will, at the
very least, not be thoughtlessly and ruthlessly destroyed, but
rather any diminishing of value will be weighed against the bene-
fit to be gained. 0 7 This does not guarantee that California's re-
sources will be maintained; it only assures that the public trust
must be taken into consideration. This is certainly a step in the
right direction.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has taken a giant step forward in
recognizing a system that can work to protect the environment.
The public has a viable interest in its environment and its scarce
resources, and the public trust doctrine ensures this interest will
at least be considered, and hopefully protected. The effectiveness
of this protection remains to be seen. Will the DWP continue to
divert the amount of water it wants or will Los Angeles have to
learn to live without Mono Basin water? Moderation and compro-
mise seem to Tbe the best solution. How the public trust doctrine
will actually affect Mono Lake and similar future regions remains
to be seen.
102. Id. at 437,1658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
103. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); see supra note 6 and ac-
companying text.
104. See supra notes 20 and 36 and accompanying text.
105. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
106. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
107. 33 Cal. 3dl at 447. 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
XXIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Special risk exception to the coming and going rule
may apply to an employee who has left the
employer's premises: Parks v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board
In Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 1 the court
confronted the question of when the cloak of workers' compensa-
tion insurance ceases to protect an employee at the end of a
working day.2 At issue was whether a school teacher was entitled
to benefits when she was assaulted in her car immediately after
leaving a school parking lot after work, under circumstances in
which the teacher's car was "immobilized by departing school
children who blocked the traffic." 3 The resolution of this question
required application of the "going and coming rule" and the rule's
"special risk" exception.4 While the court broke no legal ground
concerning the nature of the theory, the case represents the first
time that the court has expressly held that the special risk excep-
tion to the going and coming rule may apply to an employee who
has left the employer's premises and is on her way home.5
Ms. Parks taught kindergarten through third grade at a school
1. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983). (Bird, C.J., with Mosk,
Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso and Grodin, JJ., concurring; Richardson, J., dissenting).
The case was heard on appeal from the decision of the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board (WCAB).
2. In order to understand the policy considerations underlying any decision
dealing with workers' compensation, it is necessary to keep in mind the overall
purpose of the scheme:
The primary purpose of the workers' compensation law is to insure an
injured employee and those dependent on him adequate means of subsis-
tence while he is unable to work, and to bring about his recovery as soon
as possible in order that he may be returned to productive employment.
Liability for an employee's injury is placed, as part of the cost of produc-
tion, on the business or industry in which the employee was engaged.
Liability for the employee's injury, where the conditions essential to the
application of the act concur, is imposed on the employer regardless of
negligence. The theory, unlike that of the common law, is not to provide
indemnity for negligent acts or compensation for legal wrongs, but to fur-
nish economic insurance, although the act does not make the employer an
insurer of the employee at all times during the period of employment.
65 CAL. JuR. 3d, Work Injury Compensation § 1, at 20-21 (1981).
3. 33 Cal. 3d at 587, 660 P.2d at 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
4. In short, the "going and coming rule" provides that there is no workers'
compensation protection for an employee on the way to or from work. The "spe-
cial risk exception" to this rule provides for such protection where, due to peculiar
circumstances, an employee is exposed to special risks going and coming to work
because of the work's location or other factors. Both of these doctrines are dis-
cussd more fully infra at notes 11, 18, and 19.
5. "The California cases have not applied the exception to an employee ...
driving home directly after work." 33 Cal. 3d at 590, 660 P.2d at 385, 190 Cal. Rptr.
at 161 (emphasis in original).
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in Watts (a subdivision of Los Angeles).6 At the end of a winter
school day in 1979, she left school with a group of teachers and
walked to her car.7 Shortly after exiting the parking lot, she
stopped her car for a group of children crossing the street on their
way home from school. While she was stopped, three youths
ripped open the door on her car, forcibly grabbed her purse and
fled.8
As a result of the incident, Ms. Parks was unable to return to
work for three weeks due to the physical and emotional trauma
caused by the attack.9 A workers' compensation claim was ffled l0
and an award was granted by a workers' compensation judge.
The school district appealed the decision to the WCAB, which re-
scinded the a ward. Parks then appealed to the supreme court.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Bird observed that the
ultimate issue presented to the court was a "simple" one:
Does the fact that Parks was leaving her job after work and had driven a
short distance down a public street at the time the injury occurred auto-
matically bring her case within the proscription of the so-called "going
and coming,; rule?11
The "going and coming" rule springs from a basic tenet of the pol-
icy behind workers' compensation: the protection afforded applies
only to injuries suffered "in the course of employment." 12 Gener-
ally, traveling to and from work is considered to be outside the
course of employment. 13 As the court notes, the rule seems sim-
6. Watts isl not generally regarded as a crime free neighborhood.
7. It was customary for the teachers to leave in groups for purposes of safety.
8. A quick reading of the majority opinion implies that the thieves may have
been school children; however, the dissent emphasized that the villians were un-
identified. 33 Cal. 3d at-593, 660 P.2d at 387, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
9. Parks suffered pain in her shoulder, experienced periodic dizziness for
some time after the attack, and developed an anxiety about being alone upon en-
tering or leaving school grounds. Eventually she sought a transfer to another
school. Id. at 587, 660 P.2d at 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
10. In this case, there was no other party from which to seek recovery. Per-
sons seeking workers' compensation benefits are best advised to seek compensa-
tion from a tortfeasor without the shield of their employer's immunity. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1983). Workers' compensation provides only for re-
habilitation and lost pay-not for all generally conpensable injury; thus, workers'
compensation is a sure but very shallow pocket.
11. 33 Cal. d at 588, 660 P.2d at 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
12. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1983). The "course of employ-
ment" generally means the "time, place, and circumstance" surrounding an injury.
See 2 HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 9.0(1) (b) (2d ed. 1983).
13. The court had previously discussed the going and coming rule in Hinjosa
ple enough, but its application may be an arduous task. When
does the employee cross the magic line-when he walks out the
workplace door, when he is a mile away, or somewhere in be-
tween? A bright line test is not practical. Hence, the courts have
devised a number of exceptions to the rule so as to implement the
doctrine in "marginal situations," one of which is the "special risk
exception." 14 This exception provides for compensation where
"the employment creates a special risk," provided that the inju-
ries are "sustained within the field of that risk."15
In General Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, 16 the court set forth a two-pronged test for the application
of the special risk exception. It will apply "(1) if 'but for' the em-
ployment the employee would not have been at the location
where the injury occurred, and (2) if 'the risk is distinctive in na-
ture or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public.' "17
The court observed that there was no question that, but for her
teaching position, Parks would never have been in the vicinity of
her injury. Therefore, the question was whether that risk was dis-
tinctive in nature, or more likely to happen to Parks than to the
general public.18
Noting that no California case had applied the special risk ex-
ception specifically where the employee was away from the em-
v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d 150, 153-60, 501 P.2d 1176, 1178-83, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 458-63 (1972). This rule seems consistent with those in other areas of the
law: for purposes of employer liability, a person driving from home to work is sel-
dom found to be in the course of his employment. Likewise, commuting expenses
are generally said to be incurred without the scope of one's employment and are
therefore not deductible for tax purposes.
14. The other exceptions apply where the employee is on a "special mission,"
where transportation provided or required by the employer is utilized, where
there is an agreement that travel time is to be compensated, where the employee
is traveling from one place of work to another, where the employee is traveling on
business, or where the employee is required to live or board on the employer's
premises. See 65 CAL. Jun. 3d, Work Injury Compensation §§ 102-108 (1981).
Another method of dealing with the harshness of the rule is to abolish it. Both
Michigan and New Jersey have taken this route. See 1 LARSON, THE LAw OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.12 (1982). The rule has likewise been dropped in Ger-
many (where the first workers' compensation law was enacted in 1884) and in
France. See Hammond v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 56 N.J. 7, 1.2 n.3, 264 A.2d 204,
207 n.3 (1970). As to the early history of workers' compensation in Europe, see J.
SMrrii, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICES § 1.2, 3 (1973).
15. 33 Cal. 3d at 589, 660 P.2d at 384, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (citing Freire v. Mat-
son Navigation Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 11, 118 P.2d 809, 811 (1941)). See also General Ins.
Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 600-01, 546 P.2d 1361, 1363-64, 128
Cal. Rptr. 417, 419-20 (1976).
16. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
17. 33 Cal. 3d at 590, 660 P.2d at 385, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (quoting General Ins.
Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 600-01, 546 P.2d 1361, 1364, 128
Cal. Rptr. 417, 419-20 (1976)). The court clearly sets forth the two-pronged test for
the first time in the instant case.
18. 33 Cal. 3d at 592, 660 P.2d at 386, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
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ployer's premises and on the way home, the court pointed to a
pair of prior decisions applying the exception. One case allowed
recovery where it was clear that the employee had yet to reach
the employer's premises at the time of the accident,19 the other
where the employee's location was uncertain.20 Hence, it was
concluded that the claimant need not be on the employer's prem-
ises at the time of the accident. It was also observed that other
states have applied the rule where the claimant was similarly just
leaving the employer's premises. 21
Addressing the second prong, the court noted that Parks was
"regularly subjected at the end of each day's work to the risk of
becoming blocked by school children and becoming a 'sitting
duck' for assault. .... Her risk was clearly 'quantitatively greater'
than that to which passing motorists might be subjected to on a
19. See R.G. Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407
P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965). In Greydanus the claimant was a few feet short
of his employer's premises:
Basterretche was permanently employed to milk cows at the dairy oper-
ated by petitioner R.G. Greydanus. As required, he reported for work
each morning at 4:30 a.m. at the milking barn situated beside a two-lane
highway near Chino. In order to reach the barn it was necessary to turn
off the highway into a short driveway leading to the barn. On the morning
of March 20, 1963, as Basterretche proceeded in his automobile to turn left
off the highway to drive to the barn, his vehicle was struck by a truck
which was attempting to pass him on the left. At the time of the impact
Basterretche had completed his turn, and his car was headed directly to-
ward the barn. The wheels were a few feet short of touching the apron of
the driveway, but most of the vehicle was over the highway lane he was
crossing. Basterretche received multiple injuries for which the commis-
sion awarded compensation.
Id. at 491, 407 P.2d. at 297-98, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
20. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170
P.2d 18 (1946) (where the court found that, although the claimant had only entered
the means of access to the employment premises, compensation should not be de-
nied because the field of the risk to which he was subjected encompassed that
area).
21. See Oliver v. Wyandotte Indus. Corp., 308 A.2d 860 (Me. 1972) (where com-
pensation was awarded to claimant injured off the employer's premises due to a
dangerous condition on the employer's premises); Notowitz v. Rose Towel & Linen
Supply Co., 36 A.D.2d 543, 316 N.Y.S.2d 694, aft'd, 29 N.Y.2d 502, 272 N.E.2d 485, 323
N.Y.S.2d 975 (1971) (claimant assaulted by men just outside the workplace).
The California court noted:
The teaching of these cases from sister jurisdictions as well as our own
decisions in] Henslick and Greydanus is clear. Compensation will be al-
lowed for injuries off the work premises both before or after work if the
injury occurs within the field of a risk created by the employment. This is
true whether the employment creates a risk in gaining entry to the work-
place or in exiting therefrom.
33 Cal. 3d at 592, 660 P.2d at 386, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
sporadic or occasional basis."22
Ultimately, it must be kept in mind that Parks is a classic
"hard" case-and hard cases traditionally make bad law. Hence,
Parks should not be viewed as a green light to award compensa-
tion for all ills that befall a worker going or coining from work
when that harm occurs a "few blocks" or more from the work-
place. The moment an employee leaves the premises, or until he
gets there, there must be some causal link between the injury and
the employment to support a compensation award. The further
away from the premises that the injury occurs, the stronger the
causal link must be.23 In establishing this sliding scale, Parks
blurs the bright line at the edge of the employer's premises, but
allows compensation decisions more in accord with the policy
considerations behind workers' compensation than the simple
bright line test.
KEVIN CHARLES BOYLE
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22. 33 Cal. 3d at 592, 660 P.2d at 386, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162. The dissent rejected
this conclusion: "The hazard which caused petitioner's injury, the 'hit and run' as-
sault by unidentified criminals, was not 'special' to her, nor was it a 'special risk' of
her employment as a teacher, nor was it 'causally' related to the school. It was a
common danger to which the public in general was and is equally susceptible."
Id. at 594, 660 P.2d at 388, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (Richardson, J., dissenting). In sup-
port of this conclusion, Richardson pointed to the court's finding in General Insur-
ance Co., where the claimant was struck and killed while exiting from his car
across the street from work. General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16
Cal. 3d at 598, 546 P.2d at 1362, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 418. The dissenting Justice be-
lieved that the General Insurance Co. claimant's risk of being struck by a passing
motorist was common to the general public, as was Mrs. Parks' risk of being as-
saulted by thieves when her car was stopped. This analogy ignores a crucial dis-
tinction: the traffic on the road was not directly related to the employer's business
in General Insurance Co., while the children who were blocking the street were a
direct result of the employer's "business" in Parks. That Ms. Parks may just as
well have been stopped by a light is irrelevant-a case is decided by the facts that
exist, not the facts that might have been.
23. Compare Greydanus v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407
P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965) and Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946), with General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
